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Abstract
The presence of the bid-ask spread causes equilibrium 
prices to deviate from transaction prices. More 
importantly, the components of the spread - the order 
component, the inventory component, and the information 
component - have different impacts on transaction prices.
In general, the order and the inventory components induce 
negative correlation in successive transaction price 
changes. On the other hand, transaction prices will form a 
martingale if only the information component exists. This 
dissertation is composed of three related essays that 
utilize this general relationship between transaction prices 
and the components of the spread. The first essay employs a 
cross-sectional analysis that relates components of the 
spread (costs of specialists) to measures of market 
activity, risk, and information risk. Primary results 
indicate that information component is positively related to 
transaction size and insider holdings. The order component 
is positively associated with number of transactions. 
Institutional holdings is negatively related to the order 
and the inventory components. The second essay gives 
empirical evidence that trading activity, price variability, 
information component are higher in the opening
v
transactions. On the other hand, order component, inventory 
component, and a measure of the transaction cost are 
estimated to be lower in the opening. These results give 
support to the importance of liquidity trading and the role 
of transaction costs. For the last trading hour, there are 
significant changes in trading activity and price 
variability without significant changes in components of 
spread, which is consistent with the previous finding of a 
positive relationship between volume and price changes.
Some problems remain in the estimation of components of the 
spread. Therefore, caution must be taken with respect to 
results provided in essay one and two. A model that relates 
components of order imbalances (net volumes) and components 
of the spread is established in the third essay. The main 
result highlights the potentially important role of order 
imbalances in the information process. That is, variations 
in order imbalances give information concerning the degree 
of informational asymmetry in financial markets.
Chapter I
Introduction
In classical economic analysis, the existence of a 
Walrasian auctioneer assures that prices instantaneously 
converge to equilibrium prices. In reality, not all markets 
have such a perfect setting. Often traders have to rely on 
some imperfect substitutes such as a dealership market. To 
maintain a continuous and liquid market, a dealer stands 
ready to trade with incoming orders for his/her own account. 
In assuming this task, however, dealers bear some costs and 
incur some risk that must be compensated for. Therefore, 
the dealer buys low and sells high in order to cover the 
cost. The difference between dealer's purchase and sale 
prices is termed the dealer's bid-ask spread. Demsetz 
(1968) pioneers the study of the bid-ask spread and 
hypothesizes that the spread is a compensation to the dealer 
for providing immediacy to the traders. What is still 
unclear is the complete nature of the cost(s) of providing 
such services.
Stoll (1978) states that there are three main costs 
that a dealer might face : orders processing cost, inventory 
cost and information cost. Earlier studies focus on the
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inventory implications of trades to the dealer. The dealer, 
as many other investors, seeks diversification and has a 
desired inventory level for the stock the dealer specializes 
in. This means inventory imbalances present a cost to the 
dealer. Ordering costs are those incurred in handling 
orders such as communication and clerical costs. 
Surprisingly, not many studies have been devoted solely to 
the investigation of ordering costs. One natural question 
is whether the dealer industry is characterized by economies 
of scale or economies of scope in ordering costs. Answer to 
this question is still unclear at this stage.
Bagehot (1971) first points out another type of cost 
that is potentially important. Knowing the possibility that 
the trade may be originated by a trader with superior 
information over the dealer, the dealer will adjust the 
quoted price so as to make up the loss to informed traders. 
Eventually, the dealer loses to informed traders and gains 
from uninformed traders.
The studies in the bid-ask spread and the components of 
the spread have important implications for many other areas 
in finance. First, the spread introduces noise into 
transaction prices. The earliest study goes back to 
Neiderhoffer and Osborne (1966). These authors show that 
there is a general tendency for price reversal between 
trades and suggest the spread as being one of the causes for 
price reversal. In a theoretical paper, Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) show that different types of costs affect transaction 
prices differently. More explicitly, Glosten (1987) shows 
that the ordering/inventory cost produces biases in mean 
return, variance and serial covariance while the information 
cost attenuates the biases. This indicates that knowledge 
of the magnitude of the spread as well as the composition of 
the spread is needed to correct biases induced by the 
spread. Second, the information cost model ia strongly 
related to market operations and market efficiency. Being a 
central figure in the market, how does a dealer react to 
trades that may or may not originate from an informed 
trader? Easley and O'Hara (1985) give an intriguing 
discussion of market efficiency and the role of dealer's 
trading activity. Third, these studies are relevant for 
making decisions about the regulation of the security 
industry. For example, a large order cost suggests the 
security industry is not operated efficiently. Fourth, 
since the spread represents a form of transaction cost to 
investors, the bid-ask spread can be used as an indicator of 
market liquidity. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) hypothesize 
there is a transactions cost clientele and show that 
expected return is an increasing and concave function of the 
spread. Increasingly, other types of applications can also 
be found. Barclay and Smith (1988), for example, explore 
the information implication of spread adjustment to 
corporate repurchase announcements.
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to further 
extend the analysis of the components of the bid-ask spread, 
with particular emphasis on the application and extension of 
the concept of the components of the spread. The 
dissertation is composed of three separate essays, although 
they are strongly related. Also, although the dealer 
function is frequently observed on other markets (e.g., used 
car market), we focus on dealers on the organized stock 
exchanges (i.e., specialists).
To empirically estimate the magnitude of the three 
components of the spread has been shown to be difficult.
For one thing, the precise nature of inventory and 
information costs is subjective and therefore an objective 
measure of these costs appears to be lacking. Ho and Maoris
(1984) and Glosten and Harris (1988) utilize the intuition 
provided by Glosten and Milgrom to estimate the components 
of the spread. Nevertheless, each estimation approach 
assumes the absence of a certain component of spread. A 
more general approach can be found in Stoll (1989) that 
extends Roll's (1984) analysis in measuring the effective 
spread. In testing his model, Stoll (1989) uses daily 
closing data. The first essay applies Stoll's analysis to 
transaction-by-transaction data, which is more appropriate 
for his model. More importantly, we apply a slight variant 
of his approach so that the complete nature of dealer's 
costs can be studied.
Recent studies (e.g., Foster and Viswanathan (1988)) 
find that volume and price variability are higher in the 
opening and the closing hours. Satisfactory explanation for 
these results is still lacking. These results are 
consistent with investors' minimization of the transaction 
cost if the transaction cost is lower in the opening and the 
closing periods. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) present a 
more restricted model based on the notion of minimization of 
the information cost. Their model, as well as other 
explanations that may be consistent with the concentration 
of volume and price variability, are tested in the second 
essay.
The trading volume can be broadly decomposed into two 
components : the information-motivated and the liquidity 
-motivated trading. Observed trading activity then reflects 
the interaction between informed and uninformed traders. In 
the third essay, an attempt is made to link together the 
concept of the components of the spread and the concept of 
the components of trading volume. The intuition behind this 
is that the components of the spread reflect the degree of 
informational asymmetry between the dealer and traders while 
the components of trading volume reflect the degree of 
informational asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
traders. Combination of these two pieces of information 
should be valuable in inferring the degree of informational 
asymmetry in financial markets.
Since these three essays are strongly related, Chapter 
II gives a comprehensive literature review so that the 
reader can more easily grasp the relationship among these 
essays. Chapters III, IV, and V present the results of 
essay one, two and three, respectively. Chapter VI 
concludes this dissertation.
Chapter II
Literature Review 
II.A. The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread
The bid-ask spread is generally viewed as a composition 
of three types of costs faced by the dealer1 : the ordering 
cost, the inventory cost and the information cost 
components, ignoring the potential monopoly rent that the 
dealer may enjoy. Absence of monopoly power may be 
approximately true for specialists in NYSE because they face 
competition such as traders submitting limit orders, floor 
traders, large block brokers and dealers on other exchanges. 
On the other hand, monopoly power may be also absent in the 
NASDAQ market where a system of multiple market makers is 
employed. The degree of competition is usually assumed to 
be great so that the spread does not contain a monopoly 
component.
The inventory cost arises from the diversification need 
of the dealer. In this context, a desired level of the 
inventory for the dealer is usually assumed. Moving away
1Dealer is a more general terminology. The specialists 
on organized exchanges and the market makers on the options 
market and NASDAQ market are performing the dealer function.
from the desired inventory level is undesirable to the 
dealer and the dealer will attempt to adjust the quoted 
price in order to restore his/her desired inventory level. 
The inventory cost is modeled by Garman (1976), Bradfield 
(1979), Amihud and Mendleson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1981), 
Mildenstein and Schleef (1983) and O'Hara and Oldfield
(1986). These studies differ with respect to the dealer's 
utility function, the degree of competition among dealers, 
and the stochastic arrival of orders. Generally, they show 
that optimal quoted prices are function of the dealer's 
desired inventory position.
Since Bagehot (1971), many studies model information 
cost based on the asymmetric information between the dealer 
and the traders. Nevertheless, these models often follow 
diverse approaches. Copeland and Galai (1983) model spread 
being equivalent to writing a combination of put and call 
options to informed traders. According to the option 
pricing theory, the spread is then a function of stock 
return variances. Other models focus on the role of the 
informational asymmetry in a dynamic trading environment. 
Kyle (1985) develops a sequential equilibrium model in which 
a single informed trader can choose the timing of his/her 
trading. His/her information is gradually revealed to the 
public through a number of trades. Further, the speed of 
revelation of information through trades depends on several 
market activity variables such as the depth of the market
(i.e., amount of uninformed trading or noise trading). The 
basic intuition is that informed trader will prefer to trade 
in a deeper market where the cost of trade is lower. Easley 
and O'Hara (1987) hypothesize that the trade size is an 
important factor since informed traders will prefer to trade 
large quantities to maximize their profit. The impact of 
the information component on transaction prices will be 
discussed in section C. More discussion of the role of 
informational asymmetry in the trading dynamics can be found 
in section E.
One shortcoming of the previous research is that the 
potential monopoly power of specialists is not explicitly 
considered. Glosten (1989) provides a rationale for the 
coexistence of the specialist system and the multiple market 
makers system. If the information problem is severe in the 
market, a competitive market making system would likely 
result in a market shut-down. Under the specialist system, 
the market will likely remain open even in the presence of 
severe information asymmetry, since the specialist likely 
enjoys some monopoly power and can make up today's losses in 
the future. However, specialists do face some competition, 
and the issue of the degree of competition is clearly an 
empirical one.
II. B. Determinants of the (Total) Spread
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Another class of literature is less model-specific; 
instead it presents the more general notion that the spread 
is a function of several important variables such as market 
activity, risk, and the degree of competition.
Demsetz (1968) provides the theoretical foundation for 
the bid-ask spread as well as the first empirical test of 
the determinants of the spread. In his test, the magnitude 
of the spread is used as the dependent variable.
Independent variables that proxy for the level of trading 
activity and the degree of competition are used to explain 
the variations in the magnitude of the spread.
Tinic (1972), Tinic and West (1972), Benston and 
Hagerman (1974), Hamilton (1976), Branch and Freed (1977) 
and Stoll (1978a) generally follow Demsetz' approach with 
some refinement in the measurement of the market activity, 
risk, and competition. The intuition of their studies is 
simple. Since the magnitude of the spread represents the 
costs of the dealer, it should be related to the scale and 
the riskiness of his/her business. Generally speaking, 
these empirical studies find that the level of stock price, 
volume, number of dealers, number of transactions, and 
number of shareholders to be negatively related to the 
magnitude of the bid-ask spread. Measures of risk (either 
unsystematic or total risk) and measures of insider risk are 
positively associated with the magnitude of the spread.
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In addition to the measurement problem that is often 
encountered in this type of study, there is another problem 
that is often ignored. That is, some empirical findings can 
be consistent with any of the three views of spread and can 
be interpreted differently. For instance, a strong negative 
relationship between the total spread and volume can be 
consistent with the economies of scale in a purely order 
cost environment. The same relationship can also be 
consistent with the information model that says greater 
market depth should induce lower spread.
Furthermore, these studies do not consider adjustments 
in the location of the quoted prices. This point is fairly 
important and will be made clearer when the relationship 
between transaction prices and the components of the spread 
is addressed in the following section.
II.C. Bid-Ask Spread and Transaction Prices
A number of studies have noted that the spread 
influences transaction prices.2 However, it is not until 
Roll (1984) that the relationship between the spread and 
transaction prices has presented itself with a practical 
use. Recognizing that some transactions are within the
2See, for example, Neiderhoffer and Osborne (1966), 
Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1978, 1979), Goldman 
and Beja (1979).
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spread and that the quoted spread is not an accurate measure 
of the actual spread, Roll proposes a measure of the 
effective spread.
If no information arrives at the market and if the 
magnitude of the spread remains constant, all transactions 
will be conducted on either the ask price or the bid price. 
There is no possibility of successive price changes 
occurring in the same direction. Therefore, the covariance 
of price changes will be generally negative. Moreover, the 
absolute value of the covariance reflects the magnitude of 
the effective spread. Roll shows that the effective spread 
equals 2,/-covP, where covP is the covariance of transaction 
price changes.
Roll's model corresponds to the purely ordering cost 
environment in that the dealer, when knowing there is 
neither possibility of informed trading nor need to maintain 
a particular inventory level, will not adjust prices to 
trades. Therefore, it is a rather simplified model. A 
complete model requires specifying the relationship between 
transaction prices and the inventory cost, and between 
transaction prices and the information cost.
In their seminal paper, Glosten and Milgrora (1985) show 
that transaction prices will form a martingale with informed 
trading but exhibit negative serial correlation when trading 
is liquidity-motivated. This result lays the foundation for 
the analysis of the components of the spread.
The impact of the order cost on transaction prices has 
been explained. The inventory cost also produces negative 
covariance of price changes. If the inventory level is 
above (below) the desired level, the quoted price is 
adjusted downward (upward) in order to induce offsetting 
trades. This means trade types (purchase or sale) as well 
as successive price changes will be generally negatively 
correlated. Although negative covariance of price changes 
is also expected under the order cost environment, the order 
cost differs from the inventory cost in that no adjustment 
in quoted price is predicted.
Under the information cost model, the quoted price is 
adjusted downward (upward) if an investor sells to 
(purchases from) the dealer. This is because an investor's 
sale (purchase) implies the true price of the security is 
lower (higher). Therefore, inventory and information models 
predict similar price adjustment by the dealer. The key 
difference between the inventory and the information cost 
models lies in the changes in the perceived true price.
Under the inventory cost model, the true price remains to be 
the same, but under the information cost model, the true 
price is conveyed to the dealer through types of trades.
More importantly, since the perceived true price is revised 
accordingly, an upward (downward) adjustment in the quoted 
price does not necessarily induce a sale (purchase).
Rather, the movement of quoted prices reflects the arriving
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of private information and no dependence in successive price 
changes is predicted.
Note that in the inventory model the impact of trades 
on quotes is transitory since the true price remains to be 
the same. On the other hand, the information model predicts 
that the impact is permanent since the dealer permanently 
revises the true price according to types of trades.
Glosten and Harris (1988) thus refer to the information 
component as the permanent component and the inventory/order 
component as the transitory component.
Glosten (1987) further elaborates the difference 
between the permanent component and the transitory 
component. He shows that only the transitory component will 
induce statistical biases in mean return, variance and 
serial covariance but the information component attenuates 
the biases. Additionally, Glosten shows that, if there is 
an additional information component, the serial covariance 
of transaction price changes is equal to -0.25ctS2, where a 
is the proportion of the sum of the order cost and the 
information cost due to the order cost, and S is the total 
proportional spread. This implies Roll's measure of 
effective spread, 2/-covP, is an upward biased estimator of 
the order cost.
There are two related studies that point to factors 
influencing quote adjustment. Schultz, Gustavson and Reily
(1985) provide an experimental test (rather than a
statistical test) of factors influencing the setting of 
opening prices. With the assistance of some specialists, 
these authors design an experiment so as to determine the 
relative importance of the following factors in the setting 
of opening prices : current demand/supply, the number of 
limit orders, inventory position, price trend, and volume 
trend. Six NYSE specialists participate in this experiment 
and the test results show that current demand and supply is 
the most important factor; price trend and volume trend do 
not appear to be very important; limit orders and inventory 
position are modestly important. The shortcomings of their 
study are that the experimental design is limited to the 
opening quotations and that the sample is fairly small. 
Another study by Marsh and Rock (1986) finds a statistically 
positive relationship between percentage changes in quoted 
prices and measures of order imbalances (net number of 
trades, net volume).
II.D. Estimating the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread3
Ho and Maoris (1984) and Glosten and Harris (1988) 
discern the components of the spread from transaction price
3I benefit greatly from Jameson (1988) with respect to 
some of the points made in this section. Of course, any 
error is mine alone.
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changes. The two models utilize similar concept and can be 
summarized as follows.
The transaction price equals to the true price plus 
the price effect of three components of spread.
Pt = Mt + CQt - H(It - I*) + ZQb
where Pt = transaction price at time t 
Mt = true price at time t
Qt = an indicator which = 1 if an investor buys
=-1 if an investor sells
It = dealer's inventory level at time t
X* = dealer's desired inventory level
C = ordering cost component
H = inventory cost component
Z = information cost component
The dealer adjusts the true price downward (upward) 
if an investor sells (buys). The true price revision is 
therefore :
Mt = Mt_! + ZQt-i + et
where et = a random terra describing the arrival of 
public information.
If all transactions are of unit trade, then 
It =  It-i ”  Qt-i
17
Taking the first difference of prices and substituting 
the above two equations, the following obtains.
Dfc = pt - Pt-1 = (c + Z) (Qt - Qt-i) + (H + Z)Qt.1 + et .. (I) 
Equivalently :
Dt = Pt - Pt-! = C(Qt - Qt.i) + HQt-j + ZQt + et ......  (II)
Given Dt and Qt, the simultaneous estimation of C, H, 
and Z is still not possible unless any of C, H or Z is 
known. This is because an estimation of equation (I) 
provides estimates for (C+Z) and (H+Z), but these two 
estimates are insufficient to decompose the spread into 
three components. Ho and Macris ignore Z while Glosten and 
Harris basically treat H and C as one component; and 
therefore they are able to solve the estimation problem. 
Since theory predicts these three components of the spread 
affect transaction prices differently, both Ho/Macris and 
Glosten/Harris are not entirely satisfactory.
Additionally, Ho and Macris have the knowledge of Qt 
while Glosten and Harris do not. In the latter case, the 
authors assume some prior distribution for Qt and then use 
maximum likelihood estimation to estimate Qt, Z and C. The 
possibility of size-dependent components is also considered 
in their test. Specifically, Glosten and Harris assume both
18
the ordering/inventory and information components are linear 
in transaction size. That is :
Dt = Pt - P,^ = (C0 + C ^ )  (Qt - Qt-J + (Z0 + Z^ t)Qt + et
Where C is now the sum of the inventory and the order 
components and Vt is the transaction size at time t. They 
find, through a specification search, that the most useful 
model is one that assuming Z0 = Cx = 0, constant eb mean and 
variance without accounting for the discreteness in prices. 
That is, the information component is dependent on the 
transaction size but the inventory/ordering component is 
not. Nevertheless, it is suspected that the specification 
of trade size dependent components does not necessarily 
outperform one that trade size does not play a crucial role, 
since it is possible that linear trade size function may be 
misspecified.
Stoll (1989) presents another type of approach. His 
basic insight is that the three views of spread predict 
different values for two summary parameters for price 
changes; the probability of price reversal (hereinafter, n) 
and the magnitude of price reversal as a proportion of 
spread (hereinafter, 1-6). Price reversal here refers to 
consecutive trades of different type (e.g., a purchase is 
followed by a sale).
The probability of a sell or buy is equally likely 
under ordering cost and information cost models. In 
contrast, under the inventory model, if a dealer is 
satisfied with the current inventory position, an investor's 
sale (purchase) will always induce the dealer to adjust the 
spread downward (upward) to induce an offsetting trade.
Once the desired inventory position is regained, there is no 
further incentive for the dealer to adjust the spread. 
Therefore, under the inventory model, n is within the range 
of 0.5 and 1. If the inventory effect is strong, the value 
of 7r should be close to 1.0.
Assuming that inventory cost is linear in the size of 
the inventory and symmetric with respect to a purchase or a 
sale, the magnitude of price change will be one half of the 
spread. Assume under the information model dealer's 
response to buy or sell is symmetric,4 S should also equal 
to one half of the spread. The ordering cost component 
differs from the information and the inventory components in 
that there is no adjustment in dealer's quoted prices. The 
magnitude of price change will be equal to the size of the 
spread (i.e., S = 0) if a reversal occurs.
His basic point can then be summarized as below.
Each component predicts different pair of 7r and 5, and a
4If the short-selling constraint is binding, the 
information conveyed by a purchase or a sale may not be 
symmetric.
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clearer distinction of the components of the spread is made 
possible.
7r 8
ordering cost 0.5 0
information cost 0.5 0.5
inventory cost > 0 . 5  0.5
Extending Roll's analysis, Stoll shows that the 
covariance of transaction price changes (covP) and the 
covariance of quoted price changes (hereinafter, covQ) are 
functions of n , 8 and S (the quoted dollar spread) as 
follows.
covP = S2(62(1-27T)-7TZ(l-26) ) 
covQ = Sz(52(1-2tt) ) ...... .
There are several implicit assumptions in solving 
Equations (III) and (IV) to obtain estimates of n and 6. 
First, the market is efficient with respect to public 
information. If the market is inefficient, the covariance 
of transaction price changes will reflect some lagged 
adjustment in resolving information differences among 
traders. Second, the spread is assumed to be a constant 
over the estimation period. It then does not matter whether
(III)
(IV)
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an ask price, a bid price or the average of bid and ask 
prices is used. Third, all transactions occur on the inside 
quote (i.e.,the highest bid or the lowest ask available in 
the market).
The same set of assumptions are also implicitly made in 
Glosten and Harris with the exception that some type of 
lagged adjustment in public information is allowed (et is 
some function of elapsed time between successive 
transactions). In addition, components of spread are 
allowed to be dependent on trade size, provided that the 
relationship between components of spread and trade size is 
correctly specified. On the other hand, Stoll's approach 
uses the additional information of probability of price 
reversal. Distinction of various components of the spread 
is made more clearly. Each approach has its merits and 
problems.
Implicitly, the above approaches assume that the dealer 
adjusts the quoted price in the next trade. It is possible 
that empirically, there might be some lagged adjustments in 
dealer's quotes. If this is the case, the empirical results 
will contain additional noises. Hasbrouck (1988) presents a 
general approach in that no restriction is imposed on the 
number of trades for the inventory or the information 
effects to be complete. His basic intuition is that, if the 
inventory effect is stationary, trade and quote revisions 
will be a moving average process in which the coefficients
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sum to zero while the information effect predicts the 
revisions are independent. Hasbrouck's primary results say 
that the information effect is present, inventory effect is 
more apparent in low volume stocks, but not in high volume 
stocks. Nevertheless, his approach cannot be used to 
estimate the magnitude of components of the spread. Rather, 
his primary objective is to ascertain the existence of 
inventory and information effects.
II.E. The Components of Trading Volume
The information problem faced by a dealer is 
essentially one type of the adverse selection problem that 
is elaborated by Akerloff (1970). In response to the 
adverse selection problem, dealers compensate themselves for 
the losses to the informed by the gains from the uninformed5 
through adjustment in quoted prices. The inference of the 
degree of the informational asymmetry from trade revision is 
nevertheless difficult. Trade type is a valuable piece of 
information from our discussion in section C. Some other 
potentially useful pieces of information exist. One of them
5Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show the impossibility of 
informational efficiency in a world where informed and 
uninformed traders coexist. Bagehot (1971) introduces the 
concept of informational asymmetry into the area of market 
microstructure.
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is the components of volume (i. e., the composition of 
trading by the informed and the uninformed).
We broadly use the term 11 uninformed 11 because the 
cause(s) for such trading is (are) unclear. Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) model the variation of time preference across 
market participants as the cause for such trading.
Therefore, in their model, uninformed trading is basically 
liquidity-motivated trading. In Black (1986), " Market 
participants trade on noise as if it were information. 11 
Noise, then, results from human error. In this sense, 
liquidity trading may be different from noise trading since 
liquidity trading is not motivated by information. It is 
suspected that the property of noise trading can be 
different from that of the liquidity trading. This paper 
will use these terms loosely, although a distinction between 
them might be necessary.
Easley and O'Hara (1987) distinguish two types of 
trading equilibrium. In a "separating equilibrium", 
informed traders trade only large quantities. As a result, 
the presence of informed trading may not always result in a 
nontrivial spread. This is because the dealer can easily 
distinguish informed trading from uninformed trading so that 
the term for small trades is unaffected. This is not true 
under a "pooling equilibrium" in which the informed traders 
trade both small and large quantities. However, their 
results indicate that large trades will still be made at
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less favorable price. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) do not 
explicitly model the role of volume and therefore the 
presence of informed trading will always induce a nontrivial 
spread even when the dealer is risk-neutral and makes no 
profit.
In Easley and O'Hara (1987,1985), the speed of 
adjustment of price to its full information value is not 
instantaneous because the presence of liquidity trading 
introduces noise in the trades. Rather, the speed of 
adjustment varies with various market characteristics 
including market depth, size, volume and return variance. 
This is because the dealer's precision of inferences about 
the presence of informed trading from observing trades 
depends upon the amount of noise in the market. A similar 
yet different point is made in Kyle (1985). In his model, 
an informed trader prefers to trade a small (large) quantity 
now and large (small) quantity later when the current amount 
of uninformed trading is small (large). His model differs 
from Easley and O'Hara in that the informed trader has 
monopoly power of the private information (as a result of 
insider information rather than the effort to collect and 
analyze information) and therefore enjoys an additional 
choice variable : the timing of trading. Therefore, the 
trade size becomes a noisy signal since the informed trader 
will arrange his/her transactions so that these transactions 
are indistinguishable from those of uninformed traders.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) further separate the 
uninformed traders into 'discretionary' and 
'nondiscretionary'. The discretionary trader has a certain 
degree of control over the timing of trades. These authors 
show that the discretionary traders prefer to trade when 
there is a large number of informed traders to the extent 
that the degree of competition among informed traders is 
great. Informed, traders will also prefer to trade when 
there is a large number of uninformed traders in the market 
so that the informed traders will not be exposed to the 
adverse pricing by the dealer. As a result, Admati and. 
Pfleiderer give a potential explanation for the 
concentration of trading in the opening and closing periods 
as documented by Jain and Joh (1988). Foster and 
Viswanathan (1989) further incorporate the possibility of an 
imperfect public signal. That is, the private information 
is imperfectly revealed to the market through some public 
signal (e.g., corporate news release). Since Monday is 
likely to be when the public signal is weak, the 
informational asymmetry between the dealer and informed 
traders is greater. The results are that trading costs are 
the highest, the price variability and volume are the lowest 
on Monday.
In summary, the trading activity may be thought of as a 
result of the interaction among various trading parties.
Each party pursues its optimal trading strategy and thus
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both transaction price and volume will contain noises in the 
process.
II. F. The Quoted Spread, the Cost of Transacting and the 
Effective Spread
A related issue is whether the quoted spread represents 
the cost of transacting. If the quoted spread does not 
represent the cost of transacting, absolute estimates of the 
components of the spread is difficult to obtain even if 
there is an exact approach to decompose the spread.
First of all, the quoted spread is hardly meaningful to 
ordinary investors since it represents the difference 
between the bid and ask prices at one point in time 
(Grossman and Miller (1988) and Stoll (1989)). A careless 
investor may find himself/herself paying a very high 
transacting cost if he/she buys and sells stocks at points 
in time when the market is especially illiquid.
Smidt (1988) is particularly critical of the usefulness 
of the quoted spread. For the quoted spread to be 
representative of the true transacting cost, three 
conditions have to be met. First, the quoted spread has to 
be a constant over time. Second, all transactions should 
take place either at the bid or the ask. That is, there is 
no possibility of within quote trades. Third, the 
probability of purchase or sale is equally likely at any
27
point in time. The third point is related to the effect of 
inventory and the information components on transaction 
prices. That is, inventory adjustment induces trades that 
restore the dealer's desired inventory level (i.e., unequal 
probability of purchase and sale). The arrival of new 
information also leads to an unequal probability of purchase 
or sale.
Furthermore, to give a correct measure of the 
transacting cost, the suppliers and consumers of immediacy 
have to be identified. This is an impossible task, since 
suppliers of immediacy are not necessarily professional 
dealers. Traders submitting limit orders can perform the 
dealer function. Using information from the SEC and Options 
Clearing Corporation (to obtain proportion of volume due to 
market makers), Smidt (1988) estimates that the approximate 
transacting cost is only 4% of the minimum quoted spread 
(i.e., one-eighth of a dollar). Stoll (1985) conducts a 
similar study and concludes the spread realized by the 
dealer is approximately half of the quoted spread. Although 
these two studies give very different estimates of the 
transacting cost, it suffices to say that the quoted spread 
is generally not equivalent to the transacting cost.
Similar arguments are not difficult to find. Grossman 
and Hiller (1988) argue the quoted spread is not an adequate 
measure of liquidity except when the dealer simultaneously 
executes crossing orders. Roll's (1984) measure of the
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effective spread6 is among one of the attempt to measure the 
transacting cost, although he is motivated by a different 
reason (the possibility of within quote trades). That is, 
he considers only the second reason given by Smidt (1988). 
Glosten and Harris (1988) also give a measure of the 
effective spread. They define the effective spread as 
(2*C+Z), the quoted spread as 2*(C+Z), where C and Z are 
estimated from Equation (I). The intuition is that informed 
traders do not pay the amount of Z at the time of initial 
transaction, but do so at the time of the offsetting 
transaction. Similarly, Stoll (1989) gives the realized 
spread as the sum of inventory and ordering components. It 
is clear that both Glosten/Harris and Stoll consider only 
the third reason given by Smidt. To conclude, the 
measurement of the transacting cost is difficult to say the 
least. Advancement in this area will likely require more 
information.
II. G. Conclusions
In reviewing the literature, we also point out many 
problems in the area of the components of the spread. Some
BChoi, Salandro and Shastri (1988) and Bhattacharya 
(1985) extend Roll's analysis to include considerations 
about the possibility of serial correlation in transaction 
type and the possibility of within quote transactions.
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are not given solution (e. g., monopoly component), some are 
dealt with to some extent in this dissertation.
The discussion of the literature of the determinants of 
the spread points to a deficit in this type of study. That 
is, implications of these empirical findings are vague. Our 
first essay employs a revised version of Stoll's approach to 
decompose the spread, and then presents separate analysis of 
components of the spread to obtain a complete picture of 
dealers' costs.
The quote adjustment can take place in the form of 
adjustment in the quoted prices and/or the adjustment in the 
magnitude of the spread. This point is partly considered in 
essay two. Further, essay two gives estimates of the 
components of the spread using two different approaches; the 
estimation should be more reliable if two approaches give 
similar conclusions. Finally, essay three presents a model 
that relates the concept of the components of the spread and 
the concept of the components of trading volume, providing a 
framework for utilizing information about order imbalance.
Chapter III 
A Cross-Sectional Analysis of 
Costs Faced by NYSE Specialists
III.A. Introduction
The information about the relative importance of various 
components of the spread is potentially useful for 
correcting biases in transaction prices (as discussed in 
Chapter II). Other potential uses exist. One of them is to 
analyze the cross-sectional variations of the components of 
the spread with respect to factors that are important to 
each of these components. Such analysis is an extension of 
the studies of the determinants of the (total) spread such 
as Benston and Hagerman (1974).
Such an extension is important in understanding the 
total picture of dealers' costs. For instance, a negative 
relationship between the total spread and volume can be 
consistent with any of three components of the spread. If 
the specialist industry is characterized by economies of 
scale, higher volume will imply a lower order cost. Under a 
purely inventory cost environment, higher volume suggests 
the possibility of permanent inventory imbalance is less, 
and the concern for inventory level is likely less. On the 
other hand, higher volume will also imply a lower spread
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under the information model (Kyle (1985)). This is the 
primary intuition of this essay. Stoll's (1989) model is 
utilized to decompose the spread to investigate this issue.
Glosten and Harris's (1988) cross-sectional analysis is 
similar to ours in spirit. However, ours is more extensive 
than theirs. Ours includes several additional variables 
that are not considered in their test, allowing some 
hypotheses concerning the cross-sectional variation of these 
variables to be made, drawing from an extensive body of 
literature. Furthermore, ours is based on a more general 
approach (Stoll(1989)) through which three components can be 
simultaneously estimated. Glosten and Harris treat the 
ordering/inventory component as one component, and therefore 
inference of their result is limited.
However, because Stoll's empirical test is not easily 
adapted to cross-sectional analysis, we employ a slight 
variant of Stoll's empirical approach, which will be 
discussed in details in Section C.
Stoll uses daily data for his empirical test. Jameson
(1988) suggests that, with daily data, the estimated 
inventory and information effects may be biased. This is 
because quote and trade adjustments should take place fairly 
quickly, and daily closing prices are not likely to reflect 
these adjustments. Glosten and Harris (1988) also point out 
that daily closing quotes may be subject to some degree of 
manipulation by the specialist knowing that the possibility
of trades occurring at these quotes is very low. Harris
(1989) finds that, in NYSE, a large price change is 
associated with the last transaction, and the large price 
change may be related to the tendency for the last 
transaction to occur at the ask price. Based on these 
grounds, we use transaction-by-transaction data that should 
be more appropriate for Stoll's model.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section B gives 
a description of the data. Section C presents the empirical 
methodology. The results of the relative importance of 
components of the spread are shown in Section D. Section E 
presents hypotheses regarding the cross-sectional variations 
of components of the spread, and Section F gives the cross- 
sectional empirical results. The conclusions are made in 
Section G.
III.B. Data and Sample Selection
The available data consists of two months' - September 
and October, 1987 - information about every transaction for 
common stocks listed on NYSE and AMEX.7 Price, trade size, 
time of trade, and the exchange where the trade is 
originated are recorded for every trade. Similarly, for 
every quote, information about the bid/ask price, time of
7This data is provided by the Institute of the Study of 
Security Markets (ISSM), Pennsylvania State University.
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quote, and the size for which the quote is good for (the 
depth of the quote) is given.
The sample period is arbitrarily chosen to be the five 
trading days Friday September 18 through Thursday September 
24, 1987. The sample stocks contain the first 100 stocks in 
the data base using four screening criteria.0 First, stocks 
which go ex-dividend over the sample period are eliminated 
since the effect of dividends on prices is still a much 
debated issue. Second, low-volume stocks are excluded due 
to potentially greater measurement error. (In particular, 
covariance measure may be more unreliable in a small 
sample.) For a particular stock to be included in the 
sample, the minimum trades and the minimum quotes per day 
are arbitrarily set to be 15. Third, the primary exchange 
is NYSE. Fourth, dollar stocks (minimum price increment is 
one-sixteenth) are excluded, since the effect of price 
discreteness for these stocks is likely to be different from 
that of other stocks (price increment is one-eighth).
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the 
sample of stocks0. The total volume and number of
8These stocks are selected in alphabetical order.
Sample size is limited to one hundred for the ease of 
collecting additional information not provided by the data 
base.
0For the NYSE as a whole over these five days, the mean 
and median (in parentheses) across stocks and days for NT, 
NQ, vol, price are, respectively, 75 (33), 67 (34), 138,000 
(44,300) shares, $26 ($20). Therefore, our sample stocks 
tend to be higher-volume and higher-priced stocks.
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transactions vary considerably across days and across 
stocks. The skewness statistics indicate that, especially 
for the dollar spread and price, (and volume on the day of 
September 24,) distributions of these variables are highly 
skewed. This observation however does not contradict 
previous evidence and is not critical to the following 
analysis. The sample seems fairly evenly distributed among 
various industries (see Appendix A for a list of company 
names), and the possibility of industry bias is small.
Some unusual transactions are excluded. They are 
broadly categorized as : (1) large trades,10 (2) unusual 
delivery (usual delivery is five business days), (3) trades 
reported out of sequence, (4) quotes during trading halts,
(5) pre-opening quotes, and (6) transactions identified as 
potential errors.11 These excluded transactions account for 
less than 10% of the total original transactions.
III.C. Estimation of the Components of the Spread
10Such large trades (larger than 32,760 shares) 
represent less than 0.001% of the total trades. The 
classification rule (32,760 shares) appears to be 
arbitrarily set by ISSM. These large trades are excluded 
primarily for convenience.
11For our selected sample, we find one case of abnormal 
price changes for Aetna life and Casualty. In this instance, 
the price jumps up about one-third and then return to its 
previous level. Other than that, no abnormal price changes 
were found.
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For the convenience of readers, Stoll's basic equations 
are restated below.
covP = Sz(62(1-2jt) -7T2( l - 2 6 )  ) (III)
covQ = Sz(52(1-2tt) ) (IV)
For every stock and day, covariance of transaction 
price changes (covP), covariance of quoted price (the 
midpoint of the bid and ask prices) changes (covQ), and the 
average dollar quoted spread (S) are estimated.12 These 
estimates are then used to solve for j t (probability of 
reversal) and 1-6 (magnitude of price change, as the 
proportion of the spread), using numerical methods13 for 
Equations (III) and (IV). This is different from Stoll's 
empirical approach. In his approach, covP and covQ are 
regressed, separately, on the square of the spread to obtain 
average values of ir and 6 across stocks. In so doing, 
average values of the components of the spread can be
lzFuller (1976, p. 242) suggests an adjusted covariance 
for small sample. In a small sample, ordinary covariance 
estimates are biased downward. Intuitively, small sample may 
appear to have significant negative autocorrelation while in 
fact there is none (Hasbrouck(1988)). Our average number of 
transactions used to calculate the covariance of price 
changes is above 50 in most cases. The ordinary covariance 
estimator is used in this essay.
13IMSL subroutine NEQNF is employed to solve the system 
of equations. This routine uses a variation of Newton's 
method. Starting values for jt and 6 are 0.5 and 0.5. A 
solution is accepted if the difference between two 
successive approximations is less than 0.002.
36
obtained but cannot be readily applied to cross-sectional 
analysis. Therefore, this modification is important for our 
purpose. Moreover, it is unclear what the error term 
represents under Stoll's regression approach14.
One of the implicit assumptions for Stoll's model is 
that the probability distribution of price changes is 
stationary over the sample period. Roll (1984) finds 
results of covP using daily data and five-day data are quite 
different and comments : "This implies informational 
inefficiency (although not necessarily profit opportunities) 
or else very short-term nonstationarity in expected return." 
If it can be argued that the return distribution is 
relatively more stationary over a short interval of time, it 
is more appropriate to perform the analysis using data 
within a shorter time span. French (1980) finds mean return 
is different across the day of the week, which suggests 
nonstationarity in daily returns. Also, because the opening 
trading procedure is different from the rest of the day, it 
seems undesirable to treat opening transactions as 
continuation of the last closing transaction. We therefore 
chose to apply the methodology to observations within a day. 
This means there are five pairs of (ir, 6) for each stock in 
the sample, one pair each day.
uRoll (1984) infers the effective spread to be 
27-covP. He too does not utilize a regression approach.
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In Stoll's terminology, the realized spread, what the 
dealer earns on net, is equal to the sum of the inventory 
and ordering components. The information model says that 
the dealer loses to informed traders and gains from 
uninformed traders; the information component is therefore 
not a part of the realized spread and is the difference 
between the quoted spread and the realized spread. Stoll 
shows that the realized spread equals 2*(7r-5)S15. Realized 
spread is further decomposed into inventory and ordering 
components. The inventory component is shown to be 
2*(7r-0.5) and the ordering component is 2*(0.5-6).
Our interest here is to infer the expected value of 7r 
and S over the estimation period. Since Equations (III) and 
(IV) are nonlinear in it and 6 and since our covariances of 
price changes are also estimates, the numerical solutions 
would only give approximate expected values of n and 5, 
according to Jenson's inequality. Also, in Equations (III) 
and (IV), a constant spread is assumed. The Appendix B 
gives a revised version of Stoll's derivation of the 
covariance of transaction price changes (i.e., Equation 
(III)) allowing changes in the magnitude of the spread. If 
changes in the magnitude of the spread are random and small,
15Jameson (1988) is particularly critical of Stoll's 
decomposition. For a purely inventory model, the value of it 
has to be one to let realized spread equal S. Nevertheless, 
the general intuition of Stoll remains true. That is, a 
larger value of tt indicates a stronger inventory effect.
t
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the covariance of transaction price changes reduces exactly 
to Equation (III).
III.D. Relative Importance of the Components of the Spread
Table 2 contains the means and standard deviations for 
j t , 6, covP, covQ, and estimated components of the spread.
The average value of S is greater than 0.4 while ir is close 
to 0.5. Such estimates are most consistent with the 
information model. Accordingly, the estimated information 
component is extremely large. Over 80% of the spread is due 
to the information cost faced by the dealer. The inventory 
cost is small (about 2% of the spread) and insignificant. 
Both the t test and the sign rank test fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that the inventory cost is equal to zero in 
two out of four days, and the t test (but not the sign rank 
test) fails to reject the null hypothesis in two other days. 
The ordering cost accounts for about 15% of the spread. This 
pattern is fairly similar across days16. The covariance of 
quoted price changes is insignificantly different from zero 
in four out of five days (more consistent with the 
information cost model), and is generally less negative than
16Because the trading procedure for the opening market 
is quite different from that of the rest of the day, we also 
did a similar investigation excluding the first hour of 
transactions. The results are not much different. This issue 
will be looked at more carefully in Chapter Four.
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the covariance of transaction price changes, which is what 
theory suggests17.
Hasbrouck (1988) finds strong evidence for the 
information effect but mixed evidence for the inventory 
effect, although his test cannot indicate which component is 
the most important. Glosten and Harris (1988) find the 
estimated information component is not large using NYSE 
transaction data. However, since their estimation specifies 
a linear relationship between the information component and 
the transaction size, the information component can be 
substantial for a large trade. According to their 
specification, the quoted spread is 2*(C0+Z1Vt), where Vt is 
stated in thousands of shares. The quoted spread is 
estimated to be 2*(0.0242+0.0133*Vt). This means for a 
10,000 share transaction, the estimated quoted spread is 
$0.31, which is close to the actual quoted spread. This 
suggests the information component is (2*0.0133*10) $0,266 
that is approximately 86% of the estimated quoted spread. 
Smidt (1988) estimates that the return realized by 
specialists accounts for approximately 4% of the quoted 
spread. Therefore, our empirical evidence is partially 
consistent with some previous studies. Using daily NASDAQ 
data, Stoll (1989) estimates (through regression of covP, 
covQ on S2) that 43%, 9%, 48% of the spread is due to the
17That is, covQ does not contain an order cost 
component. See also Equations (III) and (IV).
information cost, the inventory cost, the ordering cost, 
respectively (5=0.265, jt=0.550). His and our average 
estimates are quite different. We suspect the difference 
may be due to the difference in data. As pointed out in 
section A, the inventory and information components may not 
be captured using daily data18. According to Stoll's model, 
the specialist's price adjustment (the information and the 
inventory components) should immediately follow the previous 
trade. Daily data may thus reflect more of the order 
component. Moreover, NASDAQ market makers are usually less 
capitalized than NYSE specialists, which suggests higher 
order costs for NASDAQ stocks. Additionally, his sample 
consists of lower-priced, higher-spread stocks (on average, 
price = $14, percentage spread = 2.9%) than ours, which 
suggests discreteness problem may be more severe for his
sample. A greater degree of discreteness problem is
consistent with higher inventory and ordering costs.
Stoll and our results are consistent with respect to a 
small inventory component. Stoll (1985) argues that the 
inventory cost is unimportant because (1) specialists'
18We compare covP and covQ using every transaction 
prices and using only daily ending prices for the same set 
of stocks for the period of August 31 through October 15 (33 
days). The mean (standard deviation) S and rr are 0.445 
(0.133) and 0.526 (0.110) for transaction data, 0.544
(1.137) and 0.186 (1.769) for daily data. The estimated jt
and S using daily data give negative order and inventory 
costs, which is very difficult to interpret. It seems 
covariance of price changes is sensitive to lags of prices.
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portfolio of stocks may be only a fraction of the 
specialist's total wealth, and (2) unlike ordinary 
investors, the specialist can go long and short with little 
constraint. These may partially explain the relatively 
small magnitude of the inventory cost. The remaining part 
of this section is primarily devoted to examining whether or 
not the estimation is robust with respect to subsets of 
transactions or stocks.
Most stocks listed on NYSE are allowed to be traded on 
regional exchanges and/or the-over-counter market. It seems 
more reasonable to employ NYSE transactions since 
specialists do not participate in off-NYSE transactions. 
However, there might be a potential cross-market information 
effect since the specialist may infer information from 
transactions occurring on other markets. If cross-market 
effect exists, we are utilizing only partial information 
with NYSE transactions. To see whether off-NYSE 
transactions may seriously affect the results, we do a 
simple comparison of transactions including and excluding 
off-NYSE transactions.
Table 3 contains all transactions while Table 2 
contains only NYSE transactions. Comparing these two 
tables, we find on average the estimated ir (over 0.6) and S 
(over 0.5) are all higher in Table 3. The information 
component remains about 80% of the spread but the inventory 
component now accounts for about 20% of the spread. The
weaker inventory effect in Table 2 seems counter-intuitive, 
since excluding trades that occur outside NYSE should make 
the inventory effect more apparent while the result suggests 
otherwise. However, the spread on regional markets or OTC 
is often higher than that of NYSE for comparable stocks, 
which is also confirmed by comparing the proportional quoted 
spread in the two tables. Recall that the components of the 
spread are directly inferred from covP and covQ; it is 
therefore very likely that the result is an artifact of the 
higher absolute values of covP and covQ in Table 3, induced 
by larger spreads. In addition, mean order costs are 
negative for all days if all transactions are included.
Given the above observations, we conclude that off-NYSE 
transactions are not directly comparable to NYSE 
transactions. The following analysis will use exclusively 
NYSE transactions, which appear to be a more reasonable set 
of data for the purpose of this chapter.
The options market may interact with the stock market. 
In particular, the specialist may sometimes trade in the 
options market to hedge his/her position in stocks.
However, the specialist can buy and sell stocks in both long 
and short position while he/she has to pay additional 
transaction cost for trading in the option market. By the 
standard option valuation model (Black and Scholes (1973)), 
options are purely redundant securities since they can be 
replicated by some combination of the risk-free asset and
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the underlying stock. The mere existence of the options 
market then suggests there are transaction cost difference 
between the options market and the stock market. Also, some 
information effect may exist. In light of the greater 
degree of leverage that a trader enjoys in options market, 
we may suspect that informed traders prefer to trade in the 
options market. This argument however also implies 
segmentation of traders for the stock market and the options 
market. Therefore, the true effect is unclear.
The sample stocks are divided into two subsamples 
according to the presence or absence of options. A standard 
t test19 (assuming unequal variances) is used to test the 
difference in means of the components of the spread between 
subsamples for each day. Only on September 23 does the t 
test indicate the inventory component for non-option stocks 
is significantly (t=2.38) different from and is higher than 
that of the option-stocks. No significant difference is 
observed in other components of the spread. The results for 
September 23 are shown in Table 4 Panel A. The average 
price, average transaction size and volume are higher for 
option-stocks than for non-option stocks. The ir and the 
absolute value of covQ are higher for non-option stocks,
t = (Xi^J/UvarfXiJ/n^ + fvarfXaJ/na)) ' , where xlf 
var(xx), and n! are the sample mean, variance, and sample 
size for group 1, similar notations apply to group 2. If 
variances are assumed to be unequal, the degree of freedom 
can be substantially less than the addition of nx and n2 if 
sample variances turn out to be quite different.
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which indicates a higher inventory cost. Panel B shows the 
results for September 24, the lightest trading day of the 
five days. For option stocks, mean covQ is large in 
absolute term relative to September 23 and other days, which 
suggests quote adjustments to be larger in light trading 
days. Another noteworthy observation is that mean inventory 
cost is especially high (0.04) for option stocks relative to 
those of other days (0.02 on average).20
Since the number of transactions used to estimate covP 
and covQ differs for each stock, mean covP and covQ among 
volume groups may differ. Furthermore, volume of trading 
should be a critical factor in the business of market 
making. Nevertheless, volume is a noisy indicator of the 
risk of dealer's business, based on the following 
observations that offer different interpretations of the 
role of volume. First, volume may be considered as a 
measure of competition if higher volume attracts more large 
block brokers. Second, volume can be considered as a 
measure of liquidity since higher volume usually suggests a 
more liquid market. Furthermore, since there are informed 
as well as uninformed trading, total volume alone does not 
mean much to the specialist.
Z0Results for other days are similar to those of 
September 23 and especially, September 24, in term of 
differences in components of spread.
To test the influence of volume, we arbitrarily 
separate the sample into three subsamples, based on cutoff 
points of 80,000 shares and 300,000 shares per day. Paired 
t tests indicate only on the day of September 18 is the 
difference in order costs between high and low volume stocks 
significant at the 10% level (t=2.10). Table 5 Panel A 
presents comparisons between volume subgroups for the day of 
September 23. The low-volume group appears to be less 
homogeneous than the other two groups, but there are no 
significant differences across volume subgroups with respect 
to means of S, ir, and the components of the spread. Panel B 
shows the results for September 24. Although the volume is 
the lowest on this day, mean components of the spread 
demonstrate no significant difference among volume 
subgroups.
There are some institutional factors that complicate the 
estimation of the components of the spread. The most 
important one perhaps is the presence of limit orders.
Limit orders can be thought of as the competition to the 
dealer from traders who commit to trade at a particular 
price.21 Limit orders may bias the estimation because some 
of the trades have no consequence to the dealer's inventory.
21An implication for the limit orders is that there is 
a need to distinguish dealer spread from market spread, 
where market spread is the better of dealer quote and quotes 
from traders submitting limit orders (Cohen, et al 
(1978,1981), Hamilton (1987)).
On the other hand, Conroy and Winkler (1981) argue that 
limit orders have some information effect to the dealer, 
since the information in the limit book is available to the 
dealer only. Thus, the effect of limit orders on our 
estimation is not an easily resolved issue. On a purely 
technical basis, if limit orders cluster around a certain 
price, an adjustment of quotes to that price will trigger a 
series of transactions occurring in the same direction 
(Choi, Salandro and Shastri (1988), Hasbrouck and Ho 
(1987)). Hasbrouck (1988) assumes limit orders arise purely 
from uninformed traders and are uncorrelated with the 
stochastic arrivals of market orders. In this case, the 
presence of limit orders simplifies into a simple 
measurement error. There are, however, reasons to suggest 
otherwise. In Kyle (1985), a monopolistic informed trader 
can time his/her trades and perhaps types of orders in order 
to avoid the adverse pricing by the dealer.
Other factors include broken orders and the 
discreteness in prices. Broken orders tend to introduce 
positive correlation in transaction types (Garbade and 
Lieber (1977)) while discreteness in prices tends to produce 
negative values of the covariance of price changes (Gottlieb 
and Kalay (1985), Cho and Frees (1988) and Ball (1988)). In 
Section F, our cross-sectional analysis uses prices to proxy 
and control the discreteness problem, since the discreteness
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problem is likely to be negatively related to the price of 
stocks.
Although the average values of ir and S are fairly 
stable across days, there are considerable variations in ir 
and S for individual stocks. This is not inconsistent with 
the theory but we need to point out that the estimated 
components of the spread are sensitive to the values of covP 
and covQ. This and factors discussed above (e. g., limit 
orders) indicate that we should be especially careful with 
measurement problems. Nevertheless, since our focus is on 
the cross-sectional variation of various components of the 
spread, measurement errors should not greatly affect the 
cross-sectional analysis if the errors are uniformly 
distributed across stocks. Additionally, there may be some 
reporting errors. In Section F, estimated components for 
individual stocks are averaged across days to reduce the 
effect of reporting errors and the effect of including an 
abnormal trading day.
In conclusion to this point, our empirical evidence 
indicates that dealers face a large information problem.
The result is fairly robust. The aggregate estimates do not 
change substantially across days. The result is not likely 
to be due to sampling bias, since aggregate estimates are 
about the same whether the sample is separated into option 
groups or volume groups. We now turn to our focus of this
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chapter - the cross-sectional variation of the components of 
the spread.
III.E. Cross-Sectional Hypotheses
This section presents cross-sectional hypotheses of 
components with respect to important factors that influence 
the magnitude of these components. Empirical test of these 
hypotheses will be shown in Section F.
Number of transactions, measures of risk, number of 
shareholders, measure of insider risk, institutional 
holding, price, and volume have been found by previous 
empirical studies (see Chapter II) to be important 
determinant of the spread. Number of shareholders is 
generally used as a proxy for the degree of informational 
asymmetry. However, since not all shareholders will be 
active in trading, the number of shareholders does not seem 
to be an appropriate proxy for the degree of informational 
asymmetry.
The first important question concerning the order cost 
is whether the specialist industry is characterized by 
economies of scale. Some components of the order cost may 
be considered relatively fixed (e.g., clerical and 
administrative costs) while others may be considered as 
variable (e.g., interest expenses and communication cost).
If a larger portion of the order cost is fixed (variable),
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then the relative importance of the order cost should 
decrease (increase) with the number of transactions, and the 
industry will be generally characterized by economies 
(diseconomies) of scale.
The average transaction size will be negatively 
correlated with the order cost if the cost per transaction 
is relatively fixed, will not be related to the order cost 
if cost per transaction varies. Easley and O'Hara (1987) 
hypothesize informed traders prefer to trade larger 
guantities. This predicts a positive relationship between 
the information cost and the transaction size. Kyle's 
(1985) model, however, indicates that transaction size is a 
noisy signal. The intuition is that informed traders will 
not necessarily always prefer to trade large guantities, 
since if they do, their private information will be revealed 
unambiguously to the market. In the empirical test, since a 
certain transaction size may be considered as large for a 
low volume stock while small for a high volume stock, rather 
than absolute transaction size, relative size is used 
instead (i. e., size/volume).
Benston and Hagerman (1974) argue that since the 
expected return of a security will compensate the holder for 
the systematic risk associated with it, only the
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unsystematic risk is relevant to the dealer.22 On the other 
hand, Stoll (1978a) argues that the total risk is more 
relevant and states that "...market making causes the dealer 
to move away from his desired position on the efficient 
risk-return frontier to a point yielding a lower level of 
utility. The expected return of a stock is not sufficient 
compensation for the loss of utility." Either theory 
predicts a positive relationship between some measure of 
risk and the inventory cost.
Since the dealer may sometimes trade in the options 
market to hedge his/her stock position, the presence of the 
options for the stock the dealer deals in suggests the 
dealer will care less about the inventory cost. This 
predicts a negative relationship between the presence of 
options and the inventory cost.
Insider trading as well as unsystematic risk (Benston 
and Hagerman (1974)) are measures of information risk to the 
dealer, thus the information cost should be positively 
related to insider trading and/or unsystematic risk.
Smidt (1971) observes that the specialist seems to be 
more willing to absorb inventory imbalances if institutions 
account for a larger proportion of trades. This may be
22In equilibrium, investors require an expected return 
to compensate them for bearing the systematic risk 
associated with an asset. This is the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964), Litner (1965), and 
Mossin (1966).
consistent with either or both of the following explanations 
: (1) a high institutional trading represents a more liquid 
market as competition for handling institutional 
transactions is greater, and/or (2) institutional traders 
are not informed traders. Explanation (1) implies 
institutional trading is negatively related to the ordering 
/inventory cost, and (2) suggests a negative relationship 
between the information cost and the amount of institutional 
trading.
Recent evidence shows that smaller firms' stocks have 
higher returns than those of larger firms' stocks, and the 
return differentials cannot be accounted for by risk 
differentials (Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981)). Barry and 
Brown (1984) consider that the scarcity of information 
available for smaller firms may be a potential explanation. 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) suggest that since smaller firms 
may have a greater degree of information asymmetry between 
shareholders, a larger information cost would be associated 
with smaller firms' stocks. However, Keim (1983) and 
Lamoureux and Sanger (1989) present evidence that most of 
the abnormal returns for smaller firms' stocks accrue in 
January. Our inference will be fairly limited because of 
the unavailability of January data.
III.F. Cross-Sectional Tests
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The following notations will be used throughout this 
chapter.
C = order cost NT = number of transactions
H = inventory cost AZ = average transaction size
Z = information cost RZ = relative transaction size
TR = total risk
UR = unsystematic risk
OP = option trading
IT = insider trading
IN = institutional trading
FZ = firm size
P = stock price
VOL = volume
The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression approach is 
employed to examine the cross-sectional variations of 
components of the spread with respect to the variables 
described in section E. The cross-sectional hypotheses are 
outlined below. The predicted signs of each of the 
coefficients are summarized in parentheses.
C = + atz NT + a3 AZ + aA IN + a5 P + a6 V O L ..........  (Al)
( ± ) ( ± ) ( - )
H = 0! + J02 UR (or TR) + /S3 OP + 04 IN + 05 P + jS6 VOL ... (A2)
( + ) ( - ) ( - )
Z=0j + 02 RZ + 0 3 UR + gh IN + 05 FZ + 06 IT + 07 P + 08 VOL
( ± )  ( + ) ( - )  ( - >  ( + ) .............  (A3)
Price is included in the regression as a proxy of the 
degree of the discreteness problem and for other unknown 
risk (see Stoll (1978a) for a further discussion of the 
price factor). Discreteness may artificially produce larger 
inventory and ordering components (through more negative 
estimates of covariance of price changes) and is likely to 
be a more important problem for low-priced stocks. Kross 
(1985) relates prices to estimation risk : "Since more 
consistent parameter estimates can be generated for high 
priced stocks, individuals will invest relatively more in 
the high priced set of stocks than in the low priced set. 
Limited diversification results unless investors are paid, 
through higher returns, to include low priced securities in 
their portfolios." Both observations indicate that the 
level of price is negatively related to estimation risk. On 
the other hand, since the capital required for higher-priced 
stocks is higher given a fixed number of shares, it can be 
argued that price is positively associated with 
(specialist') business risk.
The role of volume is also rather vague. Volume may 
reflect the degree of competition. As such, higher volume 
represents a disadvantage for the dealers. On the other 
hand, high volume may be a blessing to the dealers since 
higher volume also suggests less risk. Further, volume is 
used extensively by previous studies and should be 
investigated. Since the role of neither price nor volume is
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clear, we present regression results for each of Equation 
(Al), (A2) and (A3) in three versions : (1) price and volume 
excluded, (2) price included, volume excluded, (3) price and 
volume included. Accordingly, regression (A1.3) refers to 
regression (Al) when price and volume are both included; 
regression (A2.1) refers to regression (A2) when price and 
volume are both excluded; etc.
IN, IT and number of shares are collected from Standard 
and Poor's Corporation Stock Reports (November, 1987). OP 
is an indicator variable and is equal to one if there are 
options traded for the stock and zero otherwise. The CRSP23 
daily file is used for the purpose of estimating TR 
(measured by return variance) and UR (measured by residual 
variance from the market model) for the period of 120 
through 20 days prior to September, 1987 (i.e., 
approximately March through July). We use lagged values for 
TR and UR because dealers are uninformed (or else there will 
be no information cost) and presumably use lagged TR or UR 
as the estimated risk.24 The NT, AZ, RZ, OP, FZ, VOL are 
contemporaneous estimates to reflect current market 
activity. Averages of five days of estimates of C, H, Z,
NT, AZ, RZ and VOL for individual stocks are used to reduce
23The Center for Research in Securities Prices, 
University of Chicago.
24Benston and Hagerman (1974), Stoll (1978a), Glosten 
and Harris (1988) also use lagged estimates for risk.
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the effect of including an abnormal day and the effect of 
potential reporting errors.
The final sample contains 91 stocks; 9 stocks are 
excluded because either data on previous prices is 
unavailable (five stocks are newly listed) or Stock Reports 
do not provide information about some of the variables 
investigated (two are ADRs, and two are limited 
partnerships).
Since some of the independent variables are highly 
correlated (see Table 6), OLS regression coefficients 
estimates are still unbiased but the t values may not be 
totally reliable. Therefore, for each regression, the value 
of the maximum eigenvalue divided by the minimum eigenvalue 
for the X'X matrix is given (denoted as cn). If cn is 
larger than 900, multicoilinearity presents a serious 
problem to OLS estimates and ordinary t tests are unreliable 
(see Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl and Lee (1982)).
Regression results are given in Table 7 with Panels A, 
B, and C presenting the results for regression (Al), (A2), 
and (A3), respectively.25
25Prices may be correlated with some of the variables 
investigated. Instead of using contemporaneous prices, 
lagged prices are also used for the same set of regressions. 
The results are similar in terms of the signs and the p 
values of the coefficients. However, regressions using 
lagged prices have much higher R squares and a greater 
problem of multicollinearity than those using current prices 
in general. Results shown in this essay use current prices.
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In both regressions (Al.l) and (A1.2), NT is 
significantly (at 10%) positively related to C. Such 
relationship is not supportive of economies of scale for the 
industry as a whole. AZ is insignificantly related to C, 
which indicates that cost per transaction is not fixed. IN 
is negatively related to C (although significant only at the 
15% level in (Al.2-3)). It may be that a greater 
institutional holding represents a more competitive market. 
Alternatively, we may argue that institutional traders 
prefer to hold stocks handled by more efficient dealers.
The reverse is unlikely to be true as previous evidence 
(Barnea(1976)) indicates more efficient specialists are not 
necessarily rewarded by a preferred allocation of stocks26) . 
The negative sign for P is supportive of the conjecture that 
P is a proxy for discreteness problem and estimation risk. 
Regression (A1.3) is quite troublesome for cn is quite high 
(=344.6) relative to other regressions27. Furthermore, NT 
becomes insignificantly related to C. We may argue that NT 
is really a consequence of VOL, since NT is significant only 
when VOL is not included (correlation coefficient of NT and 
VOL is 0.854, which is significant at the 1% level). Since 
multicollinearity may be a problem in (A1.3), inference from
26A1s o , Stoll (1985) finds specialists' portfolios are 
not much different from a random portfolio.
27Further analysis indicates that the smallest 
eigenvalue affects the variation of the intercept term and 
IN, which says that the variation in IN is small.
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(A1.3) is imprecise. Nevertheless, to the extent that NT is 
a consequence of VOL, the positive relationship between VOL 
and C is a piece of evidence against industry economies of 
scale.
In Panel B, all regressions use TR as the proxy for 
risk. Results using UR are not reported here because 
results using TR and UR are remarkably similar (correlation 
coefficient of TR and UR is 0.997 and is highly 
significant). Regressions (A2.1-3) suggest TR is not a 
factor in specialist's inventory decision, which contradicts 
previous evidence. Perhaps because the dealer cannot 
estimate precisely the degree of risk, he/she relies on more 
intuitive measures of risk (such as IN28) or perhaps our 
estimation of TR and UR is unreliable. Also, OP appears to 
be unrelated to H. It is consistent with the notion that 
options trading, although providing hedging opportunity, may 
involve additional costs that outweigh the benefit. IN is 
significantly (at 5%) negatively related to H in all 
regressions (A2.1-3), and this reinforces our conclusions 
regarding IN from regression (Al). VOL is unrelated to H.
A possible explanation is that specialist' inventory 
position can accumulate fairly quickly if market volume is 
high but transactions predominantly occur at one side of the
26TR (UR) is significantly correlated with OP, IN, IT,
FZ and P (see Table 6).
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market. Thus we conclude a negative relationship between 
volume and spread is inconsistent with the inventory model.
The information cost regression (panel C) is generally 
subject to a greater multicollinearity problem as more 
variables are included. However, multicollinearity may not 
be very serious here as all three versions of regression 
(A3) generally show consistent signs and p values for 
estimated coefficients. Z is positively related to RZ, 
supporting Easley and O'Hara's conjecture that informed 
traders prefer to trade large quantities. According to 
their model, even in a pooling equilibrium, larger trades 
will still be made at less favorable term although trade 
size is a noisy signal of informed trading in this context. 
UR again is unrelated to Z, contradicting previous evidence. 
The result that is significantly positive (at 1% level) 
suggests that the institutional traders are not totally 
uninformed. Although some theories (e.g., Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988)) assume the institutional traders are 
uninformed, they are not totally convincing, as 
institutional traders presumably spend a lot of resources in 
collecting and analyzing information. However, since there 
may be more financial analysts working on stocks with a 
large amount of institutional holdings, this result may be 
an artifact of a positive relationship between information 
cost and the number of financial analysts. FZ is 
insignificantly associated with Z, although such result is
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not strong evidence against the hypothesis that smaller 
firms have a larger degree of informational asymmetry. It 
may be that informational asymmetry is more severe in 
January when annual results for most companies are revealed. 
Our data period does not include January, thus the result is 
fairly weak. IT, the measure of insider risk, is positively 
related to Z. It may be that the information asymmetry 
problem is more related to the insider information than to 
the superior analytic ability of investors.
This positive sign of P in regression (A3) does not 
contradict the notion that price is a proxy for the degree 
of the discreteness problem as higher (lower) price suggests 
less (more) degree of discreteness problem, which in turn 
suggests more positive (negative) covP and a higher (lower) 
Z. It is contradicting the conjecture that price is an 
appropriate proxy for risk of specialists' business.
In all regressions, the intercept terms are 
significantly positive (at 1%), which suggests a constant 
portion of C, H, and Z. Certainly, theory lacks a 
satisfactory explanation of what the intercept term really 
represents (except that a constant proportion of C may 
represent a fixed cost). The R-squares are generally not 
impressive, especially for regressions (Al) and (A2)20.
29Studies on the determinants of the spread usually 
find a R-square value above 0.3. To see whether the error 
term is related to any of the variables in the regression, a 
test equivalent to Breusch and Pagan (1979) is employed to 
investigate whether the square of error terms divided by
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III. G. Conclusions
For the sample of 100 stocks and for the period of 
September 18-24, 1987, our empirical results support the 
following : 1) a large portion of the cost faced by a NYSE 
specialist is attributed to the adverse selection problem;
2) the NYSE specialist industry is not characterized by 
economies of scale; 3) higher institutional holdings are 
associated with a more liquid market; 4} the information 
cost is positively related to the transaction size; 5) the 
information cost is positively associated with insider 
holdings. Overall, except for the result related to the 
measure of total risk, results show consistency with an 
extensive body of literature. This essay may then be 
considered as a first step in understanding a complete story 
of NYSE specialists' costs, since some measurement problems 
in the estimation of the components of the spread remain 
unresolved. These measurement problems include those 
arising from institutional factors such as limit orders and 
those arising from theoretical considerations such as the 
assumption of a constant spread. Little is known as to 
whether these measurement problems may vary across stocks.
mean of the square of the error terms are linear function of 
the independent variables in each of the regression. The 
result does not reject the null hypothesis that the error 
term is unrelated to these variables.
The level of price is used as a proxy to control the 
discreteness problem, since it is reasonable to expect 
discreteness problem may affect stocks differently.
Finally, our results may be considered as weakly supportive 
of Stoll's model if the hypothesized cross-sectional 
variations detailed in section E are taken as given.
Our specification implicitly assumes the independence 
of specialists' trading behavior. In NYSE, a specialist may 
specialize in more than one stock. Often specialists form 
into a specialist unit (usually a firm).30 These facts 
suggest some possible diversification effect across stocks. 
Moreover, many NYSE members participate in both specialist 
and brokerage businesses, although Smidt (1988) notes that 
"It is unlikely that specialists today can be thought of as 
dealing in stocks in order to attract brokerage business, 
although in the past, when competing specialists were 
common, dealing may have been a subsidiary by-product 
service offered to attract brokerage business." Another 
type of possible interaction among specialists may occur 
when the business of market making is especially good or 
especially bad. For example, specialists may maintain a 
moderate spread under extremely adverse market conditions in
30Using information from NYSE Unit of Trade Directory, 
we find a total of 52 specialist units responsible for the 
NYSE common stocks. Our 100 sample stocks are handled by 35 
units, and the number of stocks each unit handles ranges 
from one to seven.
the hope that they will recover any loss incurred in an 
adverse market when the market becomes favorable again.
Chapter IV 
The Intraday Variations in 
Trading Activity, Price Variability and 
The Transaction Cost :
An Exploratory Investigation
IV. A. Introduction
Recent evidence (Wood, Mclnish, and Ord (1985), Jain 
and Joh (1988), and Mulherin and Gerety (1989)) document 
that volume and price changes are higher in the opening and 
the closing periods (i.e., exhibit a U-shaped pattern). 
Although this phenomenon is partly consistent with the 
finding of a positive relationship between volume and price 
variability (as summarized by Karpoff (1987)), the 
concentration of volume and price changes in the opening and 
the closing lacks a satisfactory explanation.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) present a model that is 
consistent with the U-shaped pattern in volume and price 
variability. Their primary innovation is to point out the 
critical role of the discretionary uninformed traders (i.e., 
uninformed traders that have the capacity to time their 
trades). The concentration of volume and price variability 
results from the interaction among and between discretionary
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uninformed traders and informed traders. Essentially,
Admati and Pfleiderer argue the concentration of volume and 
price variability results from variations in transaction 
costs. This essay provides a test of their model, as well 
as tests for other explanations that are consistent with the 
concentration in volume and price variability.
Foster and Viswanathan (1988) conduct a similar study 
in that they also investigate intraday variations in the 
components of the spread. There are, however, a number of 
differences between their study and ours. In particular, 
competing hypotheses are presented and tests are more 
extensive in our study. Also, the measurement problem is 
addressed here. A brief description of Foster and 
Viswanathan's (1988) test design and empirical results will 
be given in Section B.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section B 
gives a brief review of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and 
Foster and Viswanathan (1988). The competing hypotheses are 
presented in Section C. The description of methodology and 
samples can be found in Section D. Section E gives the 
empirical results. Section F then summarizes and concludes 
this chapter.
IV. B . The Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) Model
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The interaction between informed traders and uninformed 
traders has profound implications for security returns and 
volume. Kyle (1985) gives the insight that informed traders 
prefer to trade when the market is deeper (a greater amount 
of uninformed trading), so that they will not be subject to 
the adverse pricing by the dealer.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) (AP) extend Kyle's 
analysis by including discretionary uninformed traders. 
(Institutional traders, for example, may belong to this 
class of traders.) The intuition behind AP is as follows. 
Discretionary uninformed traders will prefer to trade when 
the transaction cost is lower, which usually occurs when the 
market is deeper. The concentration of volume can therefore 
occur because discretionary traders prefer to trade 
together. However, informed traders will also prefer to 
trade in a deeper market. To the extent that the degree of 
competition among informed traders is great, more informed 
traders will increase the welfare of uninformed traders. 
Consequently, this induces more discretionary uninformed 
traders, and the concentration of volume occurs. Prices 
will be more informative and price variability will be 
greater in periods of higher volume.
AP further argue that the opening and the closing 
periods are when trading is most likely to be concentrated. 
This is because overnight liquidity demands of traders will 
have be satisfied in these hours. This explanation,
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however, does not seem convincing for the higher volume that 
is often observed in the closing.
Under the AP model, the dealer responds to public 
information and private information conveyed through order 
flows by setting the price according to the following 
schedule :
Pt = Ft + sVi er + At Qt ........................... (Bl)
where Pt = transaction price at time t
Ft = expected value of the security at time t 
eT = public information arriving at time t 
Qt = order flow at time t 
The key parameter is At, the magnitude of price 
adjustment set by the dealer in response to order flows.
The reciprocal of A is a measure of the depth of the market. 
Their main result is that the dealer responses to a deeper 
(narrower) market by setting a lower (higher) spread (or 
magnitude of price adjustment).
According to Glosten and Harris's (1988) model, the 
revision in the expected value of the security is :
Ft = Ft-i + At Qt-!
Transform Equation (Bl) to its price changes form, the 
resulting equation is :
Pt —  Pt-i =  Qt +  e t
Note that this is similar to Glosten and Harris's basic 
equation (Equation (I)) :
Pt - Pt-! = (C + Z) (Qt - Qt-i) + (H + Z)Qt-i + et
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Where C, H, and Z represent, respectively, the order 
cost, the inventory cost and the information cost. If C = H 
= 0, two equations are exactly the same and X = Z.
It is apparent that the AP model does not consider the 
inventory and the order components of the spread, which are 
found to be important components of the spread by several 
studies (Glosten and Harris (1988), Hasbrouck (1988), Stoll 
(1989), and the evidence provided in Chapter III).
Foster and Viswanathan (1988) (FV) investigate the 
intraday and interday variations in the components of the 
spread, volume and return variance for the years 1985-86. 
They use a revised version of Glosten and Harris to estimate 
the information component, the inventory component, and the 
fixed cost component.31 Their main test appears to be (p.
13) : " ... an inverse relationship should exist between the 
adverse selection spread (the information component) and 
volume." The motivation for studying intraday variations in 
H and C is unclear.
The concentration of volume is tested by whether hourly 
volume accounts for one-sixth of a day's volume. For return 
variance, components of the spread, tests of zero 
differences in adjacent means are conducted. This
31As pointed out in Chapter II, Glosten and Harris's 
approach requires additional assumption(s) (e.g., H=0, or C 
and Z as some function of volume). FV does not assume that C 
and Z are independent but details of their decomposition are 
not given, and the solution to the identification problem is 
unclear.
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estimation procedure is valid only for comparing adjacent 
means. The stated confidence level may be incorrect, since 
there are a family of hypotheses to be tested.
Generally, they find various components of the spread, 
volume, and return variance demonstrate U shaped patterns. 
These results should reject AP model. However, it seems the 
correlation between volume and price variability leads them 
to conclude : 11 ... results 'weakly' support" the AP model.
FV separate the sample into 10 dollar volume deciles. 
The motivation for using dollar volume appears to use dollar 
volume to proxy for the degree of attention given to the 
stock. However, no specific hypothesis is made regarding 
the expected differences among deciles. Moreover, dollar 
volume is influenced by price, which may reflect the degree 
of the discreteness problem.
Although there are 10 deciles available, only results 
for the first, the fifth, and the tenth deciles are shown. 
Less active firms show a more pronounced U shaped pattern.
No explanation is given for this result. Moreover, the U 
shaped pattern in Z is not robust for larger volume stocks.
C. Competing Hypotheses
In addition to the AP model, there are other 
explanations that may be consistent with the concentration
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of volume and price variability. This section is devoted to 
discuss these competing hypotheses.
The AP model predicts that when the market is deeper, x 
(or Z) is lower; and this occurs with more informed traders 
coming into the market because of the competition factor. 
However, H and C can also be expected to be lower in a 
deeper market. In an environment characterized by the 
coexistence of H, C, and Z, lower Z (and the competition 
factor) is no longer a necessary condition for the 
concentration of volume and price variability.
A more general concept inspired by AP is that the 
concentration of volume and price variability should come 
with a lower total transaction cost32. Since informed 
traders prefer to trade in a deeper market, a higher Z may 
likely to be present if the degree of competition among 
informed traders is insufficient. It is clear that the 
concentration of volume will arise only if the total 
transaction cost is lower (hereinafter, the transaction cost 
hypothesis). The total transaction cost should be lower 
with lowering in Z, H, C or some combination of Z, H and C. 
Otherwise, discretionary uninformed traders will choose not 
to trade together and a concentration of volume is not 
possible.
32We concentrate on cost arising from trading with 
dealers and ignore commissions and other transaction costs.
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A test of this simple concept is important, since it 
provides a test of the relative importance of discretionary 
uninformed traders and nondiscretionary uninformed traders. 
If all uninformed traders can time their trades, no trading 
will occur in some periods and heavy trading will be 
observed in some other periods. On the other hand, if all 
uninformed traders cannot time their trades, the 
concentration of volume can seldom occur.
It appears that the overnight liquidity demands alone 
can explain the opening concentration in volume and price 
variability. If all uninformed traders cannot time their 
trades, their overnight liquidity demands have to be 
satisfied at the opening. The accumulated demands can cause 
a greater depth in the opening and may result in a lowering 
in the transaction cost (hereinafter, the overnight demand 
hypothesis). This hypothesis predicts higher volume in the 
opening but the consequence on price changes and transaction 
cost is not so clearcut. If more informed traders are 
induced by greater liquidity trading in the opening, the 
information component may or may not be greater, depending 
on the degree of competition among informed traders.
However, lower order/inventory cost can be expected in the 
opening. In contrast, the transaction cost hypothesis does 
not strongly predict a particular intraday pattern.
The literature of the relationship between volume and 
price variability is also relevant here, since a
concentration of volume and price variability also implies a 
positive relationship between volume and price variability. 
Generally, according to the theory of volume and price 
variability, uncertainties in information will induce more 
trading and more variability in prices. If the rate of 
information flow is much faster in certain periods, greater 
volume and price variability will be observed in those 
periods (hereinafter, the rate of information flow 
hypothesis).
The AP model is distinguished from the literature of 
volume and price variability in two aspects : (1) the role 
of the dealer is explicitly considered, and (2) the 
interaction between and among informed and uninformed 
traders is modeled. Under AP, a concentration of volume and 
price variability can occur with a constant rate of 
information flow. More importantly, an important and 
testable hypothesis of the transaction cost model is that 
the transaction cost should be lower in periods of 
concentration of volume and price variability. This 
prediction is not a necessary consequence of the literature 
of volume and price variability. In the literature of 
volume and price variability, the liquidity demand does not 
enter into the rate of information flow argument. More 
importantly, the role of the transaction cost is not 
explicitly considered. We suspect that the information 
component may well be higher in periods of higher volume
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that suggests information is more uncertain. That is, the 
uncertain nature of the information precludes competition 
(and lower Z) being a major factor in trades. Also, the 
rate of information flow hypothesis does not predict a 
particular intraday pattern33.
The following give important predictions that various 
hypotheses would prescribe.
Hypothesis (1) : The concentration of volume and price 
variability will occur if the information component is 
lower. The concentration of volume and price variability 
will not always occur; when it does not, the information 
component should be fairly constant. (The AP model.)
Hypothesis (2) : The concentration of volume and price 
variability will occur if the transaction cost is lower.
The concentration of volume and price variability will not 
always occur; when it does not, the transaction cost should 
be fairly constant. (The transaction cost hypothesis.)
33Brock and Kleidon (1989) argue inelastic demands at 
the opening and closing may account for the higher volume in 
these periods. Demands are more inelastic in the opening if 
traders have greater divergences in belief. Even if this is 
true, there should be no intraday pattern in C.
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Hypothesis (3) : Higher volume, price variability, and 
lower order/inventory cost should be observed in the opening 
(The overnight demands hypothesis.)
Hypothesis (4) : Higher (lower) volume occurs with 
higher (lower) price variability, and this likely occurs 
with higher (lower) information component and transaction 
cost. There should be no particular intraday pattern. (The 
rate of information flow hypothesis.)
It is clear that these four hypotheses are not mutually 
exclusive. Moreover, the relative explanatory power of 
various hypotheses may vary over time and across stocks.
We suspect that the degree of concentration of volume 
and price variability may vary across stocks, based on three 
reasons. The first reason relates to the competition factor 
that AP model heavily relies upon. The degree of 
competition is of course difficult to measure. However, 
since high-activity stocks are more likely to be closely 
watched, the degree of competition among informed traders is 
likely to be greater. This suggests the concentration of 
volume and price variability should be more pronounced for 
higher-activity stocks. Second, if the relative importance 
of the discretionary uninformed traders varies across 
stocks, the concentration of volume and price variability 
will be more obvious for stocks that discretionary traders
play a more important role in. The relative importance of 
the discretionary traders across stocks is unclear. 
Institutional traders seem to prefer high-activity stocks. 
Nevertheless, institutional traders may not be equivalent to 
discretionary uninformed traders. Furthermore, although 
there may be fewer institutional traders interested in low- 
activity stocks, the relative importance of these traders 
may be actually higher if they assume more active trading 
than ordinary investors. No specific pattern across stocks 
is suspected at this point. Third, if liquidity trading is 
relatively more important for some stocks, the opening 
volume should be relatively high, according to the overnight 
liquidity demands hypothesis. The suspected cross-sectional 
differences motivate our analysis of different samples, 
separated by number of trades (to proxy for trading 
activity).
Although the data we use cover a short period (two 
months), it includes days of record volume and price 
variability (the so called 1987 October Crash). One obvious 
problem is that trading halts are more prevalent during 
these record-setting days. This may distort prices and 
volume. Also, there are reasons to expect that the post­
crash behavior of specialists may differ from their pre­
crash one. A report of the impact of the crash on Amex
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states34 : "Amex specialists risked unprecedented amounts of 
capital to maintain orderly markets, buying six times the 
usual number of shares on October 19-20.", and so on
October 21, when the Amex Market Value Index shot up almost 
9 percent, they (specialists) fulfilled their 
responsibilities by selling stocks, often at a substantial 
loss." For these reasons, we present separate results for 
the two periods.
There is still another complication. French (1980) and 
French and Roll (1986) document a day of the week effect in 
mean return and price variability. Theoretical explanation 
is nevertheless unclear. French and Roll argue the 
difference between weekend and weekday variances reveals the 
relative importance of public information, private 
information, and noise trading. Foster and Viswanathan 
(1989) hypothesize that the private information is revealed 
partially through some public signal. The public signal is 
weak during the weekend, and therefore discretionary 
uninformed traders prefer to trade later in the week. This 
predicts less volume and price variability, and higher 
information component on Monday. It appears that the day of 
the week effect is related to the interaction between the 
public and private information processes, and there is no
34American Stock Exchange. A Report to Listed Companies 
on the Performance of the American Stock Exchange During the 
October 1987 "Crash". January 30, 1988.
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strong link between the time of the day effect and the day 
of the week effect. Nevertheless, we are concerned with the 
nonstationarities in return and volume distributions that 
are implied by the day of the week effect. The following 
analysis includes consideration of this factor.
IV. D. Methodology and Samples
Our main interest is the intraday variations of the 
trading activity, the price variability, the information 
component, the transitory component (the sum of inventory 
and order components), and the total transaction cost. 
Proportion of block trade (the number of block trades - 
10,000 shares and above35- divided by the total number of 
trades, BLOCK) is also analyzed. BLOCK may represent either 
or both of the following : the amount of informed trading 
(if informed traders prefer to trade larger quantities 
(Easley and O'Hara (1987)), and the amount of institutional 
trading (if institutional traders tend to trade larger 
quantities). Therefore, BLOCK should provide additional 
information concerning cross-sectional variations in the 
concentration of volume and price variability.
What constitutes an adequate measure of trading 
activity is not as apparent as it seems. Number of trades
3SDefined by New York Stock Exchange.
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should represent the level of interest in the stock.
However, trade size enters as an additional signal of 
trading interest (Easely and O'Hara (1987)). This suggests 
volume should also be investigated. Moreover, volume is 
more of the focus of previous studies (e.g., Jain and Joh 
(1988)). We will investigate both the intraday variations 
in number of trades (NT) and volume (VOL). The measurement 
of price variability also involves some problems. Previous 
studies in this area use different measures. Some (e.g., 
Wood, et al (1985)) use return variance (RETV) while others 
(Mulherin and Gerety (1989)) use the absolute values of 
returns (RET). We look at both RETV and RET in this 
chapter.
There are problems in the estimation of components of 
the spread, as discussed in Chapters II and III. However, 
if the Stoll's and the Glosten/Harris's approaches give 
similar results, it will increase our confidence in the 
estimation of the components of the spread. Stoll's 
approach is explained in details in Chapters II and III.
The application of Glosten and Harris's approach requires 
some further discussion.
Glosten and Harris's empirical model can be specified 
in a number of different ways. To search for the most 
useful specification, they test the significance of the 
coefficients of the following regression :
Pt “ t^-i = C (Qt - Qt-i) + Z Qt + et
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where
Qt = trade type (purchase or sale) at time t 
C = transitory component = c0 + Cx Vt 
Z = information component = Z0 + Vt 
Vt = transaction size at time t 
They find the most useful model is one that Z0 = Cj =
0, constant et mean and variance without accounting for the 
discreteness in prices, which indicates an OLS estimation of 
the form :
Pt “ Pt-i = C0 (Qt — Qt-i) + Qt Vt + et 
provided that Qt's are known36. Since our analysis requires 
a large number of estimations, specification search for 
every stock and every hour is simply not economical.
Rather, we use the most useful model found in their study. 
(Here Vt is stated in hundreds of shares.) The information 
component is two times ZjVt and the transitory component 
(C2) is twice C0, reflecting average cost for round-trip 
transactions. The information component is notated as Z1 if 
Stoll's approach is employed, Z2 if Glosten and Harris's is 
adopted. Likewise, Cl and C2 represent the transitory
36To identify the trade type Qt (purchase or sale), the 
transaction price is compared to the most recent quote. 
Midpoint transactions (about 20% of all trades) are treated 
as neutral. To this end, it should be pointed out there are 
some classification rules to classify these midpoint 
transactions as discussed by Hasbrouck (1987). His 
classification rules are not utilized here.
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component when employing Stoll and Glosten/Harris, 
respectively.
To measure the total transaction cost is much more 
difficult than it appears. The quoted spread seems to be a 
candidate for the measure of the transaction cost. However, 
as Grossman and Miller (1988) and Stoll (1989) point out, 
the quoted spread is the difference between the ask and the 
bid prices at one point in time. The quoted spread is 
therefore not representative of the true cost that is faced 
by an ordinary investor who seldom, if ever, simultaneously 
buys and sells a security at the same point in time. 
Furthermore, Stoll (1985) and Smidt (1988) find the return 
realized by dealers is substantially different from (in most 
cases, substantially lower than) the quoted spread. We 
include average proportional quoted spread (AVGS) 
nevertheless. The percentage changes in quoted prices (AO) 
(quoted price is given as the average of the bid and ask 
prices) is given as a measure of transaction cost. An 
astute investor would prefer to trade when dealers are less 
sensitive to trades, which should be captured by /\0.
Two studies point to potential factors that may 
influence AO. Schultz, Gustavson and Reily (1985) provide 
an experimental study of factors influencing the opening 
quotes. They find that the price trend, the inventory 
position, the limit book, and especially, the order 
imbalance are important factors in the setting of opening
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prices. Marsh and Rock (1986) find a statistical 
relationship between /\0 and net number of trades37. An 
empirical model of /\0 is developed based partly on their 
findings.
Comparisons of hourly means for /\0 are insufficient 
for our purpose. First of all, /\0 are influenced by the 
factors discussed above. Second, the theory in the 
components of the spread indicates that order imbalance 
should lead to adjustment in the location of the quoted 
price. If /\0 is related to order imbalance as theory 
suggests, this will provide evidence that /\0 reflects the 
transaction cost.
Z\Q = f (HOUR DAY NETT NT RET RETV /\S)
where HOUR = a set of dummy variables representing the 
hour of the day 
DAY = a set of dummy variables representing the 
day of the week 
NETT = net number of trades (investor purchase 
minus investor sale)
NT = total number of trades 
RET = hourly return
RETV = trade-by-trade return variance
37Their analysis is conducted on the level of 
individual stocks while ours focuses more on aggregate 
statistics.
8 1
/\S = percentage changes in proportional spread
NETT gives the magnitude of the order imbalance. NT 
proxies for the depth of the market. RET and RETV are 
proxies for price trend and price risk, respectively. Since 
the magnitude of the spread is likely not a constant over 
the estimation period, A S is included to control for this 
factor.
The frequency of the quote adjustment (FREQ) is another 
potentially useful piece of information. A higher FREQ 
suggests more information is coming into the market. On the 
other hand, changes in the transaction cost will likely 
reflect more of the degree of informational asymmetry 
between informed traders and the dealer. Therefore, the 
inclusion of FREQ may help in distinguishing the rate of 
information flow hypothesis and the AP hypothesis. FREQ is 
measured by the average number of trades between quotes. 
However, incidence of consecutive quotes without trades is 
often observed. For our purpose, in the case of consecutive 
quotes without trades, only the first quote is kept for our 
analysis.
Without prior studies of FREQ, the empirical model of 
FREQ will be specified less precisely. A model similar to 
that of the /\Q is adopted for FREQ, with the modification 
that NETT, RET, and A S are now in their absolute values.
FREQ = f (HOUR DAY NETT NT RET RETV /\S)
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Ideally, we want to employ similar analysis of /\0 to 
other variables that are of interest. Unfortunately, 
factors influencing these variables are not known. We 
include only the hour effect and the day effect for the 
analysis. The two-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
approach is adopted to test whether the means of NT, VOL, 
RETV, RET, Z, C, AVGS, and BLOCK are different across hours. 
The main focus is on the hour of the day effect and the day 
of the week effect is included as an additional factor. No 
interaction is assumed to exist between the day and the hour 
effects.38
The same data set used in chapter III is employed here. 
To study the hour of the day effect, a day's trading is 
split into six trading periods. During the data period - 
September and October 1987, two months or 44 trading days - 
the exchange normally is open six and a half hours39. 
Therefore, a day's trading is partitioned into six sixty- 
five minute periods. {For convenience, hours and periods 
will be used as interchangeable terms hereinafter.)
38The methodology is equivalent to the regression 
approach using purely dummy variables. If interaction effect 
is present, it is less meaningful to compare factor level 
means. Therefore, the exclusion of the interaction effect 
simplifies the analysis to a great extent. Furthermore, our 
general results are the same even if the interaction effect 
is incorporated.
39This is verified by the Wall Street Journal.
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The nature of this study (i.e., exploratory) requires a 
large sample. We arbitrarily choose the first 500 stocks in 
the data base that meet the following criteria : 1) NYSE 
stocks, 2) no stock dividends or special dividends issued 
over the data period, and 3) minimum price increment is one- 
eighth over the entire data period. Some 253 stocks are 
eliminated by 1), 5 are eliminated by 2) and 87 are excluded 
due to 3), when reaching the 500 mark'*0.
A large sample also requires all 44 days be included.
As argued before, however, we present separate analysis for 
the pre- and post-crash periods. Pre-crash period covers 
August 31 through October 15. Post-crash period begins with 
October 16 (the day before the crash, which also exhibits 
substantial price variability and high volume) and ends with 
October 30. For the pre-crash period, there are 6 Mondays,
6 Fridays, and 7 each for the other weekdays. For the post­
crash period, there are two each for every weekday with the 
exception of Friday (three).
For each stock, each hour and each day, NT, VOL, RETV, 
RET, Zl, Z2, Cl, C2, AVGS, and BLOCK are computed. RET is 
the absolute percentage changes between the first and the 
last transaction prices over an hour. RETV is the trade-by-
*°Additionally, four stocks do not yield convergence 
when using Stoll's approach (visual inspection indicates 
this is a result of some doubtful prices) and are excluded. 
Also, some transactions are excluded, as detailed in chapter 
III, section B.
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trade return variance over an hour. Since at least three 
transactions are needed to compute covariance of price 
changes (and 21, Cl), this essentially limits our ability to 
analyze low-activity stocks. Nevertheless, to be consistent 
in computing NT, VOL, RETV, RET, Z, C, AVGS, and BLOCK,41 
low trades observations (i.e., less than three trades and 
three quotes in an hour) are excluded. Therefore, not all 
stocks have an observation for every one-hour period. This 
is especially true for a sample of low trading stocks.
Three samples are created based on cutoff points of 600 
(approximately 25% quantile of the data set) and 3,800 
(approximately 75% quantile of the data set) trades over the 
data period.42 The exchange closes two hours early for the 
last six days of the data period. Therefore, there are a 
maximum of 252 observations for each stock. High-activity 
sample contains 135 stocks, 30249 observations (pre-crash : 
23786, post-crash : 6463), with the observations for 
individual stocks ranging from 101 to 252 (average = 224). 
Medium-activity sample consists of 252 stocks, 31252 
observations (pre-crash : 21705, post-crash : 9547), and
41In computing RETV, RET, Z, C, and AVGS, prices are 
adjusted for cash dividends. Namely, the amount of dividend 
is added to the prices subsequent to and including the ex- 
dividend date.
42The medium sample is then artificially created to be 
larger than the high and the low samples. This is to create 
a large enough medium sample so that there is confidence for 
the medium sample at least.
individual observations range from 28 to 238 (average =
124). Low-activity sample contains 92 stocks, 2115 
observations (pre-crash : 943, post-crash : 1172), with 
individual observations ranging from 1 to 60 (average = 23). 
Some 21 stocks are excluded from the low activity sample due 
to insufficient trading over all hours. We know, therefore, 
the inference based on the low activity sample will be less 
powerful. The average volume across stocks and hours are 
7,080 shares, 15,541 shares, and 63,158 shares for the low- 
activity sample, medium-activity sample, and high-activity 
sample, respectively.
The generation of these samples should be considered as 
a conservative approach. Specifically, by systematically 
discarding low trading observations, mean statistics for NT 
and VOL should show less contrast across hours than if all 
observations are included. If significant differences were 
to be found across hours, such differences should not be due 
to sampling biases.
The data set is quite large. Since little effort is 
spent in detecting potential reporting errors, some more 
robust procedure that is insensitive to data errors is 
desired. To this end, observations are ranked and the same 
ANOVA approach is used on the rank transformed data.
Conover (1980, p. 337) comments on the rank transformed data 
: "The result is a robust regression method that is not 
sensitive to outliers or nonnormal distributions to the
8 6
extent that regular regression methods on the data are 
affected." If the two methods give different results, then 
: " ... the analysis on ranks is probably more accurate than 
the analysis on the data and should be preferred."
The AP model predicts concentration of trading activity 
and price variability for some periods. The argument for 
the U-shaped pattern is less convincing. To gain adequate 
inferences of differences in hourly means, multiple mean 
comparisons procedure is required. Multiple comparisons 
procedure is necessary because a family of comparisons are 
of interest here. There are a number of methods for 
performing multiple comparisons. The Tukey method43 is 
chosen here because it gives narrower confidence limits if 
all or a large number of pairwise comparisons are of 
interest. Moreover, "The Tukey method is exact if all 
factor level sample sizes are the same, is a conservative 
method when the sample sizes are unequal." (Neter,
Wasserman, and Kutner (1985). )44
43The Tukey method utilizes the studentized range 
distribution. The confidence interval for difference in 
means is the difference in hourly means plus and minus 
Tsz(D), where s2(D) = (MSE/b2)Sj(l/n^l/n^), T = (l/,/2)q[l- 
a; a, nT-ab], a (b) is number of levels for the hour (day) 
factor, i (j) is the ith (jth) level for hour (day), nT is 
the total number of observations, and q represents the 
studentized range distribution.
A4See also Stoline (1981) for a survey of multiple 
pairwise comparisons methods.
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IV. E. Empirical Results
For clarity of the presentation, results for various 
samples are given separately, in the order of the results 
for the high-activity sample first (Table 8 for the pre­
crash period, Table 9 for the post-crash period), medium- 
activity sample second (Table 10 for pre-crash, Table 11 for 
post-crash), and low-activity sample last (Table 12 for pre­
crash, Table 13 for post-crash). Since the analysis is the 
same for all samples, more details will be given in 
discussing results for the high-activity sample and fewer 
details will be given for the analyses of other samples. No 
statistical test is used to test differences among samples, 
although some discussion will be presented at the latter 
part of this section.
Table 8 panel A gives the means and standard deviations 
(they are pooled time series and cross-sectional statistics) 
for NT, VOL, RETV, RET, Z, C, AVGS and BLOCK. Mean NT, VOL, 
RETV, RET, Zl, AVGS, BLOCK are the highest, while mean Cl 
and C2 are the lowest in the first hour. To see the 
significance of the hour effect as well as the marginal 
significance of the day effect, ANOVA result is given in 
panel B. F gives the overall significance of the ANOVA 
result. Fh represents the F value if only the hour variable
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is included. Fh/W (FM/h)“ measures the marginal significance 
of the hour (day) variable when the day (hour) variable is 
also included. For all variables, the hour effect is 
statistically significant at 1% level'16. The day effect 
shows some inconsistency for RETV, Zl, Z2, and C2 using the 
original data and rank transformed data, which suggests that 
measurement problem is present for these variables.
Overall, the day effect is significant.
Panel C gives the signs of hourly mean differences (the 
differences in means can be inferred from panel A). Except 
for difference in RETV between hours 1 and 6, the first hour 
patterns are significant for all variables. NT, VOL, RET, 
RETV, Zl, Z2, AVGS, and BLOCK are the highest, and Cl, C2 
are the lowest in the first hour (although Z2 and C2 do not 
give same conclusion using original data and transformed 
data). In contrast, remaining hours show mixed results.
NT, VOL and RET for hour 2 are higher than those of hours 3- 
5 but no significant differences are observed for components 
of spread or AVGS. In general, hour 6's NT, VOL, RETV and 
RET are higher than those of hours 3-5. With the exception 
of hour 4, no significant differences between hour 6 and
“ For example, Fh/W is (SSE(R)-SSE(F) )/(dfR- 
dfF)/(SSE(F)/dfF), where F represents the full model, R 
represents the reduced model (i. e., hour effect is 
excluded). Test for the interaction effect is similar.
“ For convenience, the term "significant" refers to 
"significant at 1% level" hereinafter.
hours 2-5 in components of the spread are observed. The 
results suggest the relationship between trading activity 
and transaction cost differs across hours. First hour 
results do not contradict hypotheses (2), (3) and (4). The 
results for the remaining hours contradict hypotheses (1) 
through (3). To better distinguish hypotheses (2) and (4), 
the analysis for /\o is needed.
Since patterns among hours 2-5 are similar, we simplify 
the analysis of /\0 by ignoring differences among hours 2-5. 
For the day effect, the significant patterns using both the 
original data and the rank data are that mean NT (Monday : 
20.25, Friday : 18.74, others : 22.61), VOL (Monday : 410, 
Friday : 438, others : 508) and RET (Monday : 0.0052, Friday 
: 0.0047, others : 0.0061) are lower on Monday and Friday.
In addition, mean BLOCK is higher on Friday (0.0477 vs. 
0.0437 for other days)*7. We further simplify the analysis 
to the following :
/\0 = f(HI, H6, Wl, W5, NETT, NT, RET, RETV, /\S) 
where HI is a dummy variable = 1 if hour 1
= 0 otherwise 
H6 is a dummy variable = 1 if hour 6
- o otherwise
*7The interaction effect is present for NT (F=6.49),
VOL (F=3.09) and RET (F=14.70). Nevertheless, results for 
hourly mean comparisons are identical in terms of panel C 
whether the interaction effect is included. This is true for 
all samples.
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W1 is a dummy variable = 1 if Monday
= 0 otherwise 
W5 is a dummy variable = 1 if Friday
= 0 otherwise 
Similar analysis is conducted for FREQ, except that 
NETT, RET, and /\S are now in their absolute values.
FREQ = f(HI, H6, Wl, W5, NETT, NT, RET, RETV, /\S)
The OLS regression approach is adopted for the analysis 
of /\0 and FREQ, and the result is shown in Table 8 panel D. 
The estimated coefficient of HI measures how much higher the 
mean /\0 for hour 1 is than the one for hours 2-5.
Similarly, the coefficient of H6 measures how much higher 
the mean /\0 for hour 6 is than the one for hours 2-5. The 
difference between the coefficient of HI and the coefficient 
of H6 gives how much higher /\0 for hour 1 is than that for 
hour 6. Similar interpretation is applied to Wl and W5.
HI is significantly negatively related to /\Q. 
indicating that the sensitivity of dealer's price adjustment 
is lower at hour 1. HI (H6) is positively (negatively) 
related to FREQ, suggesting specialists adjust quotes more 
(less) frequently at hour 1 (hour 6). Since /\0 is lower at 
hour 1, the depth of the market is inferred to be greater at 
hour 1. Combining with previous results (higher NT, VOL, 
RETV, RET, Zl, Z2, AVGS, BLOCK and lower Cl, C2 at hour 1), 
these results support hypotheses (2) and (3). The last hour 
increase in NT, VOL and RET without significant changes in
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Z, C and /\0 is more consistent with hypothesis (4). It 
suggests that the rate of information flow is faster at the 
last hour. A potential explanation is that because the 
information is uncertain, investors unwind their positions 
before the close in order to avoid risk that may incur 
overnight40.
Regression result in panel D confirms that /\Q is 
positively related to NETT, which is the underlying 
behavioral assumption that is commonly employed in the 
studies of the component of the spread. That is, net 
investor purchase (sale) will lead to an upward (downward) 
adjustment in quoted price. The FREQ regression is 
confusing; in particular, the negative relationship between 
FREQ and the absolute value of NETT contradicts competitive 
behavior among specialists. It is quite possible that FREQ 
model is not well specified.
In contrast, the post-crash results in Table 9 
demonstrate inconsistent patterns (inconsistency here refers 
to contradicting patterns for similar variables such as NT 
and VOL). Mean NT, RET are the highest and C2 is the lowest 
at hour 6, but mean VOL, RETV, Zl, Z2, AVGS, BLOCK are the 
highest and Cl is the lowest at hour 1. Panel B indicates 
that the hour effect is insignificant for RETV, AVGS, and 
for original Z2 and C2. The day effect is particularly
48Jain and Joh (1988) make similar argument.
strong for NT, VOL, transformed RETV, RET, AVGS and BLOCK*9. 
Multiple comparisons results (panel C) are generally 
inconsistent. The only significant and consistent pattern 
in trading activity and transaction cost occurs between hour 
1 and hours 3-4, between hour 2 and hours 3-4 (hours 1-2 
have higher NT, VOL, lower Cl and C2). A possible 
explanation of the weaker concentration in trading activity 
and transaction cost is that informed trading dominates 
uninformed trading for the post-crash period. This 
explanation predicts that the concentration of volume, price 
variability and transaction cost is less likely to be 
present for the post-crash period, according to the 
transaction cost and the overnight demands hypotheses. The 
insignificance of HI and H6 in /\Q regression (panel D) 
leads to similar conclusion.
The pre-crash results for the medium-activity sample 
are shown in Table 10. Mean statistics in panel A 
demonstrate some inconsistency in NT and VOL, and in Zl and 
Z2. Nevertheless, it seems clear that more obvious patterns 
occur at hours 1 and 6. Mean NT is the highest at hour 6. 
Mean VOL, RET, Zl, AVGS are the highest, and Cl, C2 are the 
lowest at hour 1. Mean BLOCK is the highest at hour 3.
^ e a n  NT and VOL are lower on Thursday (33.96, 1086) 
and Friday (35.69, 934) than on other days (42.74, 1319). 
Mean RET, AVGS and BLOCK are the lowest on Friday (0.0131, 
0.0115, 0.0573) than other days (0.0280, 0.0163, 0.0682). 
The interaction effect is present for RET and AVGS (F=26.81, 
2.25).
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Additionally, mean Z2 and C2 are quite large, compared to 
the high-activity sample. The average cost for 100 shares 
round-trip transactions according Glosten and Harris's 
approach is approximately 14 (=Z2+C2) times the quoted 
spread (about more than one-eighth of a dollar), which seems 
extremely high. Panel B ANOVA results show that, for RETV, 
Z2, C2, and BLOCK, the hour effect is insignificant using 
original data while significant using rank data. Hour 
effects for NT, VOL, RET, Zl, and AVGS are significant and 
more robust. The day effect is significant only for NT and 
VOL50.
Multiple comparisons results (panel C) show some 
contradicting signs for difference in NT and VOL between 
hours 1 and 6. The consistent and significant patterns 
occur between hour 1 and hours 2-5. Like the results for 
high-activity sample, NT, VOL, RETV, RET, Zl, Z2, and BLOCK 
are generally higher, and Cl is lower at hour 1 than those 
at hours 2-5. This is consistent with hypotheses (2) and
(3). NT, VOL, RETV, and RET for hours 4-5 are lower than 
those of hour 6, which is more consistent with hypothesis
(4). In panel D, the analysis of /\0 indicates /\0 is lower 
at hour 1, which is again more consistent with hypotheses 
(2) and (3). W5 is significantly positively related to /\0.
50Mean NT is 7.07 on Monday, 7.00 on Friday versus 7.51 
for other days. The interaction effect is present for NT and 
RET (F=4.60, 1.89).
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This is inconsistent with Foster and Viswanathan (1989), 
since their model predicts only Monday is different from 
other weekdays.
For the post-crash period, mean NT is the highest at 
hour 6, VOL, RET, Z2, AVGS, and BLOCK are the highest at 
hour 1. On the other hand, RETV is the highest at hour 3,
Zl is the highest at hour 5, and Cl (C2) is the lowest at 
hour 5 (hour 2). The hour effects for all transformed 
variables are significant. Like the results for the post­
crash high-activity sample, the day effect is particularly 
strong for NT, VOL, transformed RETV, RET, and AVGS (panel 
B)51. Investigation of panel C indicates that the only 
consistent and significant pattern in trading activity, 
price variability and transaction cost occurs between hour 1 
and hour 4. NT, VOL, RETV, RET, Zl, Z2, BLOCK are higher, 
and Cl is lower at hour 1 than at hour 4. Other patterns 
are generally either insignificant or inconsistent, this 
reinforces our previous conjecture that the relative 
importance of uninformed trading decreases in the post-crash 
period.
Table 12 presents results for the low-activity sample 
before the crash. The results are relatively 
straightforward, compared to those of medium and high
slMean NT, VOL, RET and AVGS are lower on Friday (9.67, 
173, 0.0151, 0.0190) than on other days (12.17, 231, 0.0275, 
0.0266). The interaction effect is present for NT, RET, Zl 
and AVGS (F=3.82, 15.94, 2.09, 4.62).
activity samples. Simply put, there are no significant 
intraday patterns in NT, VOL, RETV, Z, C, AVGS, and BLOCK 
(Panels B and C). Panel A shows that mean NT and RETV are 
the highest at hour 1. VOL is the highest at hour 5. Zl,
Z2 AVGS, BLOCK are the highest, and Cl is the lowest at hour 
4. The analysis of /\Q shows no significant difference in 
the price sensitivity between hour 1, hour 6 and the rest of 
the day52. The non-pattern in the low-activity sample can 
be explained if the relative importance of the discretionary 
traders is less for low-activity sample. If institutional 
traders are discretionary traders and if they are less 
interested in low activity stocks, AP model will predict 
little or no concentration in volume and price variability.
Post-crash results for the low-activity sample are 
again insignificant (Table 13). Panel A shows that mean NT, 
VOL, RET, C2 and BLOCK are the highest at hour 1. RETV and 
Z2 are higher at hour 2. Panel B indicates that the hour 
effect is significant only for VOL and for transformed
52For all regressions in this chapter, the analysis of 
eigenvalues of the X'X matrix shows that the 
multicollinearity problem is not severe.
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BLOCK. Panel C indicates the only significant pattern 
occurs for VOL between hour 1 and hours 2-4.53
One noteworthy observation is the variations in BLOCK 
before and after the crash. For high-activity sample, BIXDCK 
generally increases in the post-crash period. The opposite 
pattern occurs for the low-activity sample. As we have 
argued before, BLOCK may represent either or both of the 
institutional trading and informed trading. The observation 
here contradicts BLOCK is solely a measure of informed 
trading, since it is difficult to explain why the relative 
importance of informed trading decreases for some stocks 
while increases for some other stocks, unless the crash is a 
result of company-specific information, rather than market- 
wide information. If this conjecture is true, it reinforces 
hypotheses (2) and (3), since we find that BLOCK is higher 
in periods of higher trading activity, price variability, 
and lower /\0.
For the pre-crash high-activity sample, VOL for the 
first hour is relatively high. Mean VOL for the first hour 
(=761.24) is about twice the average of those of other 
hours, although standard deviation of VOL is also the
53Mean NT, RETV, RET, and AVGS are lower on Monday and 
Friday. The interaction is present for RET (F=2.02). If 5% 
significance level is used instead of 1%, there are some 
small number of changes. For the post-crash low-activity 
sample, the only change is that VOL is significantly higher 
at hour 1 than at hours 2-5. For all samples, the general 
results are unaffected even if 5% is used instead.
highest at hour 1 (=1239, which is about twice the average 
of those of other hours). In contrast, Medium-activity 
sample shows less concentration in VOL. Mean VOL is the 
highest at hour 1 (=144.66) but the average VOL for other 
hours is only slightly below that of hour 1 (average is 
about 120). The low-activity sample is in even sharper 
contrast to the high- and medium-activity samples. No 
significant patterns are observed for the low-activity 
sample. This is consistent with the level of trading 
activity being a proxy for the degree of competition among 
informed traders (hypothesis (1)). It is also consistent 
with hypothesis (2) or (3) if the relative importance of 
discretionary uninformed trading (hypothesis (2)) or 
liquidity trading (hypothesis (3)) is higher for higher- 
activity stocks.
In all /\Q regressions, A Q is significantly positively 
related to NETT and RET. Only in the post-crash high- 
activity sample is /\0 significantly negatively related to 
NT. The negative relationship between /\0 and NT is 
consistent with the notion that dealers response less 
sensitively to trades when the market depth is greater.
Also, there is a significantly negative relationship between 
/\0 and /\S for the medium sample, which suggests some 
tradeoff between A O and A S . These results seem worthwhile 
for future research.
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The caveat in Chapter III applies here. That is, there 
are some measurement problems involved, especially for the 
components of the spread. In this chapter, we find that 
Glosten and Harris's approach may be sensitive to sample 
size. Average round-trip Z2 or C2 is within the range of 
0.1 to 2 for the high-activity sample. For the low-activity 
sample, the average number of Z2 or C2 is above 10 in most 
cases. In contrast, Stoll's approach (Cl and Zl) does not 
appear to be sensitive to sample size.
As in Chapter III where we provide aggregate statistics 
for various components of the spread across stocks, the 
independence among stocks is implicitly assumed. 
Nevertheless, we find the high- and the medium-activity 
samples do not appear to behave much differently from each 
other. The difference between the low sample and the high 
(medium) sample may be due to the degree of measurement 
problem, or may be due to some differences in stocks 
characteristics. Either explanation suggests more caution 
should be taken with respect to results for low-trading 
stocks.
IV. F. Summary and Conclusions
Intraday variations in means of number of trades, 
volume, return variance, absolute value of return, the 
information component, the transitory component, the
sensitivity of dealer's price adjustment, and the proportion 
of block trades are investigated for the period of September 
and October, 1987. Three samples, separated by the number 
of trades, show different patterns. High-activity sample 
shows that trading activity, price variability, the 
information component, and proportion of block trades are 
the highest, and the transitory component, the sensitivity 
of price adjustment are the lowest at the first hour.
Medium activity sample shows similar results. In both 
samples, trading activity increases at the last hour without 
significant changes in the information component or the 
price sensitivity. In addition, the concentration of 
trading activity, price variability and transaction cost 
weakens in the post-crash period. In contrast, low-activity 
sample demonstrates no significant intraday patterns, for 
both the pre- and post-crash periods.
The first hour results are consistent with the notion 
that liquidity traders time their trades to minimize 
transaction costs, inconsistent with Admati and Pfleiderer's 
model that predicts a negative relationship between 
information component and trading activity. The results are 
also consistent with overnight liquidity demands hypothesis. 
Our test unfortunately cannot fully distinguish the 
transaction cost hypothesis and the overnight demands 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, according to the overnight 
liquidity demands hypothesis, the differences among samples
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suggest liquidity traders are more important for higher- 
activity stocks, which lacks both theoretical and empirical 
support. In contrast, the transaction cost hypothesis says 
that the relative importance of discretionary uninformed 
trading is more for higher-activity stocks. This 
explanation seems more appealing. The two hypotheses 
nevertheless point to the importance of trading not 
motivated by information.
The patterns of the remaining hours are more consistent 
with the rate of information flow hypothesis. Of course, 
the rate of information flow hypothesis does not predict a 
particular intraday pattern. The significant pattern at the 
last hour can be explained by investors' avoiding overnight 
risk exposure by unwinding their positions before the close. 
Since these transactions involve little precise information, 
no substantial changes in the information component is 
predicted. The difference between the pre- and post-crash 
results is consistent with an increase in the relative 
importance of informed trading for the post-crash period.
There are two other observations that should be 
considered when interpreting the results. One is the 
difference between trading procedures for the opening and 
the remaining markets. The opening operates like a call 
market while the remaining is market in which dealers 
perform a more critical role. It is unclear that whether 
difference in trading procedures may affect our results. To
this, we point out a finding by Garbade and Sekaran (1981) 
that opening prices are unbiased estimators of subsequent 
(up to an hour) intraday prices. Another observation is the 
Harris's (1989) finding of a tendency for the last trade to 
occur at the ask price. Nevertheless, to the extent that 
opening and closing minutes are not representative of 
remaining minutes, the effect should be minimal for our 
hourly statistics. It is imaginable that the effect may be 
more severe for low-trading stocks, for which we do not find 
significant patterns.
Additional results also point to areas for future 
research. In particular, changes in quoted prices relate 
more to order imbalance than to the total number of trades. 
This result provides empirical support for the framework 
adopted in the model in the third essay.
Chapter V
The Components of Trading Volume and 
The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread :
Model and Application
V. A. Introduction
A simple model is structured to present the simple 
intuition that the composition of trading volume (informed 
and uninformed components) conveys information to the dealer 
about the degree of the information asymmetry. Thus, there 
is a link between the components of trading volume and the 
components of the spread. We assume a one-period model and 
structure the model generally enough to avoid detailing the 
trading process and the process resolving information 
differences among market participants. An application of 
the model then follows.
V. B. Related Issues
Volume is empirically easy to measure. However, it is 
not so easy to model volume theoretically. Volume is the 
combined absolute purchase and absolute sale. In itself, 
volume reflects neither the demand nor the supply of the
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security. This may partly explain the largely ignorance of 
volume by financial economists5*. Some theoretical models 
construct complex measure of volume, but often do so in an 
ad-hoc fashion. Since transaction-by-transaction data 
become increasingly available to researchers, net volume can 
be empirically estimated. Furthermore, net volume has a 
clearer economic interpretation - the order imbalances.
Since at a given point in time, only a small proportion 
of investors can participate in trades, prices likely will 
not reflect the equilibrium value of the security. The 
disequilibrium model such as that developed by Goldman and 
Beja (1979) makes this point clearly. However, this 
approach is not taken here because it is extremely complex 
to model interaction among various trading parties using 
this approach. Rather, the market is structured to resemble 
a combination of the call market and continuous market to 
allow the equilibrium type of approach.
V. C. The Model
Consider that we are in a market with three types of 
participants : a risk-neutral dealer, informed traders and 
uninformed traders. The demand and supply functions of the
5*See Karpoff (1987) for a summary of literature of 
volume and price variability.
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informed and uninformed traders can be specified as follows.
Pt = Xlt -   (Cl)
Pt = - EmVot + et ................................. (C2)
where
Pt = transaction price at time t
Xit = true price known only to the informed trader 
X^ t = price perceived by the uninformed and dealer 
Vt = trading volume at time t (can be either positive 
or negative)
et = an error term representing noise in the trade 
E± = sensitivity of informed demand/supply to prices 
Em = sensitivity of uninformed demand/supply to prices 
Here the cause(s) for the noise trading is(are) not 
specified. It may be due to, for example, the random 
liquidity need of uninformed traders. On the other hand, 
informed traders trade only when their perceived true price 
is different from that of the rest of the market. The 
reason for informed traders knowing the true price need not 
be specified. It may be due to the better analytic ability 
or insider information.
A further assumption is made that et and Xit are 
normally distributed with mean and variance (0, var(e)) and 
(X^, var(i)), respectively. In addition, noise in the 
trade and the true price are assumed to be uncorrelated;
10 5
that is, cov (et, Xlt) = 0. Eif Effl, var(e), and var(i) are 
assumed to be exogenous and are of fixed positive values 
over the trading period.
Following Glosten and Harris (1988), the dealer will 
set prices as follows.
Pt = + (Zt + C) Vt ............................  (C3)
where
Zt = information component 
C = ordering/inventory component 
Market clearing requires that the trading volume is the 
combined quantity desired by informed and uninformed 
traders.
Vt = Vit + Vmt .......................................  (C4)
Since we specify that the volume can be either positive 
or negative, Vt is better viewed as the net quantity. The 
market setting is similar to that of a call market. In a 
call market, orders are accumulated and executed at some
prespecified time.55 It is similar to a call market because
55Some models of the bid-ask spread do assume a call 
market environment. For example, Mendelson (1982), Ho, 
Schwartz and Whitcomb (1985) and O'Hara and Oldfield (1986) 
examine the trading process in a call market. See also 
Amihud and Mendelson (1987) for an empirical comparison of 
the opening and the closing data.
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the dealer can deal with more than one trade at a time. 
Additionally, informed traders and uninformed traders can 
make trades between themselves without going through the 
dealer. The dealer takes up only the net quantity.
However, it is implicitly assumed that traders know the 
bid-ask quote when they submit the orders. In this sense, 
it is also similar to a continuous market where the dealer 
maintains continuous trading by standing ready to trade with 
the incoming orders based on his/her quotes.
Let dt = Xit - X^ t, then E(dt) = 0, var(dt) = var(i). 
Further, substitute Equations (Cl), (C2) and (C3) into 
Equation (C4), then :
Vt = (dt-fZt+CjVJ/Ei + (et- (Zt+C) Vt)/Em .............  (C5)
A risk-neutral dealer will set the quote so that 
he/she will break even on the trades. That is, the dealer 
will set the quoted price equal to the inferred true price 
plus the ordering/inventory cost.
E(Xit|vt) + CVt = Xmt + (Zt + C)Vt
Or,
E(dt|vt) = ZtVt ..................................... (C6)
The inference problem faced by the dealer is to solve 
for the expected difference between the true price and the
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price perceived by the dealer (and uninformed traders). He 
can do that only through inferring the net quantity of 
trades. For example, a higher net quantity implies a 
greater degree of informational asymmetry. The net quantity 
is not known to the dealer before the actual transactions 
take place. However, given Vt, the expected value of dt can 
be solved.
E(db|Vt) = V t t v a r f V j r ^ c o v ^ d J )  .................  (C7)
Let a = (1 + (Zt + CJ/Ei + (Zt + C)/Era) then from 
Equation (C5), the following obtain.
var(Vt) = var(i)/Ei2a2 + var (e)/Em2a2 ...............  (C8)
cov(Vt, dt) = varfiJ/Eia ............................  (C9)
Substitute (C7), (C8) and (C9) into (C6), an equilibrium 
schedule for setting the Z in relation to C is specified as 
follows.
var (i)Em(CEi + CE,. + EiEJ
Zt   — — — — — — — — — — —  . —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  p. . .......... (CIO)
varfeJEi2 - varfiJEiEn,
Some comparative statics can be observed from Equation 
(CIO). The information component is positively related to 
the ordering/inventory component. Note that the positive
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relationship will be even stronger when the volatility of 
true price is greater. This is consistent with the notion 
that, when information is more uncertain, the dealer is more 
concerned with the information problem, which also 
aggravates the ordering/inventory cost problem.
The information cost is negatively related to noise 
trading and the sensitivity of uninformed traders. A 
possible explanation for the negative relationship between 
noise trading and the information cost is that when the 
noise is greater, the dealer cares less about the possible 
loss to the informed traders. When the demand/supply of 
uninformed traders is insensitive, it is easier to infer the 
information conveyed through net quantity. Therefore, the 
dealer will penalize a large net quantity of trade with a 
higher information component. This differs from Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) in which the more inelastic the demand of the 
uninformed, the easier can the dealer make back the losses 
to the informed. Thus, the dealer will set a smaller 
spread. The two models may not necessarily be inconsistent 
with each other, however. If the uninformed traders are 
insensitive to prices, then the dealer will have a 'normal' 
volume in mind. Excess of normal volume will be interpreted 
as originating from informed traders and thus the dealer 
will set a higher information component. On the other hand, 
a large normal volume also implies a smaller total spread.
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From Equations (C8) and (C9), the following 
conclusions obtain. Variance of the net quantity does not 
necessarily increase (decrease) with the increase (decrease) 
in the variance of the true price. To break even on the 
trades, the dealer will set a higher (lower) spread when the 
variance of the true price is greater (lower). The 
mechanism will discourage (encourage) trades which in turn 
makes the relationship between the variance of true price 
and variance of net quantity ambiguous.
V. D. Application of the Model
When setting the spread, the dealer can infer the 
degree of the information problem by observing the order 
imbalance in trades and the sequence of trades. While 
previous studies of the components of the spread primarily 
utilize the latter information, our model focuses on the 
former.
Trading volume may result either from informed traders 
or from uninformed traders. The composition of trading 
volume depends upon the elasticity of traders, the variance 
of noise, and the variance of the true price, which are all 
unobservable. However, by combining the information about 
the sequence of trades (to infer the components of the 
spread) and the information about the variance of trading 
volume, a new insight concerning the relative importance of
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noise and private information in price variability can be 
gained.
An application of the model follows. Specifically, 
given Elf EB, Equations (C8) and (CIO) can be used to infer 
var(i), and var(e) for the period of interest.
The actual implementation of our experiment involves 
some difficulties and ambiguities, mainly because no 
specific functional relationship between price changes and 
order imbalance is specified. To apply the model, some 
assumption regarding EA and Em has to be made. There is a 
reason to suspect that and Era are not equal. That is, 
there is a possible trade size clientele suggested by Easley 
and O'Hara (1987). Informed traders will prefer to trade 
larger quantities to maximize their profit. In our 
empirical experiment, we employ a range of values for EA and 
Em with the assumption that EA is one half of Em.
We choose the ten most actively traded stocks in 1987, 
with the reasoning that measurement problems for these 
stocks will be less and that the investors' characteristics 
may be similar. If employing our methodology, the more 
reasonable values of E's fall into the same range, it will 
increase our confidence of the experiment. These stocks are 
: American Express, Eastman Kodak, General Electric, General
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Motors, IBM, Navistar International, AT&T, Texaco, USX, and 
Exxon56.
Our model indicates that net volume is the critical 
information in inferring the relative importance of private 
information and noises. Series of hourly net volume and 
hourly ending prices are extracted from the same data set 
used in Chapters III and IV. However, since no specific 
functional relationship between net volume and price 
changes57 is specified, we transform the net volume into 
values of +1 (if positive net volume), -1 (if negative net 
volume) and 0. This is quite an ad-hoc approach indeed. 
Nevertheless, it readily fits into Glosten and Harris's 
(1988) estimation approach. Recall the Glosten and Harris's 
basic equation assuming all transactions are unit trades and 
the inventory component is zero :
Pt ” Pt-i = C(Qt - Qt-i) + ZQt + et
where Pt = transaction price at time t
Qt = 1 if investor purchase, = -1 if sale
et = an error term describing the arrival of
public information
56Source : 1988 NYSE Fact Book.
57Prices are adjusted for cash dividends, stock 
dividends, and stock splits.
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That is, we are applying Glosten and Harris's approach 
using transformed data. Qt is now hourly net volume with 
values of +1, 0, or -1, and Pt is now the hourly ending 
price. We can argue that this transformed data is less 
noisy than individual transactions, because dealers 
sometimes may not adjust quotes immediately and because 
there is evidence of a strong relationship between net 
trades and quote adjustment (see Chapter IV Section E). To 
be consistent, variance of net volume is also computed using 
the transformed data. Therefore, some information regarding 
var(V) will be lost than if the original data is used.
According to Glosten and Harris, variance of et 
reflects price variability induced by public information. 
This is fairly important for our test. The variance of et 
is served as the lower bound for var(i), since var(i) 
reflects the combination of public information and private 
information. If applying different values of E, the 
resulting var(i) and variance of et are close, more 
reasonable values of Ejl, En, var(e) and var(i) can be 
simultaneously inferred. This is of course a rather 
imprecise approach. Except in presenting the estimation 
results for Z and C, we will not give statistical statements 
concerning the precision of the estimates of E, var(e), and 
var(i).
The period investigated is arbitrarily chosen to be the 
18 days August 31 through September 24. The number of
hourly price changes is then 107. The estimations of Z and 
C for each of the ten stocks are shown in Table 14. The t 
values for the estimated Z are significant at 1% for all 
stocks with the exception of Navistar International that is 
a relatively lower-priced stock (about $5, compared to other 
stocks, $35 - $160) and may involve a greater degree of 
measurement problem. This indicates that the information 
problem is important to the specialist. In contrast, C is 
significant at 1% only for Eastman Kodak and General 
Electric, significant at 10% for five other stocks. If Qt 
is an unit trade, estimated Z and C are clearly related to 
the magnitude of spread for an unit trade. In our case, the 
interpretation of the estimated Z and C is unfortunately not 
so clear. The range of values for R-square is 0.09 to 0.34, 
and is 10.9 to 54.6 for F values.
Table 15 gives the values of var(e) and var(i) assuming 
different values of EA and Em. The variance of the error 
term (denoted as redv) for our previous regression is to be 
used as the lower bound of var(i). For EXXON, the variance 
of the error term seems relatively high compared to its 
price level, this may be due to a stock split (two for one) 
that goes into effect during the estimation period. In 
general, the values of var(i) and var(e) increase with 
increases in the values of EA and Effl. The intuition is that 
when investors are less sensitive to prices, larger values 
of var(i) and var(e) are implied for a given value of
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var(V). The patterns in var(i) and var(e) are similar 
across stocks, which may be due to lack of variations in 
var(V) and redv across stocks.
The var(i) that are below redv can be ruled out as 
reasonable values. Using this rule of thumb, more 
reasonable values of var(i) and var(e) usually fall in the 
range of EA = 0.5 = 1.0) to EL = 1.0 (Em = 2.0). The
results suggest that, for our sample period and sample 
stocks and with our added assumptions, variance of true 
prices is lower than variance of noises. Although not based 
on information, uninformed trading still induces price 
changes because dealers are uncertain whether trades contain 
information or not.
v * E. Conclusions
The theory in the area of the components of the spread 
is not fully integrated. This essay presents a model that 
incorporates one important piece of information in trading : 
order imbalances (net volume). Although some simplifying 
assumptions have to be made, the concept this model 
introduces may be considered as a small contribution to our 
understanding regarding prices, volume, spread, and 
information.
Chapter VI 
Conclusions
This dissertation is composed of three essays.
Although each essay has a different focus, the central theme 
of the three essays lies in the relationship between the 
components of the spread and transaction prices. The first 
essay (Chapter III) and the second essay (Chapter IV) apply 
existing approaches to decompose the spread into ordering 
component, the inventory component, and the information 
component. On the other hand, the third essay (Chapter V) 
points to a direction for improving existing approaches by 
bringing in additional information about order imbalances.
The first essay employs a slight variant of Stoll's 
(1989) approach to decompose the spread. Then each 
component of the spread is related to factors that are 
important to each component. The results should provide a 
clearer understanding of the nature of costs faced by 
dealers, thereby extend the literature of the determinants 
of the spread. In addition, some considerations about the 
appropriate data are given. These considerations include 
the use of transaction data versus daily data, the 
appropriate estimation period, etc.
Problems remain in the decomposition of the spread 
though. In particular, the decomposition is sensitive to
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obtained values of the covariance of price changes. 
Currently, there is no rigorous theory for positive values 
of covariance of price changes, although we sometimes 
encounter such cases. Also, there are some substantial 
differences between covariances of price changes based on 
daily data and transaction data. We have largely ignored 
this issue since transaction prices are more compatible with 
the study of market microstructure. Nevertheless, the cause 
of this difference is potentially important. It may be 
related to, for example, noises in trades. In all, the fact 
is that our understanding of the nature of covariance of 
price changes is far from complete. Stoll's (1989) approach 
relies heavily on the covariance of price changes.
Therefore, care must be taken in interpreting results 
obtained from using Stoll's approach. Glosten and Harris's 
(1988) approach utilizes similar information. Furthermore, 
their approach cannot fully decompose the spread, which 
limits its uses.
Another problem in the decomposition of the spread is 
the ignorance of monopoly rent, which suggests another 
component of the spread. A complete investigation of this 
issue would likely require more information regarding costs 
and revenues of specialists. The potential diversification 
effect among specialists within a specialist unit likely 
requires similar information.
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Even without accounting for theoretical problems, there 
are some institutional factors that may affect the results, 
such as the simultaneous existence of the limit orders and 
market orders, the difference between trading procedures for 
the opening and the remaining of the day.
Nevertheless, the cross-sectional results should be 
valid unless measurement problems also vary across stocks. 
The first essay uses the price level to proxy and control 
for the discreteness problem. If future research indicates 
that other measurement problems affect stocks differently, 
then our empirical test should adjust accordingly.
The cross-sectional test in the first essay is more 
extensive than previous studies. The extension of the 
cross-sectional test requires better understanding of 
factors influencing the components of the spread and 
appropriate measures of these factors.
The second essay also offers partial relief to the 
measurement problem. Various measures of trading activity, 
price variability and transaction cost are given and the 
results are robust with respect to uses of different 
measures. Our main results say that trading activity, price 
variability and the information component are the highest in 
the first trading hour. On the other hand, the transitory 
component and the percentage changes in quoted prices are 
the lowest in the first hour. These results are consistent 
with the notion that liquidity traders time their trades to
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minimize transaction costs. This notion is based on Admati 
and Pfleiderer (1988), which presents a more restrictive 
model based on the minimization of information cost. The 
last hour increases in trading activity and price 
variability without significant changes in information 
component and the percentage changes in quoted changes are 
consistent with investors' unwinding position to avoid risk 
incurred overnight. Timing of trades is a relatively 
unexploratory area in finance. To the extent that timing of 
trades affects transaction prices, volume and transaction 
cost, it adds another dimension to the traditional analysis.
The test employed in the second essay gives a simple 
analysis of hourly means for variables that are of interest. 
It is likely that trading activity, price variability and 
the transaction cost are determined simultaneously. 
Therefore, possible interactions need to be considered in 
future research.
The differences in results between the pre-crash and 
the post-crash periods are interesting to say the least. If 
specialists' quoting behavior varies over time, the return 
generating process might well be different. This points to 
another potential explanation for nonstationarity in the 
return generating process.
The quote adjustment can take place either in the form 
of adjustment in the location of quoted prices or in the 
form of adjustment in the magnitude of the spread.
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Essentially, the dealer's decision is multi-dimensional. 
Evidence provided in the second essay (negative relationship 
between changes in the magnitude of the spread and changes 
in quoted prices) suggests this may be the case.
Implicitly, a constant magnitude of the spread suggests the 
degree of competition is so great and/or the monitoring 
function of the exchange is in great constraint to the 
dealer that the dealer has forgiven manipulating the 
magnitude of the spread. This is perhaps one of the most 
difficult problems in this area.
The problems encountered in the decomposition of the 
spread may be solved by bringing in additional information. 
This is the primary motivation of the third essay. The 
components of the spread reflects the degree of 
informational asymmetry between the dealer and informed 
traders, and the components of the net volume reflects the 
degree of informational asymmetry between the informed and 
the uninformed. Information about the components of the 
spread and information about the components of net volume 
thus should compliment each other.
Information about order imbalance is less ambiguous 
relative to volume or trade size. Volume reflects the 
combination of absolute purchase and absolute sale. Volume 
is therefore not compatible with traditional economic 
analysis. Trade size is another potentially useful piece of 
information, but different models give different
interpretations of the role of trade size (Easely and O'Hara 
(1987) and Kyle (1985)). On the other hand, order imbalance 
is more readily interpretable (excess supply or demand).
The intuition behind the third essay is that the variability 
of excess supply/demand gives information concerning the 
degree of informational asymmetry existed in financial 
markets.
There will be more to come in the future.
Table 1
Summary Statistics Describing the Sample Stocks 
NYSE Transactions 
( 1 0 0  stocks )
870918 870921 870922 870923 870924
Friday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday
NT mean 76.03 
median 52.50 
s. d. 58.52 
skewness 1.84
92.51
71.50
67.47
1 . 8 6
107.30
92.00
78.50
1.57
116.75
89.50
87.53
1.41
78.05
60.00
62.38
1.96
NQ mean 54.82 
median 42.50 
s. d. 38.95 
skewness 2.15
64.78
52.00
41.91
1.54
75.91
60.00
52.51
1.46
78.53
64.50
53.75
1.69
57.04
45.50
40.20
1.79
S mean 0.2549 
median 0.2381 
s. d. 0.1181 
skewness 4.75
0.2643
0.2376
0.1345
5.19
0.2779
0.2589
0.1537
6 . 2 1
0.2760 
0.2631 
0.1391 
4.86
0.2789
0.2582
0.1508
5.41
vol mean 2 0 0 1 1 1  
median 130800 
s. d. 212811 
skewness 2.60
192778
142800
171286
1.45
225582
163950
215885
1.82
250059
166800
233103
1.49
188473
111800
291065
5.52
price mean 45.40 
median 35.58 
S. d. (47.15) 
skewness 5 . 8 8
45.16
35.55
(46.81)
5.84
44.78
35.73
(46.30)
5.85
45.62
36.29
(46.85)
5.82
45.73
35.94
(46.86)
5.79
NT = number of trades
NQ = number of quotes
S = average quoted spread (in dollars)
vol = volume of trading (in number of shares)
price = average stock price (in dollars)
1 2 1
1 2 2
Table 2
Components of the Bid-Ask Spread 
NYSE Transactions 
( 1 0 0  stocks )
870918 870921 870922 870923 870924
Friday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday
6 mean 0.4257 0.4248 0.4229 0.4177 0.4376
s. d. (0.0902) (0.1199) (0.0789) (0.0755) (0.1067)
v mean 0.5096 0.5036 0.4914 0.5084 0.5217
s. d. (0.0514) (0.0960) (0.0748) (0.0462) (0.0840)
C mean 0.1486 0.1505 0.1541 0.1646 0.1248
s. d. (0.1804) (0.2397) (0.1578) (0.1510) (0.2135)
H mean 0.0192* 0.0071# -0.0171# 0.0168* 0.0435
s. d. (0.1027) (0.1920) (0.1496) (0.0925) (0.1680)
Z mean 0.8322 0.8424 0.8630 0.8186 0.8317
s. d. (0.1729) (0.1427) (0.1752) (0.1647) (0.1742)
S mean 0.0080 0.0083 0.0086 0.0085 0.0087
s. d. (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0066) (0.0074)
covP mean -0 . 0 0 2 0 -0 . 0 0 2 2 -0 .0 0 1 2 * -0.0026 -0.0025
s. d. (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0067) (0.0029) (0.0048)
covQ mean -0.0003 -0.0013# 0.0009# + 0 .0 0 0 0 # -0.0044*
s. d. (0.0014) (0.0168) (0.0088) (0.0026) (0.0319)
# : insignificantly different from zero by both the t
test and the sign rank test (at 5% level)
* : insignificantly different from zero by the t test 
1 - 6  = magnitude of price reversal (proportion of spread) 
7r = probability of reversal
C = order cost (proportion of spread)
H = inventory cost (proportion of spread)
Z = information cost (proportion of spread)
S = quoted spread (proportion of price)
covP = covariance of transaction price changes
covQ = covariance of quoted price changes
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Table 3
Components of the Bid-Ask spread 
All Transactions 
( 100 stocks )
870918 870921 870922 870923 870924
Friday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday
5 mean 0.5275 0.5275 0.5629 0.5130 0.5292
s. d. (0.0919) (0.1067) (0.3338) (0.1363) (0.1013)
IT mean 0.6085 0.6129 0.6448 0.6143 0.6180
s. d. (0.0742) (0.0836) (0.3205) (0.0767) (0.0809)
c mean -0.0550 -0.0549 -0.1257 -0.0259 -0.0583
s. d. (0.1837) (0.2135) (0.6675) (0.2725) (0.2026)
H mean 0.2169 0.2258 0.2897 0.2285 0.2359
s. d. (0.1483) (0.1672) (0.6411) (0.1533) (0.1618)
Z mean 0.8381 0.8291 0.8361 0.7974 0.8224
s. d. (0.1293) (0.1176) (0.1413) (0.2353) (0.1397)
S mean 0.0098 0.0103 0.0108 0.0104 0.0106
s. d. (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0069) (0.0072) (0.0079)
covP mean -0.0032 -0.0049 -0.0035 -0.0051 -0.0041
s. d. (0.0026) (0.0059) (0.0056) (0.0095) (0.0065)
covQ mean -0.0093 -0 . 0 1 2 0 -0.2440 -0.0103 -0.0145
s. d. (0.0133) (0.0251) (2.1397) (0.0132) (0.0289)
1-5 = magnitude of price reversal (proportion of spread) 
7r = probability of reversal 
C = order cost (proportion of spread)
H = inventory cost (proportion of spread)
Z = information cost (proportion of spread) 
s = quoted spread (as proportion of price) 
covP = covariance of transaction price changes 
covQ = covariance of quoted price changes
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Table 4 
Panel A
Comparison of Option versus Non-Option Stocks 
on September 23(NYSE Transactions)
Option 
( 6 6 stocks)
Non-Option 
(34 stocks)
S mean 0.4211 0.4110
s. d . (0.0567) (0.1034)
ir mean 0.5007 0.5234*
s. d. (0.0461) (0.0433)
C mean 0.1578 0.1780
s. d. (0.1134) (0.2069)
H mean 0.0013 0.0467*
s. d. (0.0922) (0.0866)
Z mean 0.8409 0.7753
s. d. (0.1318) (0.2103)
S mean 0.2734 0.2808
s. d. (0.1452) (0.1283)
vol mean 332268 90476*
s. d. (243758) (78871)
size mean 2294 1654*
s. d. (1105) (1180)
price mean 52.20 32.86*
s. d. (54.80) (20.41)
covP mean -0.0024 -0.0029
s. d. (0 .0 0 2 1 ) (0.0040)
covQ mean 0.0003 -0.0006*
s. d. (0.0027) (0.0021)
* indicates different between two groups at 1 0 % level 
1-5 = magnitude of price reversal (proportion of spread) 
ir = probability of reversal 
C = order cost (proportion of spread)
H = inventory cost (proportion of spread)
Z = information cost (proportion of spread)
S = average quoted spread (in dollars)
vol - volume of trading (in number of shares)
size = average size of trade (in number of shares)
price = average stock price (in dollars)
covP = covariance of transaction price changes
covQ = covariance of quoted price changes
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Table 4 (continued)
Panel B
Comparison of Option versus Non-Option Stocks 
on September 24(NYSE Transactions)
Option Non-Option
( 6 6 stocks) (34 stocks)
S mean 0.4466 0.4201
s. d. (0.1097) (0.0999)
ir mean 0.5227 0.5199
s. d. (0.0890) (0.0747)
C mean 0.1068 0.1597
s. d. (0.2195) (0.1999)
H mean 0.0453 0.0398
s. d. (0.1779) (0.1495)
Z mean 0.8479 0.8004
s. d. (0.1401) (0.2255)
S mean 0.2796 0.2775
s. d. (0.1714) (0.1018)
vol mean 274153 74565*
s. d. (341435) (65416)
size mean 2524 1847
s. d. (2320) (1776)
price mean 52.35 32.89*
s. d. (54.84) (20.16)
covP mean -0.0018 -0.0040*
s. d. (0.0035) (0.0063)
covQ mean -0.0059 -0.0016
s. d. (0.0390) (0.0071)
* indicates different between two groups at 1 0 %
1-5 = magnitude of price reversal (proportion of spread) 
n = probability of reversal 
C = order cost (proportion of spread)
H = inventory cost (proportion of spread)
Z = information cost (proportion of spread)
S = average quoted spread (in dollars)
vol = volume of trading (in number of shares)
size = average size of trade (in number of shares)
price = average stock price (in dollars)
covP = covariance of transaction price changes
covQ = covariance of quoted price changes
1 2 6
Table 5 
Panel A
Comparison of Different Volume Subgroups 
on September 23 (NYSE Transactions)
Low Median High
( 2 1 stocks) (47 stocks) (32 stocks)
S mean 
s. d.
0.3945
(0.1171)
0.4281
(0.0634)
0.4176
(0.0530)
7T mean 
s. d.
0.5049
(0.0673)
0.5082
(0.0427)
0.5111
(0.0341)
C mean 
s. d.
0 . 2 1 1 1
(0.2342)
0.1437
(0.1268)
0.1648
(0.1061)
H mean 
s. d.
0.0097
(0.1346)
0.0163
(0.0854)
0 . 0 2 2 2
(0.0683)
Z mean 
s. d.
0.7792
(0.2452)
0.8400
(0.1395)
0.8130
(0.1310)
S mean 
s. d.
0.3454
(0.2659)
0.2720
(0.0765)
0.2362
(0.0506)
vol mean 
s. d.
39857
(17900)
153911
(62200)
529222
(207815)
size mean 
s. d.
1041
(558)
1961
(8 6 6 )
2925
(1239)
price mean 
s. d.
54.56
(86.79)
42.07
(32.54)
44.97
(22.48)
covP mean 
s. d.
-0.0032 
(0.0050)
-0.0024
(0 .0 0 2 2 )
-0.0023
(0.0016)
covQ mean 
s. d.
0.0006
(0.0051)
-0 . 0 0 0 2
(0.0015)
-0 . 0 0 0 1
(0.0009)
1-5 = magnitude of price reversal (proportion of spread) 
jt = probability of reversal 
C = order cost (proportion of spread)
H = inventory cost (proportion of spread)
Z = information cost (proportion of spread)
S = average quoted spread(in dollars)
vol = volume of trading (in number of shares)
size = average size of trade (in number of shares)
price = average stock price (in dollars)
covP = covariance of transaction price changes
covQ = covariance of quoted price changes
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Table 5 (continued)
Panel B
Comparison of Different Volume Subgroups 
on September 24 (NYSE Transactions)
Low Median High
(37 stocks) (51 stocks) ( 1 2 stocks)
S mean 
s. d.
0.4262
(0.0957)
0.4494
(0.1225)
0.4228
(0.0552)
jt mean 
s. d.
0.5171
(0.0667)
0.5287
(0.0982)
0.5062
(0.0674)
C mean 
s. d.
0.1476
(0.1914)
0.1013
(0.2450)
0.1544
(0.1104)
H mean 
s. d.
0.0342
(0.1334)
0.0574
(0.1965)
0.0124
(0.1348)
Z mean 
s. d.
0.8182
(0.2266)
0.8413
(0.1403)
0.8332
(0 .1 2 0 0 )
S mean 
s. d.
0.3085
(0.2237)
0.2693
(0.0857)
0.2248
(0.0377)
vol mean 
s. d.
43116
(22655)
165578
(58968)
733958
(588962)
size mean 
s. d.
1159
(631)
2513
(1441)
4859
(4444)
price mean 
s. d.
48.52
(72.05)
44.49
(22.89)
42.40
(18.67)
covP mean 
s. d.
-0.0023
(0.0067)
-0.0027
(0.0035)
-0 . 0 0 2 2
(0.0019)
covQ mean 
s. d.
-0.0017
(0.0074)
-0.0074
(0.0442)
-0 . 0 0 0 2
(0 .0 0 1 2 )
1-5 = magnitude of price reversal (proportion of spread) 
n = probability of reversal 
C = order cost (proportion of spread)
H = inventory cost (proportion of spread)
Z = information cost (proportion of spread)
S = average quoted spread (in dollars)
vol = volume of trading (in number of shares)
size = average size of trade (in number of shares)
price = average stock price (in dollars)
covP = covariance of transaction price changes
covQ = covariance of quoted price changes
Table 6
Correlation Coefficients for Independent Variables 
in Regressions (A1)-(A3)
AZ TR UR OP IN IT FZ P VOL
NT 0.085
(0.413)
-0.073
(0.490)
-0.075
(0.479)
0.458
(0.001)
0.245
(0.017)
-0.203
(0.049)
0.624
(0.000)
0.061
(0.560)
0.854
(0.000)
AZ -0.063
(0.553)
-0.071
(0.501)
0.299
(0.004)
0.229
(0.026)
-0.221
(0.032)
0.140
(0.177)
-0.210
(0.043)
0.495
(0.000)
TR 0.997
(0.000)
-0.254
(0.015)
-0.251
(0.016)
0.196
(0.063)
-0.236
(0.025)
-0.212
(0.044)
-0.094
(0.375)
UR -0.260
(0.013)
-0.267
(0.010)
0.200
(0.058)
-0.235
(0.025)
-0.210
(0.046)
-0.098
(0.354)
OP 0.363
(0.001)
-0.393
(0.001)
0.405
(0.0D1)
0.173
(0.095)
0.465
(0.001)
IN -0.492
(0.000)
0.190
(0,066)
0.324
(0.002)
0.288
(0.005)
IT -0.230
(0.026)
-0.052
(0.617)
-0.247
(0.016)
FZ 0.317
(0.002)
0.589
(0.000)
P -0.041
(0.694)
•‘Numbers in parentheses are the p values for H0: coefficient =0 
‘Note: sample size = 91 
NT=number of trades
AZ-transaction size (in hundreds of shares)
TR~return variance 
UR=unsystematic risk 
0P=1, if options traded, =0 otherwise 
IN=institutional holding (X) 
lT=insider holding (X)
FZ=finn size (in millions)
P=average transaction price (in dollars)
VOL=volune (in hundreds of shares)
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Table 7
Panel A
OLS Estimation of Equation (Al)
C = a! + a2 NT + a3 AZ + a* IN + a5 P + a6 VOL
(Al.l) (Al. 2) (Al.3)
0.1576
(0 .0 0 0 1 )
0.1709
(0 .0 0 0 1 )
0.2169
(0 .0 0 0 1 )
“ 2 0.0003
(0.0509)
0.0003
(0.0507)
-0.0003
(0.4893)
“3 0.0008
(0.4396)
0 . 0 0 0 2
(0.8541)
-0.0018
(0.2825)
-0.1266
(0 .0 2 0 1 )
-0.0880
(0.1274)
-0.0845
(0.1410)
a5 -0.0004
(0.0823)
-0.0004
(0.0751)
aB 2 . 6 *1 0 ~ 5 
(0.1394)
F 2.691 2.840 2.750
R2 0.0849 0.1167 0.1392
ad j . R2 0.0534 0.0756 0.0886
cn 50.5 58.3 344.6
N 91 91 91
Numbers in parentheses are p values for H0 : coefficient=
NT=number of trades
AZ=transaction size (in hundreds of shares) 
IN=institutional holding (%)
P=average transaction price (in dollars) 
VOt=volume (in hundreds of shares) 
cn=maximum eigenvalue/minimum eigenvalue 
N=sample size
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Table 7 (continued)
Panel B
OLS Estimation of Equation (A2)
H = 0X + 02 TR + 03 OP + pA IN + p5 P + /J6 VOL
(A2.1) (A2.2) (A2.3)
01 0.0549
(0.0183)
0.0582
(0.0131)
0.0589
(0.0126)
02 8.6226
(0.4010)
6.9927
(0.4985)
7.1101
(0.4935)
03 0.0081
(0.6337)
0.0088 
(0.6024)
0.0123
(0.5105)
04 -0.0976
(0.0115)
-0.0858
(0.0307)
-0.0824
(0.0419)
05 -0 . 0 0 0 2
(0.2436)
-0 . 0 0 0 2
(0 .2 2 1 2 )
06 -1.9*10'6
(0.6530)
F 2.963 2.576 2.083
Rz 0.0927 0.1070 0.1091
adj. R2 0.0614 0.0655 0.0567
cn 50.4 57.8 6 8 . 8
N 91 91 91
Numbers in parentheses are p values for H0 : coefficient=
TR=return variance
OP=l, if options traded, =0 otherwise 
IN=institutional holding(%)
P=average transaction price (in dollars) 
VOL=volume (in hundreds of shares) 
cn=maximum eigenvalue/minimum eigenvalue 
N=sample size
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Table 7 (continued)
Panel C
OLS Estimation of Equation (A3)
Z = B1 + 02RZ + tf3UR + + 05FZ + 06IT + 07P +08VOL
(A3.1) (A3.2) (A3.3)
*1 0.6085
(0 .0 0 0 1 )
0.6182
(0 .0 0 0 1 )
0.6293
(0 .0 0 0 1 )
^2 4.0641
(0.0044)
3.8165
(0.0060)
3.4342
(0.0284)
6 3 -1.3473
(0.9303)
1.9358
(0.8977)
2.0314
(0.8932)
u 0.2787
(0 .0 0 0 1 )
0.2309
(0.0005)
0.2386
(0.0005)
05 5. 0*10"6 
(0.1470)
2.7*10‘6
(0.4343)
3 . 7*10"6 
(0.3499)
0Q 0.1825
(0.0218)
0.1454
(0.0643)
0.1438
(0.0685)
07 0.0006
(0.0186)
0.0005
(0.0499)
hcj 
«c» 00
5.489 5.790
-4.4*10'6
(0.5974)
4.960
R2 0.2441 0.2926 0.2950
ad j . Rz 0.1996 0.2420 0.2355
cn 116.4 138.8 171.9
N 91 91 91
Numbers in parentheses are p 
RZ=relative transaction size 
UR=unsystematic risk 
IN=institutional holding(%) 
FZ=firm size (in millions) 
IT=insider holding(%) 
P=average transaction price
values for H0 
(=AZ/VOL)
(in dollars)
: coefficient=
VOL=volume (in hundreds of shares) 
cn=maximum eigenvalue/minimum eigenvalue 
N=sample size
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Table 8
Hourly Statistics of Trading Activity, Price Changes and Transaction Cost 
for the Pre-Crash High-Activity Sample
Panel A
High-Activity Sample Hourly Summary Statistics 
Pre-Crash Period
Numbers are Keans and Standard Deviation (in parentheses) across days and stocks
1 2 3 4 5 6
NT 27.11
(22.77)
22.31
(19.11)
18.70
(15.57)
16.34
(13.87)
18.55
(14.86)
24.71
(19.41)
VOL 761.24 
(1239.7)
492.51
(784.15)
402.63
(567.40)
336.46
(505.39)
344.23
(452.89)
485.85
(808.31)
RETV 1.3E-5
(3.7E-5)
1 -IE-5 
(2.6E-5)
1.IE-5 
(2.4E-5)
1 -IE-5 
(4.5E-5)
1.IE-5 
(2.4E-5)
1.2E-5
(2.7E-5)
RET 0.0072
(0.0072)
0.0054
(0.0062)
0.0047
(0.0052)
0.0044
(0.0049)
0.0048
(0.0053)
0.0067
(0.0062)
Z1 0.8475
(0.2291)
0.8001
(0.3003)
0.7986
(0.2804)
0.8079
(0.2836)
0.7935
(0.289B)
0.8015
(0.2590)
Z2 0.1144
(5.4458)
0.1006
(2.3930)
1.1495
(25.690)
0.5707
(16.388)
1.2869
(27.630)
0.4368
(14.147)
C1 0.1525
(0.2291)
0.1999
(0.3003)
0.2014
(0.2804)
0.1921
(0.2836)
0.2065
(0.2898)
0.1985
(0.2590)
C2 0.5810
(3.2363)
1.0120
(15.700)
1.8506 
(24.189)
2.3379
(27.224)
1.2027
(14.145)
1.0163
(12.247)
AVGS 0.0077
(0.0055)
0.0070
(0.0042)
0.0069
(0.0049)
0.0069
(0.0040)
0.0068
(0.0040)
0.0073
(0.0043)
BLOCK 0.0580
(0.0721)
0.0442
(0.0702)
0.0459
(0.0763)
0.0433
(0.0746)
0.0360
(0.0642)
0.0378
(0.0650)
sample
size 4363 4071 3821 3646 3824 4061
NT : hourly number of trades
VOL : hourly volune (in hundreds of shares)
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance 
RET : absolute value of hourly return
Z1 : information component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
Z2 : information component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
C1 : transitory component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
C2 : transitory component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
AVGS : average quoted spread (as proportion of price)
BLOCK : proportion of block trades (tfblock trades/#total trades)
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Table B (continued)
Panel B
High-Activity Sample ANOVA ResuLts 
Pre-Crash Period
Variables F Fh Fh/w Fw/h R
NT 139.99 210.66 212.36 51.67 0.0503
(224.58) (335.37) (338,08) (86.09) (0.0784)
VOL 103.85 165.94 166.91 26.22 0.0378
(185.86) (303.03) (305.02) (39.40) (0.0657)
RETV 4.49 6.57 6.59 1.90+ 0.0017
(29.42) (47.02) (47.36) (7.42) (0.0110)
RET 95.38 140.00 140.93 39.60 0.0348
(86.11) (126.48) (127.50) (35.65) (0.0316)
Z1 15.06 22.32 22.48 5.98 0.0057
(12.52) (21.13) (21.19) (1.76)+ (0.0047)
Z2 1.94+ 3.27 3.27 0.29+ 0.0007
(15.05) (18.82) (18.97) (10.32) (0.0057)
C2 3.86 5.17 5.20 2.21 0.0015
(9.51) (16.22) (16.25) (1.13)+ (0.0036)
AVGS 15.93 25.81 25.92 3.57 0.0060
(22.10) (32.09) (32.26) (9.62) (0.0083)
BLOCK 31.08 51.09 50.90 6.07 0.0116
(63.59) (110.00) (110.04) (5.57) (0.0235)
n
23786
23786
23786
23786
23786
23786
23786
23786
23786
Independent variables = hour of the day and day of the week
F = overall F value of the ANOVA 
Fh = F value when only the hour effect is included 
Fh/w = partial F value of the hour effect 
Fw/h = partial F value of the day effect
+ : insignificant at the 1% level
Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding statistics using rank transformed data
NT : hourly number of trades
VOL : hourly volume (in hundreds of shares)
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance 
RET : absolute value of hourly return
Z1 : information component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
Z2 : information component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread) 
C1 : transitory component using Stoll's approach (not included as the result is the same as Zl) 
C2 : transitory component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread) 
AVGS : average quoted spread (as proportion of price)
BLOCK : proportion of block trades (#block trades/#total trades)
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Table 8 (continued)
Panel C
High-Activity Sample Hourly Kean Comparisons
Pre-Crash Period
Signs of row minus colum means : +++ significant at 1X using both original and rank data, ++ 
significant only with ranks, + insignificant or significant only uhen using originaL data (where 
contradiction occurs, sign for ranks is used); same signing convention is used for negative values.
2 3 4 5 6
NT +++ +++ +++ +++ 444 NT
VOL +++ +++ 444 +++ 444 VOL
RETV +++ +++ +++ +++ + RETV
RET +++ +++ +++ +++ 444 RET
21 +++ +++ +++ +++ 4++ Z1
22 44 ++ ++ ++ ++ 22
C1 — --- --- --- -- Cl
C2 -- -- -- -- -- C2
AVGS +++ 444 444 444 444 AVGS
BLOCK +++ +++ +++ +++ 444 BLOCK
NT +++ 444 444 ... NT
VOL 444 444 444 + VOL
RETV + ++ + -- RETV
RET +++ +++ +++ -- RET
21 + - 4 + 21
22 + + - - 22
Cl - 4 - - Cl
C2 - + - - C2
AVGS + + + - AVGS
BLOCK 4 ++ 444 + BLOCK
NT +++ . ... NT
VOL +++ 44 ... VOL
RETV + - -- RETV
RET + + RET
21 - + + Z1
22 4 — 22
Cl + - - C1
C2 + - - C2
AVGS + + -- AVGS
BLOCK + +++ + BLOCK
NT ----- . . . NT
VOL - . . . VOL
RETV -- -- RETV
RET - . . . RET
21 + ++ 21
22 - - - - 22
Cl - - - Cl
C2 - - - C2
AVGS 4 . . . AVGS
BLOCK 4 - BLOCK
NT . . . NT
VOL . . . VOL
RETV - - RETV
RET . . . RET
Z1 + 21
22 4 22
Cl - C1
C2 4 C2
AVGS . . . AVGS
BLOCK - - BLOCK
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Table 8 (continued)
Panel D
High-Activity Sample Regression Result
Pre-Crash Period
Dependent Variable
AO FREQ
Independent Variables 
intercept -2.6E-6 0.9073
(-0.045) (131.213)*
HI -0.00021 0.1288
(-2.544)* (14.698)*
H6 8.8E-5 -0.0342
(1.040) (-3.842)*
U1 -6.4E-5 0.0066
(-0.774) (0.764)
US 2.9E-5 0.0023
(0.341) (0.265)
NETT 9.4E-5 -0.0142
(18.417)* (-17.244)*
NT -2.8E-6 -0.0018
(-1.609) (-8.109)*
As 2.6E-5 0.0358
(0.500) (5.272)*
RET 0.7863 2.1482
(201.262)* (3.945)*
RETV 0.0478 -621.799
(0.049) (-5.932)*
F 5376.93 114.878
R2 0.6705 0.0417
adj. RZ 0.6704 0.0413
n 23786 23786
Nunber in parentheses are the t values for the null hypothesis that corresponding coefficient a 0, 
* indicates significant at the 1% level
Dependent variables :
A Q  = percentage charges in quoted prices over an hourly interval 
FREQ = number of quotes / nunber of trades
Independent variables : (Note : NETT, A S  and RET are in their absolute values in FREQ regression) 
H1 : an indicator = 1 if hour 1, = 0 otherwise
H6 : an indicator = 1 if hour 6 , = 0 otherwise
W1 : an indicator = 1 if Monday, = 0 otherwise
W5 : an indicator = 1 if Friday, = 0 otherwise
NETT : number of purchase minus number of sale over an hourly interval 
NT : hourly nunber of trades
A S  : percentage changes in the magnitude of the spread 
RET : hourly return
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance
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Table 9
Hourly Statistics of Trading Activity, Price Changes and Transaction Cost 
for the Post-Crash High-Activity Sample
Panel A
High-Activity Sample Hourly Sunnary Statistics 
Post-Crash Period
Nunbers are Means and Standard Deviation (in parentheses) across days and stocks
1 2 3 4 5 6
NT 39.80
(33.05)
43.14
(33.16)
35.24
(29.49)
35.86
(29.36)
41.00
(32.34)
46.49
(35.96)
VOL 1638.50
(1880.9)
1313.10
(1629.0)
929.69
(1294.0)
972.59
(1461.5)
1056.50
(1214.8)
1198.00
(1503.4)
RETV 0.0601
(2.1395)
5.9E-5
(1.4E-4)
6.IE-5 
(1.5E-4)
5.8E-5
(1.5E-4)
5.0E-5
(9.7E-5)
5.9E-5
(1.4E-4)
RET 0.0279
(0.0319)
0.0322
(0.0398)
0.0178
(0.0238)
0.0179
(0.0207)
0.0232
(0.0272)
0.0348
(0.0407)
Z1 0.8997
(0.2382)
0.8879
(0.2815)
0.8487
(0.2548)
0.8564
(0.2971)
0.8903
(0.2625)
0.8837
(0.1969)
Z2 0.5249
(18.381)
0.0064
(0.0112)
0.0055
(0.0163)
0.0072
(0.0234)
0.1571
(3.8006)
0.0076
(0.0132)
Cl 0.1003
(0.2382)
0.1121
(0.2B15)
0.1513
(0.2548)
0.1436
(0.2971)
0.1097
(0.2625)
0.1163
(0.1969)
C2 0.6171
(5.3939)
0.5881
(4.443B)
0.4986
(0.2138)
1.2481
(27.322)
0.4855
(0.2440)
0.4650
(0.1862)
AVGS 0.0157
(0.0111)
0.0155
(0.0107)
0.0153
(0.0115)
0.0151
(0.0111)
0.0149
(0.0104)
0.0154
(0.0105)
BLOCK 0.0898
(0.0778)
0.0671
(0.0728)
0.0600
(0.0745)
0.0590
(0.0729)
0.0544
(0.0635)
0.0538
(0.0579)
sample
size 1271 1313 1292 1295 647 645
NT : hourly nunber of trades
VOL : hourly volume (in hundreds of shares)
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance 
RET : absolute value of hourly return
Z1 : information component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
Z2 : information component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
C1 : transitory component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
C2 : transitory component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
AVGS : average quoted spread (as proportion of price)
BLOCK : proportion of block trades (#block trades/#total trades)
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Table 9 {continued)
Panel B
High-Activity Sample ANOVA Results 
PoBt-Crash Period
Variables F Fh Fh/w Fw/h R2 n
NT 21.86
(41.61)
18.18
(35.82)
18.14
(35.77)
26.46
(48.84)
0.0296
(0.0548)
6463
VOL 30.27
(55.28)
37.23
(67.63)
37.59
(68.41)
21.58
(39.83)
0.0405
(0.0716)
6463
RETV 0.88+
(49.66)
0.82+
(1.75)+
0.82+
(1.84)+
0.97+
(109.55)
0.0012
(0.0648)
6463
RET 109.92
(90.76)
63.02
(62.32)
63.03
(62.67)
168.55
(126.30)
0.1329
(0.1124)
6463
Z1 6.26
(7.89)
7.39
(9.43)
7.43
(9.50)
4.86
(5.98)
0.0087
(0.0109)
6463
22 0.87+
(5.62)
0.79+
(9.80)
0.79+
(9.79)
0.98+
(0.40)+
0.0012
(0.0078)
6463
C2 0.91+
(9.79)
0.67+
(9.66)
0.67+
(9.76)
1.21+
(9.95)
0.0013
(0.0135)
6463
AVGS 35.83
(56.81)
0.75+
(2.22)+
0.80+
(2.35)+
79.68
(125.04)
0.0476
(0.0734)
6463
BLOCK 25.74
(35.53)
39.40
(57.41)
39.06
(57.81)
8.66
(8.18)
0.0347
(0.0472)
6463
Independent variables = hour of the day and day of the week
F = overall F value of the ANOVA
Fjj = F value when only the hour effect is included
Fh/w = partial F value of the hour effect
Fw/h = P°rt’al F value of the day effect
+ : insignificant at the IX level
Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding statistics using rank transformed data
NT : hourly number of trades
VOL : hourly volune (in hundreds of shares)
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance 
RET : absolute value of hourly return
21 : information component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
22 : information component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread) 
Cl : transitory component using Stoll's approach (not included as the result is the same as 21) 
C2 : transitory component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread) 
AVGS : average quoted spread (as proportion of price)
BLOCK : proportion of block trades (#block trades/#total trades)
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Table 9 (continued)
Panel C
High-Activity Sample Hourly Mean Comparisons
Post-Crash Period
Signs of row minus colum means : +++ significant at 1% using both original and rank data, ++ 
significant only with ranks, + insignificant or significant only uhen using original data (where 
contradiction occurs, sign for ranks is used); same signing convention is used for negative values.
2 3 U 5 6
NT +++ ++ - NT
VOL +++ +++ -n-+ +++ +++ VOL
RETV + + + + + RETV
RET +++ +++ + --- RET
Z1 + ♦++ +++ + Z1
Z2 + ++ + + - 12
Cl — --- - - C1
C2 -- — - - C2
AVGS + + + + •f AVGS
BLOCK +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ BLOCK
NT +++ +++ - . NT
VOL +++ +-H- +++ + VOL
RETV + + - - RETV
RET +++ +++ +++ - RET
Z1 +++ + - + Z1
Z2 ++ + - - 22
C1 — - - Cl
C2 -- -- - - C2
AVGS + + + - AVGS
BLOCK ++ ++ +++ +++ BLOCK
NT - ... — NT
VOL - -- — VOL
RETV + - RETV
RET - --- — RET
Z1 - Z1
22 -- -- -- Z2
Cl + ++ + C1
C2 + + + C2
AVGS + - - AVGS
BLOCK + + + BLOCK
NT — — NT
VOL - -- VOL
RETV - RETV
RET — ... RET
Z1 - Z1
Z2 - Z2
C1 + + Cl
C2 + + C2
AVGS - - AVGS
BLOCK + + BLOCK
NT .. NT
VOL - VOL
RETV + RETV
RET — RET
Z1 + Z1
Z2 - Z2
C1 - C1
C2 + C2
AVGS - AVGS
BLOCK - BLOCK
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Table 9 (continued)
Panel D
High-Activity Sample Regression Result
Post-Crash Period
Dependent Variable
A« FREQ
Independent Variables 
intercept 0.00015 0.6207
(0.541) (98.086)*
HI 8.1E-5 0.0514
(0.218) (6.567)*
H6 -2.1E-5 -0.0048
(-0.043) (-0.455)
U1 0.00080 -0.0009
(2.022) (-0.115)
W5 0.00098 0.0686
(2.585)* (8.604)*
NETT 4.9E-5 -0.0051
(3.582)* (-11.914)*
NT -1.7E-5 -0.0013
(-3.618)* (-10.272)*
AS -0.00027 0.0122
(-1.371) (2.492)*
RET 0.9620 0.8634
(247.627)* (8.564)*
RETV -1.1E-6 0.0D17
(-0.007) (0.537)
F 8022.94 88.249
R2 0.9180 0.1096
adj. R2 0.9179 0.1084
n 6463 6463
Nunber in parentheses are the t values for the null hypothesis that corresponding coefficient = 0, 
* indicates significant at the 1% level
Dependent variables :
A Q  = percentage changes in quoted prices over an hourly interval 
FREQ = number of quotes / number of trades
Independent variables : (Note : NETT, A S  and RET are in their absolute values in FREQ regression) 
HI : an indicator = 1 if hour 1, - 0 otherwise
H6 : an indicator = 1 if hour 6, = 0 otherwise
U1 : Bn indicator = 1 if Monday, & 0 otherwise
U5 : an indicator = 1 if Friday, = 0 otherwise
NETT : number of purchase minus number of sale over an hourly interval 
NT : hourly number of trades
/IS : percentage changes in the magnitude of the spread 
RET : hourly return
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance
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Table 10
Hourly Statistics of Trading Activity, Price Changes and Transaction Cost 
for the Pre-Crash Hediun-Activity Sample
Panel A
Medium-Activity Sample Hourly Sunmary Statistics 
Pre-Crash Period
Numbers are Means and Standard Deviation (in parentheses) across days and stocks
1 2 3 4 5 6
NT 8.02
(5.48)
7.38
(4.71)
6.79
(4.07)
6.35
(3.95)
6.66
(3.88)
8.06
(5.07)
VOL 144.66
(249.20)
130.18
(260.90)
118.22
(229.17)
113.57
(242.02)
108.48
(194.86)
126.22
(219.75)
RETV 4.4E-5
(1.6E-4)
3.9E-5
(1.4E-4)
4.0E-5
(1.4E-4)
4.4E-5
(2.2E-4)
3.4E-5 
Cl.IE-4)
3.7E-5
(1.2E-4)
RET 0.0091
(0.0120)
0.0075
(0.0096)
0.0074
(0.0101)
0.0070
(0.0103)
0.0068
(0.0095)
0.0077 
(0.0098)
Z1 0.8246
(0.3589)
0.7956
(0.3676)
0.7945
(0.3526)
0.7968
(0.3514)
0.7861
(0.3571)
0.7918
(0.3370)
zz 8.0479
(59.546)
8.3509
(74.390)
7.3269
(55.010)
9.6486
(63.916)
9.3004
(64.423)
8.5494
(70.593)
Cl 0.1754
(0.35B9)
0.2044
(0.3676)
0.2055
(0.3526)
0.2032
(0.3514)
0.2139
(0.3571)
0.2082
(0.3370)
C2 5.4236
(46.293)
6.6459
(51.889)
7.3644
(62.114)
7.3385
(53.200)
8.1850
(61.088)
6.9190
(53.129)
AVGS 0.0138
(0.0091)
0.0129
(0.0087)
0.0130
(0.0089)
0.0129
(0.0098)
0.0126
(0.0084)
0.0127
(0.0080)
BLOCK 0.0350
(0.0864)
0.0346
(0.0883)
0.0366
(0.0942)
0.0333
(0.0904)
0.0330
(0.0894)
0.0298
(0.0808)
sample
size 5495 3913 3162 2527 2954 3654
NT : hourly number of trades
VOL : hourly volune (in hundreds of shares)
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance 
RET : absolute value of hourly return
Z1 : information component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
Z2 : information component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
C1 : transitory component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
C2 : transitory conponent using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
AVGS : average quoted spread (as proportion of price)
BLOCK : proportion of block trades (ffblock trades/#total trades)
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Table 10 (continued)
Panel B
Mediun-Activity Sample ANOVA Results 
Pre-Crash Period
Variables F Fh Fh/w Fw/h R2 n
NT 53.51
(56.21)
82.86
(87.61)
82.59
(87.17)
16.83
(16.97)
0.0217
(0.0228)
21705
VOL 8.71
(25.28)
12.43
(41.48)
12.54
(41.70)
4.05
(5.04)
0.0036
(0.0104)
21705
RETV 1.91+
(13.07)
2.3B+
(22.96)
2.34+
(22.99)
1.31+
(0.71)+
0.0008
(0.0054)
21705
RET 15.4B
(20.35)
25.74
(33.22)
25.69
(33.09)
2.65+
(4.27)
0.0064
(0.0084)
21705
Z1 4.74
(4.95)
6.85
(6.77)
6.89
(6.83)
2.10+
(2.67)+
0.0020
(0.0020)
21705
Z2 0.53+
(15.46)
0.47+
(26.29)
0.47+
(26.27)
0.60+
(1.93)+
0.0002
(0.0068)
21705
C2 0.80+
(3.72)
1.22+
(6.31)
1.21+
(6.31)
0.29+
(0.48)+
0,0003
(0.0016)
21705
AVGS 6.43
(11.51)
10.85
(19.95)
10.81
(19.92)
0.91+
(0.97)+
0.0027
(0.0048)
21705
BLOCK 3.24
(4.01)
2.49+
(5.26)
2.43+
(5.29)
4.18
(2.43)+
0.0013
(0.0017)
21705
Independent variables = hour of the da/ and day of the ueek
F = overall F value of the ANOVA
F[j = F value when only the hour effect is included
Fh/w = F value of the hour effect
F„/h = partial F value of the day effect
+ : insignificant at the 1% level
Nurbers in parentheses are the corresponding statistics using rank transformed data
NT : hourly number of trades
VOL : hourly volume (in hundreds of shares)
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance 
RET : absolute value of hourly return
Z1 : information component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
Z2 : information component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread) 
C1 : transitory component using Stoll's approach (not included as the result is the same as Zl) 
C2 : transitory component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread) 
AVGS : average quoted BpreBd (as proportion of price)
BLOCK : proportion of block trades (tfblock trades/#total trades)
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Table 10 (continued)
Panel c
Hediun-Activity Sample Hourly Mean Comparisons
Pre-Crash Period
Signs of rou minus column means : +++ significant at IX using both original and rank data, ++ 
significant only with ranks, + insignificant or significant only when using original data (where 
contradiction occurs, sign for ranks is used); same signing convention is used for negative values.
2 3 4 5 6
NT +++ +++ +44 444 ** NT
VOL 44 +++ 444 4+4 4+4 VOL
RETV ++ ++ +4 44 4 RETV
RET +++ +++ +44 444 444 RET
Z1 +++ ++4 4 44+ +44 Z1
zz ++ ++ 44 44 +4 Z2
C1 ... - ... --- Cl
C2 - - - - C2
AVGS + + + 4++ 444 444 +44 AVGS
BLOCK + 4 4+ 4+ +4 BLOCK
NT 44+ 444 444 ... NT
VOL + 44 444 - VOL
RETV 4 44 4 - RETV
RET + 4 44 - RET
Z1 + - 4 4 Z1
22 + 4 4 - Z2
C1 - 4 - - Cl
C2 - 4 - - C2
AVGS 4 4 4 4 AVGS
BLOCK 4 4 4 4 BLOCK
NT 444 4 ... NT
VOL 4 4 -- VOL
RETV 4 4 - RETV
RET 4 4 - RET
Z1 - - 4 Z1
Z2 4 - " Z2
Cl 4 4 - Cl
C2 4 - - C2
AVGS 4 4 4 AVGS
BLOCK 4 4 4 BLOCK
NT ... NT
VOL - .. VOL
RETV - -- RETV
RET 4 RET
21 4 4 21
Z2 - -- Z2
C1 - - C1
C2 - - C2
AVGS 4 - AVGS
BLOCK 4 4 BLOCK
NT ... NT
VOL VOL
RETV .. RETV
RET RET
Z1 4 Z1
Z2 - Z2
Cl - Cl
C2 - 02
AVGS - AVGS
BLOCK - BLOCK
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Table 10 (continued)
Panel D
Medium-Activity Sample Regression Result
Pre-Crash Period
Dependent Variable 
ZiQ FREQ
Independent Variables
intercept 0.00016 1.1589
(1.182) (124.739)*
H1 -0.00084 0.1821
(-5.608)* (18.188)*
H6 9.0E-5 -0.0273
(0.524) (-2.352)
U1 7.2E-5 0.0374
(0.431) (3.346)*
U5 0.00048 0.0563
(2.789)* (4.841)*
NETT 0.00039 -0.0606
(15.333)* (-23.806)*
NT 2.7E-5 -0.0149
(2.036) (-13.526)*
A S -0.00239 0.0273
(-25.220)* (3.699)*
RET 0.7045 4.6699
(143.122)* (10.498)*
RETV 0.6126 -92.984
(1.486) (-3.099)*
F 2659.38 226.89
R2 0.5245 0.0860
adj. Rz 0.5243 0.0856
n 21705 21705
Number in parentheses are the t values for the null hypothesis that corresponding coefficient = 0, 
* indicates significant at the IX level
Dependent variables :
i \Q  = percentage changes in quoted prices over an hourly interval 
FREQ = nunber of quotes / number of trades
Independent variables : (Note : NETT, / \ S  and RET are in their absolute vaLues in FREQ regression) 
H1 : an indicator = 1 if hour 1, = 0 otherwise
H6 : an indicator = 1 if hour 6, = 0 otherwise
W1 : an indicator = 1 if Monday, = 0 otherwise
W5 : an indicator = 1 if Friday, = 0 otherwise
NETT : number of purchase minus nuiber of sale over an hourly interval 
NT : hourly number of trades
: percentage changes in the magnitude of the spread 
RET : hourly return
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance
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Table 11
Hourly Statistics of Trading Activity, Price Changes and Transaction Cost 
for the Post-Crash Hediun-Activity Sample
Panel A
Hedium-Activity Sample Hourly Summary Statistics 
Post-Crash Period
Numbers are Means and Standard Deviation (in parentheses) across days and stocks
1 2 3 4 5 6
NT 12.46
(7.26)
12.63
(7.52)
10.93
(6.73)
10.52
(6.10)
11.18
(6.24)
12.64
(7.28)
VOL 275.57
(352.43)
228.66
(395.83)
193.25
(572.99)
193.41
(615.68)
178.38
(261.12)
225.31
(935.93)
RETV 1.6E-4
(2.7E-4)
1.5E-4
(2.7E-4)
1.0E-3
(3.6E-2)
1.5E-4
(2.7E-4)
1.5E-4
(4.8E-4)
1.4E-4
(2.9E-4)
RET 0.0320
(0.0340)
0.0266
(0.0292)
0.0229
(0.0303)
0.019B
(0.0226)
0.0202
(0.0235)
0.0267
(0.0325)
Z1 0.8664
(0.3016)
0.8577
(0.2843)
0.8214
(0.3146)
0.8108
(0.3378)
0.8672
(0.2894)
0.8340
(0.3814)
Z2 2.7235
(34.784)
1.6986
(28.132)
2.2479
(31.269)
2.4130
(25.961)
2.5390
(30.849)
1.4660
(20.161)
C1 0.1336
(0.3016)
0.1423
(0.2843)
0.1786
(0.3146)
0.1892
(0.3378)
0.1328
(0.2894)
0.1660
(0.3614)
C2 2.5730
(28.447)
1.4041 
(17.391)
1.5399
(15.333)
2.4130
(25.961)
3.4368
(33.509)
0.8778
(7.4512)
AVGS 0.0262
(0.0158)
0.0252
(0.0148)
0.0253
(0.0165)
0.0252
(0.0166)
0.0238
(0.0158)
0.0243
(0.0154)
BLOCK 0.0469
(0.0807)
0.0300
(0.0675)
0.0296
(0.0707)
0.0315
(0.0740)
0.0299
(0.0690)
0.0316
(0.0679)
sample
size 2149 2015 1809 1776 874 924
NT : hourly nimber of trades
VOL : hourly volume (in hundreds of shares)
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance 
RET : absolute value of hourly return
Z1 : information component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
Z2 : information component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
C1 : transitory component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
C2 : transitory component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
AVGS : average quoted spread (as proportion of price)
BLOCK : proportion of block trades (#block trades/#total trades)
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Table 11 (continued)
Panel B
Mediun-Activity Sample ANOVA Results 
Post-Crash Period
Variables F Fh Fh/w Fw/h R2 n
NT 60.85
(65.68)
32.84
(33.72)
34.13
(35.19)
95.87
(105.63)
0.0543
(0.0584)
9547
VOL 8.96
(58.79)
7.66
(65.76)
7.97
(67.56)
10.58
(50.07)
0.0084
(0.0526)
9547
RETV 0.91+
(63.39)
0.87+
(7.69)
0.85+
(7.60)
0.96+
(133.02)
0.0009
(0.0564)
9547
RET 74.40
(74.74)
46.03
(44.75)
47.51
(46.56)
109.87
(112.21)
0.0656
(0.0659)
9547
21 8.76
(6.28)
9.88
(7.55)
10.02
(7.65)
7.36
(4.69)
0.0082
(0.0059)
9547
22 1.70+
(9.14)
0.50+
(13.66)
0.49+
(13.82)
3.19+
(3.50)
0.0017
(0.0089)
9547
C2 2.71
(5.61)
1.92+
(6.45)
1.89+
(6.50)
3.71
(4.56)
0,0026
(0.0053)
9547
AVGS 53.64
(78.18)
4.09
(7.43)
4.10
(7.43)
115.59
(166.63)
0.0482
(0.0687)
9547
BLOCK 11.25
(23.71)
17.19
(33.80)
17.23
(34.15)
3.83
(11.10)
0.0105
(0.0219)
9547
Independent variables = hour of the day and day of the week
F = overall F value of the ANOVA 
Fh B F value when only the hour effect is included 
Fh/w = partial F value of the hour effect 
Fw/h = partial F value of the day effect
+ : insignificant at the 1% level
Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding statistics using rank transformed data
NT : hourly number of trades
VOL : hourly volume (in hundreds of shares)
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance 
RET : absolute value of hourly return
21 : information component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
22 : information component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread) 
Cl : transitory component using Stoll's approach (not included as the result is the same as 21) 
C2 : transitory component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread) 
AVGS : average quoted spread (as proportion of price)
BLOCK : proportion of block trades (#block trades/#total trades)
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Table 11 (continued)
Panel C
Hedlum-Activity Sample HourLy Mean Comparisons 
Post-Crash Period
Signs of rou minus column means : +++ significant at 1% using both original and rank data, ++ 
significant only with ranks, + insignificant or significant only when using original data (where 
contradiction occurs, sign for ranks is used); same signing convention is used for negative values.
2 3 4 5 6
NT - +++ +++ 444 - NT
VOL ++ +++ +++ 444 ++ VOL
RETV 4 + 44 44 ++ RETV
RET +++ 444 444 444 +++ RET
Z1 4 444 444 4 + Z1
Z2 44 44 44 44 + ZZ
Cl - — --- - - Cl
C2 - - -- - - C2
AVGS + + 4 444 ++ AVGS
BLOCK +++ +++ 444 444 +++ BLOCK
NT 444 444 444 - NT
VOL 44 44 44 + VOL
RETV + 4 44 + RETV
RET 444 444 444 + RET
Z1 + 4 - + Z1
22 4 4 4 - ZZ
Cl ... - 4 - Cl
C2 - -- - - cz
AVGS 4 4 44 + AVGS
BLOCK + 4 4 - BLOCK
NT - — NT
VOL 4 -- VOL
RETV 4 44 * RETV
RET 4 4 -- RET
Z1 4 - - Z1
Z2 4 - -- Z2
C1 4 44 + Cl
C2 - - + CZ
AVGS 4 4 + AVGS
BLOCK - - - BLOCK
NT . — NT
VOL - — VOL
RETV 4 + RETV
RET 4 — RET
Z1 -- - Z1
11 - -- ZZ
C1 4 + Cl
C2 4 + C2
AVGS 4 AVGS
BLOCK - - BLOCK
NT — NT
VOL - VOL
RETV - RETV
RET ... RET
Z1 Z1
22 - ZZ
Cl - C1
C2 + cz
AVGS - AVGS
BLOCK - BLOCK
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Table 11(continued)
Panel D
Medium-Activity Sample Regression Result
Post-Crash Period
Dependent Variable
FREQ
Independent Variables 
i ntercept -4.IE-6 0.8802
(-0.013) (116.957)*
HI -0.00024 0.0582
(-0.702) (7.405)*
H6 0.00011 -0.0025
(0.237) (-0.226)
U1 -0.00076 -0.0171
(-2.057) (-2.09B)
U5 0.00017 0.0453
(0.445) (5.232)*
NETT 0.00041 -0.0239
(9.991)* (-17.577)*
NT -2.8E-6 -0.0114
(-0.140) (-19.952)*
A S -0.00072 0.0265
(-3.139)* (4.233)*
RET 0.8889 1.2186
(224.805)* (10.454)*
RETV 0.0029 -0.0336
(0.329) (-0.165)
F 6977.24 180.96
R2 0.8681 0.1459
adj. R2 0.8680 0.1451
n 9547 9547
Number in parentheses are the t values for the nuLL hypothesis that corresponding coefficient = 0, 
* indicates significant at the IX level
Dependent variables :
A °  = percentage changes in quoted prices over an hourly interval 
FREO = nunber of quotes / number of trades
Independent variables : (Note : NETT, A S  and RET are in their absolute values in FREQ regression) 
K1 : an indicator = 1 if hour 1, = 0 otherwise
H6 : an indicator = 1 if hour 6, = 0 otherwise
U1 : an indicator - 1 if Monday, = 0 otherwise
MS : an indicator = 1 if Friday, = 0 otherwise
NETT : nunber of purchase minus number of sale over an hourly interval 
NT : hourly nunber of trades
A S  : percentage changes in the magnitude of the spread 
RET : hourly return
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance
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Table 12
Hourly Statistics of Trading Activity, Price Changes and Transaction Cost 
for the Pre-Crash Low-Activity Sample
Panel A
Low-Activity Sample Hourly Summary Statistics 
Pre-Crash Period
Numbers are Keans and Standard Deviation (in parentheses) across days and stocks
1 2 3 4 5 6
NT 4.47
(1-94)
4.35
(1.86)
4.27
(1.76)
4.13
(2.00)
4.13
(1.41)
4.51
(1.70)
VOL 84.84
(207.90)
73.82
(192.96)
76.92
(270.69)
60.01
(99.06)
127.31
(516.54)
47.95
(56.60)
RETV 7.1E-5
(2.5E-4)
3.8E-5
(6.7E-5)
3.9E-5
(7.7E-5)
4.3E-5
(8.8E-5)
2.3E-5
(3.9E-5)
3.8E-5
(8.1E-5)
RET 0.0105
(0.0139)
0.0104
(0.0133)
0.0082
(0.0078)
0.0104
(0.0126)
0.0079
(0.0088)
0.0105
(0.0112)
21 0.8108
(0.3301)
0.8038
(0.3247)
0.8141
(0.3009)
0.8823
(0.1821)
0.8031
(0.2872)
0.8593
(0.1751)
22 15.868
(73.027)
17.347
(82.535)
11.527
(53.401)
17.612
(63.300)
12.643
(73.907)
13.205
(56.177)
C1 0.1892
(0.3301)
0.1962
(0.3274)
0.1859
(0.3009)
0.1177
(0.1821)
0.1969
(0.2872)
0.1407
(0.1751)
C2 15.836
(75.770)
8.6443
(42.132)
15.064
(73.787)
18.747
(71.044)
12.701
(59.344)
7.1014
(36.727)
AVGS 0.0182
(0.0119)
0.0165
(0.0090)
0.0167
(0.0092)
0.0190
(0.0129)
0.0141
(0.0076)
0.0157
(0.0076)
BLOCK 0.0297
(0.0948)
0.0275
(0.0972)
0.0215
(0.0873)
0.0373
(0.1203)
0.0320
(0.1035)
0.0191
(0.0704)
sample
size 384 217 123 72 64 83
NT : hourly number of trades
VOL : hourly volune (in hundreds of shares)
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance 
RET : absolute value of hourly return
21 : information component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
22 : information component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
C1 : transitory component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
C2 : transitory component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
AVGS : average quoted spread (as proportion of price)
BLOCK : proportion of block trades (#block trades/tftotal trades)
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Table 12 (continued)
Panel B
Low-Activity Sample ANOVA Results 
Pre-Crash Period
Dependent Variables F Fh Fh/w Fw/h R2 n
NT 1.24+
(1.43)+
0.88+
(1.30)+
0.91+
(1.36)+
1.68+
(1.58)+
0.0118
(0.0134)
943
VOL 0.78+
(0.91)+
1.00+
(0.37)+
1.10+
(0.40)+
0.51+
(1.58)+
0.0075
(0.0087)
943
RETV 1.24+
(1.26)+
1.98+ 
(2.21)+
2.01+
(2.19)+
0.32+
(0.07)+
0.0119
(0.0120)
943
RET 1.13+
(0.60)+
1.10+
(0.38)+
1.22+
(0.43)+
1.17+
(0.88)+
0.010B
(0.0058)
943
Z1 0.76+
(0.60)+
1.13+
(0.66)+
1.17+
(0.74)+
0.30+
(0.52)+
0.0073
(0.0057)
943
Z2 1.60+
(1.86)+
0.14+
(1.45)+
0.19+
(1.46)+
3.42
(2.38)+
0.0171
(0.0200)
943
C2 0.76+
(0.65)+
0.60+
(0.51)+
0.63+
(0.47)+
0.97+
(0.82)+
0.0075
(0.0063)
943
AVGS 2.41+
(1.64)+
2.89+
(2.04)+
3.18 
(2.21)+
1.82+
(1.15)+
0.0228
(0.0156)
943
BLOCK 0.86+
(0.80)+
0.45+
(0.34)+
0.39+
(0.32)+
1.39+
(1.37)+
O.OQB3
(0.0076)
943
Independent variables = hour of the day and day of the week
F = overall F value of the ANOVA 
Fh = F value when only the hour effect is included 
Fh/w = partial F value of the hour effect 
Fw h^ = partial F value of the day effect
+ : insignificant at the 1% level
Nunbers in parentheses are the corresponding statistics using rank transformed data
NT : hourly number of trades
VOL : hourly volume (in hundreds of shares)
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance 
RET : absolute value of hourly return
Z1 : information component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
Z2 : information component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread) 
C1 : transitory component using Stoll's approach (not included as the result is the same as Z1) 
C2 : transitory component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread) 
AVGS : average quoted spread (as proportion of price)
BLOCK : proportion of block trades (ftblock trades/#total trades)
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Table 12 (continued)
Panel C
Low-Activity Sample Hourly Mean Comparisons
Pre-Crash Period
Signs of row minus colum means : +++ significant at 1% using both original and rank data, ++ 
significant only with ranks, + insignificant or significant only when using original data (where 
contradiction occurs, sign for ranks is used); same signing convention is used for negative values.
2 3 A 5 6
NT + + + + - NT
VOL + + + + + VOL
RETV + + ■f + + RETV
RET + + + - RET
Zl + + - 11
Z2 ♦ + + + 22
Cl + - + Cl
C2 L + - - - C2
AVGS + + - + + AVGS
BLOCK + + - + BLOCK
NT + + + . NT
VOL + - + VOL
RETV + + + + RETV
RET + + - RET
Z1 - * - Zl
22 + + + Z2
Cl + + + Cl
C2 - - - C2
AVGS - + + AVGS
BLOCK + - - + BLOCK
NT + + . NT
VOL + + VOL
RETV + + + RETV
RET + - RET
21 + + Z1
22 + + - Z2
Cl + - - Cl
C2 + - C2
AVGS - + + AVGS
BLOCK - - + BLOCK
NT - . NT
VOL + VOL
RETV + - RETV
RET + - RET
11 + + 11
12 - - 22
Cl - - Cl
C2 - - C2
AVGS + + AVGS
BLOCK + + BLOCK
NT . NT
VOL + VOL
RETV - RETV
RET - RET
Zl - Zl
Z2 - Z2
C1 + Cl
C2 - C2
AVGS - AVGS
BLOCK + BLOCK
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Table 12 (continued)
Panel D
Low-Activity Sample Regression Result 
Pre-Crash Period
Dependent Variable
A O FREQ
Independent Variables 
intercept -0.00030 1.3524
(-0.399) (20.913)*
HI -0.00061 0.1241
(-1.075) (2.712)*
H6 0.00024 -0.0031
(0.245) (-0.039)
W1 3.7E-5 0.1206
(0.051) (2.048)
W5 0.00070 0.0728
(0.880) (1.139)
NETT 0.00079 -0.1729
(4.323)* (-8.793)*
NT -3.0E-5 -0.0163
(-0.203) (-1.170)*
A S 0.00043 0.0300
(0.901) (0.621)
RET 0.7564 1.6360
(43.897)* (0.868)
RETV 10.5123 -217.743
(6.521)* (-1.573)
F 243.75 14.97
R2 0.7016 0.1262
adj. R2 0.6987 0.1178
n 943 943
Nunber in parentheses are the t values for the null hypothesis that corresponding coefficient = 0, 
* indicates significant at the IX level
Dependent variables :
A Q  = percentage changes in quoted prices over an hourly interval 
FREQ = number of quotes / nunber of trades
Independent variables : (Note : NETT, A S  and RET are in their absolute values in FREQ regression) 
HI : an indicator « 1 if hour 1, = 0 otherwise
H6 : an indicator = 1 if hour 6, = 0 otherwise
U1 : an indicator = 1 if Monday, = 0 otherwise
US : an indicator = 1 if Friday, = 0 otherwise
NETT : nunber of purchase minus number of sale over an hourly interval 
NT : hourly nunber of trades
A S  : percentage changes in the magnitude of the spread 
RET : hourly return
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance
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Table 13
Hourly Statistics of Trading Activity, Price Changes and Transaction Cost 
for the Post-Crash Low-Activity Sample
Panel A
Low-Activity Sample Hourly Summary Statistics 
Post-Crash Period
Numbers are Means and Standard Deviation (in parentheses) across days and stocks
1 2 3 4 5 6
NT 5.53
(2.46)
5.26
(2.44)
5.16
(2.13)
5.14
(2.10)
4.92
(2.03)
5.31
(2.11)
VOL BO.68 
(113.60)
57.25
(81.83)
55.03
(88.73)
54.08
(62.64)
47.87
(51.65)
60.88
(74.34)
RETV 2.6E-4
(7.0E-4)
3.0E-4
(1.2E-3)
2.4E-4
(6.2E-4)
2.9E-4
(5.9E-4)
2.4E-4
(5.8E-4)
2.6E-4
(7.2E-4)
RET 0.0264
(0.0267)
0.0237
(0.0252)
0.0233
(0.0230)
0.0234
(0.0238)
0.0230
(0.0206)
0.0237
(0.0250)
Zl 0.8153
(0.3741)
0.8306
(0.3816)
0.8174
(0.2522)
0.8026
(0.2830)
0.8318
(0.2473)
0.8219
(0.2120)
Z2 12.266
(57.552)
20.553
(86.319)
7.2647
(44.873)
11.663
(59.712)
8.4469
(41.441)
2.0552
(17.658)
C1 0.1847
(0.3741)
0.1694
(0.3816)
0.1826
(0.2522)
0.1974
(0.2830)
0.1682
(0.2473)
0.1780
(0.2120)
C2 11.553
(54.557)
4.0376
(22.504)
7.5911
(38.024)
9.7731
(61.609)
8.7095
(53.846)
3.2560
(26.183)
AVGS 0.0332
(0.0251)
0.0342
(0.0264)
0.0329
(0.0229)
0.0351
(0.0250)
0.0334
(0.0250)
0.0327
(0.0215)
BLOCK 0.0239
(0.0754)
0.0135
(0.0739)
0.0079
(0.0400)
0.0146
(0.0577)
0.0157
(0.0738)
0.0157
(0.0621)
sample
size 405 253 183 172 75 84
NT : hourly number of trades
VOL : hourly volume (in hundreds of shares)
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance 
RET : absolute value of hourly return
Zl : information component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
Z2 : information component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
Cl : transitory component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
C2 : transitory component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
AVGS : average quoted spread (as proportion of price)
BLOCK : proportion of block trades (#block trades/#total trades)
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Table 13 (continued)
Panel B
Low-Activity Sample ANOVA Results 
Post-Crash Period
Variables F Fh Fh/w Fw/h R2 n
NT 3.31
(3.22)
1.54+
(1.56)+
1.70+
(1.67)+
5.53
(5.30)
0.0250
(0.0243)
1172
VOL 3.08
(4-69)
4.26
(6.19)
4.35
(6.36)
1.61+
(2.82)+
0.0233
(0.0351)
1172
RETV 1.89+
(3.99)
0.18+
(0.21)+
0.22+
(0.30)+
4.03
(8.71)
0.0145
(0.0300)
1172
RET 2.78
(3.24)
0.74+
(0.62)+
0.85+
(0.77)+
5.34
(6.50)
0.0211
(0,0244)
1172
Z1 0.40+
(0.98)+
0.18+
(1.04)+
0.19+
(1.06)+
0.68+
(0.91)+
0.0031
(0.0075)
1172
22 1.05+
(1.21)+
1.56+
(2.04)+
1.54+
(2.07)+
0.42+
(0.18)+
0.0089
(0.0102)
1172
C2 1.25+
(0.78)+
1.05+
(0.45)+
0.99+
(0.47)+
1.50+
(1.20)+
0.0097
(0.0061)
1172
AVGS 2.59
(4.51)
0.23+
(0.32)+
0.29+
(0.44)+
5.54
(9.74)
0.0197
(0.0337)
1172
BLOCK 1.77+
(2.51)
1.72+
(3.12)
1.66+
(3.07)
1.84+
(1.75)+
0.0135
(0.0191)
1172
Independent variables = hour of the day and day of the week
F = overall F value of the ANOVA 
Fh = F value when only the hour effect is included 
Fh/w = partial F value of the hour effect 
Fw/h = partial F value of the day effect
+ : insignificant at the 15£ level
Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding statistics using rank transformed data
NT : hourly number of trades
VOL : hourly volume (in hundreds of shares)
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance 
RET : absolute value of hourly return
Z1 : information component using Stoll's approach (as proportion of quoted spread)
Z2 : information component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread) 
Cl : transitory component using Stoll's approach (not included as the result is the same as Z1) 
C2 : transitory component using Glosten and Harris's approach (as proportion of quoted spread) 
AVGS : average quoted spread (as proportion of price)
BLOCK : proportion of block trades (#block trades/fltotal trades)
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Table 13 (continued)
Panel C
Low-Activity Sample Hourly Mean Comparisons
Post-Crash Period
Signs of row minus coluxi means : +++ significant at IX using both original and rank data, ++ 
significant only with ranks, + insignificant or significant only when using original data (where 
contradiction occurs, sign for ranks is used); same signing convention is used for negative values.
2 3 4 5 6
NT + + + + + NT
VOL ++ ++ ++ + + VOL
RETV - - - - RETV
RET + + + + RET
Zl - + + + Zl
Z2 + + + + + Z2
Cl + - - - Cl
C2 + - + + C2
AVGS - - - - AVGS
BLOCK + + + + + BLOCK
NT _ - + _ NT
VOL + + + VOL
RETV + - + - RETV
RET - - - RET
Zl + + + + Zl
Z2 ♦ + + + Z2
Cl - - - Cl
C2 - + C2
AVGS + + + AVGS
BLOCK + - - - BLOCK
NT + + . NT
VOL - + * VOL
RETV - + - RETV
RET - - - RET
Z1 + - + Zl
Z2 + - + Z2
Cl + - C1
C2 - - + C2
AVGS - - - AVGS
BLOCK - - - BLOCK
NT + - NT
VOL + - VOL
RETV + - RETV
RET - + RET
Zl - + Zl
Z2 - - Z2
Cl + - C1
C2 + CH
AVGS + AVGS
BLOCK + - BLOCK
NT - NT
VOL - VOL
RETV - RETV
RET + RET
Zl + Zl
Z2 + Z2
C1 - Cl
C2 + C2
AVGS + AVGS
BLOCK - BLOCK
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Table 13{continued)
Panel D
Low-Activity Sample Regression Result 
Post-Crash Period
Independent Variables 
intercept
A O
-0.00052
(-0.417)
Dependent Variable
FREQ
1.0911
(36.054)*
HI -0.00076
(-0.777)
0.0093
(0.410)
H6 0.00179
(0.987)
0.0152
(0.365)
U1 -0.00253
(-2.304)
-0.0139
(-0.560)
US -0.00019
(-0.811)
0.0233
(0.688)
NETT 0.00117
(4.276)*
-0.0835
(-9.617)*
NT 8.3E-5
(0.412)
-0.0253
(-4.576)*
A s -0.00060
(-0.792)
0.0403
(1.883)
RET 0.8240
(57.189)*
1.5656
(3.292)*
RETV -0.2135
(-0.364)
-7.0052
(-0.490)
F 457.58 23.19
R2 0.7799 0.1523
adj. R2 0.7782 0.1457
n 1172 1172
Number in parentheses are the t values for the null hypothesis that corresponding coefficient = 0, 
* indicates significant at the 1% level
Dependent variables :
A Q  = percentage changes in quoted prices over an hourly interval 
FREQ = nunber of quotes / number of trades
Independent variables : (Note : NETT, As and RET are in their absolute values in FREQ regression) 
H1 : an indicator = 1 if hour 1, = 0 otherwise
H6 : an indicator = 1 if hour 6, = 0 otherwise
W1 : an indicator = 1 if Monday, = 0 otherwise
W5 : an indicator = 1 if Friday, = 0 otherwise
NETT : number of purchase minus number of sale over an hourly interval 
NT : hourly number of trades
A S  : percentage changes in the magnitude of the spread 
RET : hourly return
RETV : (trade-by-trade) return variance
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Table 14
Estimation of the Information and transitory components 
for the ten most active stocks in 1987 
estimation period : August 31 - September 24
Company Name Symbol Z C R2 F n P
American Express AXY 0.096
(2.952)*
0.054
(1.648)+
0.153 18.988 107 35
Eastman Kodak EK 0.176
(3.327)*
0.177
(3.367)*
0.287 42.194 107 70
General Electric GE 0.208
(4.597)*
0.124
(2.752)*
0.342 54.582 107 60
General Motors GH 0.248
(5.459)*
0.034
(0.741)
0.289 42.753 107 90
IBM IBM 0.408
(4.309)*
0.124
(1.309)+
0.286 42.047 107 160
Navistar International NAV 0.019
(1.622)+
0.016
(1.470)+
0.094 10.889 107 5
AT&T T 0.095
(4.468)*
0.035
(1.645)+
0.274 39.531 107 35
Texaco TX 0.096
(4.003)*
0.053
(2.238)+
0.248 34.699 107 40
USX Corp X 0.143
(5.864)*
0.002
(0.074)
0.287 42.208 107 40
Exxon Corp XOH 0.265
(4.247)*
0.060
(0.971)
0.222 29.898 107 50
Nunbers in parentheses are the t values for the null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient =
0, and * < + ) indicates that the regression coefficient is significantly different from zero at the
1% <1054) level
Z = information component (in dollars)
C = transitory component (in dollars) 
n = sample size = number of days * hours per day - 1 = 107 
p = approximate stock price (in dot Lars)
The Z and C are estimated from the OLS regression (Glosten and Harris (1988))
Pt - Pfc-i = C(Qt - O^i) + Z0t + et
The Pt and Qt are different from Glosten and Harris in that :
Pt = ending price at hour t
Qt = net volume (investor purchase - investor sate) in hour t 
= 1 if positive net volume 
= 0 if zero net volume 
=-1 if negative net volume
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Table 15
The Implied Values of the Variances of Noises and Variances of True Prices 
Using Equations CCS) and (C10) 
assuning different values of sensitivities of informed and uninformed traders
for the ten most active stocks in 1987 
estimation period : August 31 - September 24
E^O.OS Em=1.0 Ejs0.25 Em=0.5 E^O.5 E^I.O E^I.O E.^2.0
var(i) var(e) var(i) var(e) var{i) var(e) var(i) var(e) redv P var(V)
AXY 0.025 0.019 0.044 0.693 0.067 1.755 0.113 5.324 0.091 35 0.963
EK 0.099 0.909 0.133 1.829 0.176 3.415 0.261 8.045 0.229 70 0.971
GE 0.115 0.751 0.156 1.627 0.209 3.176 0.313 7.785 0.163 60 1.007
GM 0.118 0.428 0.168 1.512 0.231 2.510 0.356 6.741 0.169 90 1.009
IBM 0.349 1.509 0.432 2.711 0.535 4.667 0.740 10.093 0.585 160 1.009
NAV 0.001 0.025 0.004 0.254 0.008 0.871 0.015 3.214 0.008 5 0.738
T 0.023 0.147 0.042 0.621 0.066 1.661 0.113 5.232 0.036 35 0.995
TX 0.025 0.187 0.044 0.686 0.066 1.741 0.112 5.287 0.049 40 0.957
X 0.038 0.132 0.066 0.602 0.102 1.638 0.173 5.201 0.052 40 0.995
XQH 0.143 0.587 0.196 1.396 0.262 2.845 0.394 7.272 0.312 50 0.999
Ea (E,,,) = sensitivity of informed (uninformed) traders. 
var{e) = variance of noises 
var(i) = variance of true prices
redv = variance of error terms for the regression in Table 14 
P = approximate stock price 
var(V) = variance of net volume
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APPENDIX A
List of Company Names for the Sample used in Chapter III
Aluminum Co. Amer.
Anacomp Inc.
Alexander & Alexander Services 
Abbott Labs
American Barrick Res. Corp.
ACM Government Income Fund Inc.
Armstrong World Industry Inc.
American Cyanamid Co.
Ames Dept. Stores Inc.
Analog Devices Inc.
Archer Daniels Midland Co.
Allegis Corp.
American Elec. Power Inc.
Aetna Life & Gas Co.
American Family Corp.
Affiliated Publications Inc.
Amfesco Inds Inc.
American General Corp.
Edward A. G. Inc.
AGS Computers Inc.
Amerada Hess Corp.
Ahmanson H. F. & Co.
American Home Products Corp.
American International Group Inc.
Allied Signal Inc.
Arkla Inc.
Amfac Inc.
American Brands Inc.
Advanced Micro Devices Inc.
American Medical International Inc.
AMP inc.
AMR Corp.
Amoco Corp.
Anchor Glass Container Corp.
Anadarko Petroleum Corp.
Air Products & Chemicals Inc.
Applied Magnetics Corp.
Apache Petroleum Co.
QMS inc.
Asarco Inc.
Atlantic Richfield Co.
Aristech Chem. Corp.
Arvin Industries Inc.
Armco Inc.
ASA Ltd.
American Stores Co.
American Standard Inc.
Alltel Corp.
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Automatic Data Processing Inc.
Augat Inc.
Avon Products Inc.
Avnet Inc.
Avery International Corp.
American Express Co.
Boeing Co.
Baxter Travenol Labs Inc.
Barnett Banks Inc.
Best Buy Inc.
Brunswick Corp.
Boise Cascade Corp.
BCE Inc.
Biocraft Labs Inc.
Bard (CR) Inc.
Becton Dickinson & Co.
BET Pub. Ltd. Co.
Browning Ferris Industries Inc. 
Baltimore Gas & Electrics Co.
Baker Hughes Inc.
Bell & Howell Co.
Bank New York Inc.
Ball Corp.
Battle Mountain Gold Co.
Borden Inc.
Burlington Northern Inc.
Beneficial Corp.
Bausch & Lomb Inc.
Bowater Inc.
British Petroleum Ltd.
Brockway Inc.
Bethelehem Steel Corp.
Bear Sterns Cos Inc.
Brooklyn Union Gas Co.
Anheuser Busch Cos Inc.
Chrysler Corp.
Computer Association International Inc. 
Furs Bishops Cafeterias 
ConAgra Inc.
CalFed Inc.
Cannon Group Inc.
Carter Wallace Inc.
Caterpillar Inc.
Caesars World Inc.
Cooper Industries Inc.
CBS Inc.
Cabot Corp.
Commodore International Ltd.
Capital Cities ABC inc.
Commercial Cr. Co.
Coca Cola Enterprises Inc.
Citicorp
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APPENDIX B
Derivation of Serial Covariance 
Allowing Changes in the Spread
Based on Stoll (1989), consider that the spread 
changes at time t, and let dS= St-S,^, dPt=Pt -Pt-i then the 
joint distribution of successive transaction price changes 
may be shown as follows. The notation BB here refers to 
that a bid price is followed by a bid price.
dPt
Initial Trade Initial Trade
at Bid at Ask
BB BA AA AB
6* (1-6)* 6* (1-6)* 
(-Sfi-dS/2) (S^+dS/2) (St_i+dS/2) (-Sfi-dS/2)
BB -6S (1-JT)2 0 0 7T (1—7T)
BA (1-6) S 7r(l-JT) 7r
dpt+i
AA 6S W (1“ 7T ) (1“7r) ‘
AB -(1-6)S 0 7T (1-7T)
Then
covP = (l-7r)z62(StSt.1+StdS/2)-7Tz(l-6)2(StSt-1+StdS/2)
= (StSt+StSt_1)/2* (62 (1-2JT) —7T (1-26))
If dS is random and small, then the equation reduces to 
Equation (III).
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